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ABSTRACT 
CHANGING CONTEXT, CHANGING OPPORTUNITIES: 
THE POLITICAL EVOLUTION OF THE ROMAN 
CATHOLIC CHURCH IN POST -COMMUNIST 
POLAND AND SLOVENIA, 1992 - 2005 
Krista F. Baker 
The sweeping social, political, and economic changes that occurred over the 
period from 1992 to 2005 in Poland and Slovenia tested the Roman Catholic Church with 
a new structure of opportunities for and constraints upon political activity. The aim of this 
study was to discover how this shifting political opportunity structure affected the 
Church's ability to take part in the post-Communist political process. The relatively 
volatile nature of Polish politics, combined with a religiously adherent, yet somewhat 
skeptical, society presented the Polish Church with a political opportunity structure that 
was often variable, yet predominantly favourable for the Church. This allowed the Church 
to make considerable political gains. In contrast, the Slovene Church faced a remarkably 
different context than its Polish counterpart. A relatively stable political system and 
openly skeptical Slovene society presented few openings to the Church to attain a 
significant influence in politics and, aside from a few state concessions in the early 2000 , 
the Church was shut out of politics. 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
The former Communise countries of Central and Eastern Europe have undergone a 
period of profound economic, political, and social development over the last 16 years. This 
transition/ exemplified by the attempt to replace the rigid control of the former regimes 
with democracy and free markets, has shown varying success across the region. Often, 
such times of intense change provide a variety of actors, both powerful and weak, with 
opportunities to make an impression on the system which evolves during the 
transformation. However, the nature of each national context, exemplified in its political 
opportunity structure, determines which actors are presented with viable opportunities for 
influence. 
Several indications of regenerating religious power in Poland, including the Polish 
Solidarity movement's use of religious symbolism in its political struggles and the Roman 
1 The use of the tern1 "conununist" is not intended to imply that all of the regimes in this region 
fit within one catch-all definition of Conununism. It is widely used in the literature that stu die the 
politics of this region and it is this wide recognition of the term that necessitates its use. 
2 Although considerable debate revolves around the use of the tern1 "transition" to describe the 
process of political change in the Soviet Union and East-Central Europe during the late 1980s and early 
1990s, few alternatives are available which have entered widespread usage. Therefore, this tenn will refer 
to the "interval between an authoritarian political regime and a democratic one." This is not confined to 
the period between the breakdown of authoritarianism and the first fully free elections. Rather, the 
transition period persists beyond that time because of the myriad of pressing issues which confront elites, 
the indefinite nature of the e issues, the uncertainty surrounding the endpoints of the reforn1 process, and 
the necessity of finding solutions by compromise. Helga A. Welsh, "Political Transition Processes in 
Central and Eastern Europe," Comparative Politics 26, no. 4 ( 1994): 380-383. 
2 
Catholic Church's3 active participation in Polish transitional politics, suggested that the 
atheistic facade of the Communist state hid a surviving, and often thriving, religious 
society. Similar, but less intense, hopeful signs in other central and east European nations 
also fed into the idea that this region was in the midst of a religious renewal in both private 
and public life. Simultaneously, the governing Communist parties, under significant 
economic and political strain, lost their monopolistic hold on power, thereby providing a 
large opening for new actors to attain influence over the development of the new system 
and the policies which emerged. Thus, religious organizations, including the Roman 
Catholic Church, which had traditionally been powerful actors in many nations prior to the 
institution of Communist rule, were presented with the possibility of restoring their power 
in the religious and political arenas. But, how would the structure of individual national 
contexts affect the Church's opportunities to influence the transformation and reclaim a 
prominent role in their nation's life? 
The Roman Catholic Church once held a prominent position in a number of east-
central European states, but two states, Poland and Slovenia, are of particular interest to 
this study. First, although Poland and Slovenia are separated by considerable distance 
within Europe, these two states represent the success stories of the democratic 
transformation; neither has achieved a perfect democratic or economic system, but their 
progress toward that goal has been greater than most other countries in the region. In 
3 For the sake of convenience, the Roman Catholic Church will be referred to as either the 
Roman Catholic Church, the Catholic Church or, simply, the Church, for the remainder of this thesis. 
3 
addition, each country has received approval from the West, signified by their induction 
into both NATO and the EU early in this decade. Most importantly, in both of these 
countries, the Roman Catholic Church commanded a significant role in political life before 
World War ll, after which Communist victories transformed state structures such that they 
were officially dedicated to the diminishment of religion in favour of an atheistic society, 
loyal only to the state and the officially sanctioned way of life. Also, Roman Catholicism 
has continued to be the dominant religion in each nation, claiming a majority of the 
population as adherents. These similarities, although superficial, suggest that these two 
contexts are suitable for comparative study. 
At the same time, divergence between the Church's position in each developing 
polity suggests that deeper differences exist between the Polish and Slovene contexts that 
govern the political opportunities available to each national Church. In Poland, where the 
changeover in power was characterized by a great deal of dissension between the 
opposition and the Communists and, as well, the Church was an active supporter of the 
opposition and a major political player during the dying days of the Communist regime, the 
Church rode a wave of success into the political transition, committed to using its high 
status to attain political influence. This contrasts sharply with the situation in Slovenia, 
where the Church was a minor voice in the political realm, dwarfed by the consensus 
between the Communists and civil society about the necessity for reform and political 
independence from Yugoslavia. As each national Church entered the transition in a 
different position - the Polish Church experiencing many opportunities for power and 
4 
influence and the Slovene Church possessing fewer opportunities- how did both situational 
and enduring features of each context serve to exacerbate the divergence or create a degree 
of convergence between each Church's position as the democratic order consolidated? 
A Preview of the Analysis 
The purpose of this thesis is to provide an analysis of the most significant factors, 
both situational and enduring, which form the Church's national context and thus its 
political opportunity structure, thereby regulating the Church's ability to take part in the 
post-Communist political process. This will reveal how new openings in the system, a 
changing society, and the development of the democratic state create a dynamic, changing 
context that either clears the way or raises obstacles on the Church's path to political 
influence during the time period stretching from approximately 1991 to 2005. Other, more 
enduring features of the state and mechanisms for dealing with non-state actors will also 
demonstrate the influence of context. This means that the Church's political power, in 
terms of its ability to influence politics to produce a desirable outcome, relies not only on 
the political strategies of its leadership, but also on the fortuitous confluence of various 
contextual variables to form a favourable political opportunity structure. In each national 
context, the Church initially encounterd a different configuration of opportunities and 
constraints. In Poland, the Church initially confronted a highly favourable context, but the 
development and consolidation of the political system altered this context, weakening the 
Church's influence. Regardless, the Church remains a formidable presence on the Polish 
political scene. In contrast, the Slovene context was relatively constant in its closure to 
- ---------------
5 
significant political input from the Church. Consequently, the Polish Church retained its 
strength as an institution, holding many opportunities to influence the system, while the 
Slovene Church remained weakened, maintaining only modest political influence. 
Further, this analytical comparison of the Church's situation in both Poland and Slovenia 
will demonstrate that in a transitional context, it is crucial for the Church and other 
interests to pursue the opportunities which are available while other actors in the system 
are in the midst of reorganizing because this is a rare chance to secure a high level of 
influence. This framework, which seeks to explain political events in Poland and Slovenia, 
also has the potential to explain the varying success and failure of the Roman Catholic 
Church and other dominant religions in other post-Communist transitional contexts. It also 
promises to show that theoretical concepts which have been seldom used to study an 
established religious organization such as the Roman Catholic Church are useful when 
applied to novel applications. 
Summary 
The nature of democratic transition and consolidation in eastern and central Europe 
over the last two decades provided unusual opportunities for political activity and 
influence, particularly for religious organizations, which were sidelined from decision-
making processes during the Communist period. To discover how this type of context 
interacts with the ambitions of a religious organization, this thesis will compare the 
influence of both dynamic and stable contextual variables on the Roman Catholic Church's 
potential for and ability to achieve political influence in the countries of Poland and 
6 
Slovenia during the most of the post-Communist period with the goal of applying novel 
concepts to the analysis. Therefore, not only should this thesis explain the Church's 
situation in both countries, it should also provide a basic framework for analyzing majority 
religious institutions in other transitional contexts. 
- ------
CHAPTER2 
REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE 
Before this comparative examination of the Roman Catholic Church's context in 
Poland and Slovenia begins, it is valuable to explore various scholarly perspectives on a 
selection of relevant topics. This review begins by considering works pertaining to issues 
in religious and general Church politics, gradually evolving to examine specific issues in 
Church politics in Poland and Slovenia. In order to understand the basic concepts that 
underlie the interaction between religion and politics, a small sample of relevant concepts is 
considered. From that point, the focus shifts to the Roman Catholic Church and some 
recent perspectives on its political role in the modem world. This consideration, outside of 
a specific national context, is intended to highlight themes and ideas that are relevant to the 
Polish and Slovene cases, especially those which arise from the transnational dimensions of 
Catholicism. In the most substantial portion of the review, the discussion converges on the 
Roman Catholic Church's role in two specific post-Communist contexts- Poland and 
Slovenia. This section is divided into separate discussions of first, Poland, second, 
Slovenia, and third, comparative studies of the east-central European region that include 
both countries. The fmal portion defines the main theoretical concept employed in this 
study to delineate the Church's context, political opportunity or, as it is often known, 
political opportunity structure (POS), by perusing some of the major literature on this 
topic. 
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The Power of Churches in Politics 
In the past, across Europe, religious denominations dominated not only the moral 
and religious lives of their adherents, but also the political life of a nation. The modern 
liberal state tried to curb this level of religious influence in politics by using legal measures 
to explicitly situate religion in the private and politics in the public spheres of life. 1 
Another distinction between religion and politics tries to differentiate between the two 
based on how each organizes human existence; the religious is defined by morality and 
spirituality, while the political is defined by opposing world view.2 However, despite this 
attempt to construct a barrier between religion and politics, religion and politics continue to 
interact across these artificially-defined realms. Because of this interaction and the nature 
of contemporary civil society, which allows the mingling of politics and morality, Inglis 
argues that civil society has become the arena fro religious influence on political life.3 
Although this idea i~ intriguing, religious institutions still enjoy channels of access in the 
democratic system that circumvent civil society. Further, the spiritual nature of religious 
identity confounds conventional conceptions of civil society, which are otherwise capable 
1Jose Casanova, Public Religions in the Modern World. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
1994), 40-4 1. 
2 Tom Inglis, "Understanding Religion and Politics," in Religion and Politics: East- West 
Contrasts /Yom Contemporary Europe, eds. Tom Inglis, Zdzislaw Mach, and Rafal Mazanek, (Dublin: 
University College Dublin Press, 2000), 3. 
3 fbid., 3-4. 
of placing other types of organizations into this sphere.4 Thus, religious organizations 
represent a conundrum in modern democratic societies by failing to fit into easily defined 
categories; they are simultaneously part of civil society, yet somehow separate. 
Religious organizations translate their unique qualities into political power by 
utilizing their linkage to both the spiritual and the political orders. First, the collective 
dimensions of religious membership provide schemas for interpreting the world,5 thereby 
shaping perceptions of political reality among adherents. But, simultaneously, "religious 
identities are subject to individual, collective, and institutional construction and 
reconstruction."6 In this way, the prism through which adherents in a particular society 
view their context is also shaped by factors that lie beyond the control of institutional 
religion. Second, religious organizations act as pressure groups and organize for or 
against state policies, according to their own interests. 7 Religious organizations acting as 
pressure groups 
may employ a variety of tactics, including (a) lobbying the executive 
apparatus of the State; (b) going to court; (c) building links with political 
parties; (d) forming alliances with like-minded groups, whether secular or 
from other religions; (e) mobilizing their followers to protest, and/or (f) 
4 Susanne Hoeber Rudolph, "Dehomogenizing Religious Formations," in Transnational Religion 
and Fading States, eds. Susanne Hoeber Rudolph and James Piscatori (Boulder: Westview Press, 1997) 
246. 
5 Jeff Haynes, Religion in Global Politics (New York: Addison-Wesley Longman Ltd., 1998), 5. 
6 Hoeber Rudolph, " Dehomogenizing Religious Fon11ations," 246. 
7 Haynes, 6-7. 
9 
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seeking to sensitize public opinion through the mass media.8 
Based upon these activities, religious denominations appear to have the same range of 
tactics available to them as other pressure groups, but religious denominations also sponsor 
a variety of issue-oriented pressure groups that pursue specific goals, adding to their 
strength as a political interest. 
In this era of 'globalization,' religion has an increased ability to move beyond state 
boundaries. Although many religious organizations, in the past, have spanned the world 
and had millions of adherents, profound changes in technologies and societies have also 
integrated states into a larger global community. According to Casanova, the forces of 
globalization make religious relationships more relevant, such that religion has become an 
organizing factor that unifies both within and beyond the nation-state.9 Esposito and 
Watson see the unifying aspects of religion as an advantage for religious organizations. 
Globalization offers an opportunity for religious organizations to effect political change 
because while an individual state's ability to control its own territory has deteriorated, 
religious organizations often have structures which transcend state boundaries, expanding 
communication among groups located in different regions and in that way facilitating 
concerted action on a larger territorial scale. 10 This ties into the capacity of religious 
8 Haynes, 8. 
9 Casanova, "Religion, the New Millennium, and Globalization," Sociology ofReligion 62, no. 4 
(200 I): 428-43 1. 
10 John L. Esposito and Michael Watson, "Overview: The Significance of Religion for Global 
Order," in Religion and Global Order, eds. John L Esposito and Michael Watson (Cardiff: University of 
11 
organizations to behave as pressure groups, expanding their reach beyond a single state, to 
larger groups of states and the world. Thus, religious organizations have great potential 
and capacity to make large-scale political gains. 
The Roman Catholic Church as a Political Actor 
As one of the largest and most prominent religious organizations in the world, the 
Roman Catholic Church has demonstrated its potential to affect politics at both the national 
and international level throughout its history, possessing many of the attributes of global 
religion espoused by the previous authors. The field of politics is opened to the Church by 
the hierarchy' s interpretation of Roman Catholicism's "religious mission to be a sacrament 
of God's reign." 11 The Church is often required to participate in politics so that it may 
"defend human dignity and human rights, promote human unity, and help people find 
meaning .. . not ... in the quest for power, wealth, or prestige, or on behalf of any 
ideology."12 Additionally, the Church simultaneously exists a both a national organization 
in states around the world and as a transnational religious and political organization, 
providing it with several sources of political strength. First, the hierarchical arrangement of 
the Church means that the Roman Catholic Church draws strength from the formality of its 
structure, while taking advantage of the spread of its institutionally-supported 
Wales Press, 2000), 2 1-24; 33-34. 
11 Kenneth R. Himes, O.F.M., "Vatican II and Contemporary Politics," in The Catholic Church 
and the Nation-State: Comparative Perspectives, eds. Paul Christopher Manuel, Lawrence C. Reardon, 
and Clyde Wilcox (Washington D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 2006), 23-24. 
12 Ibid., 23. 
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organizations. 13 This increases the Church's ability to pursue political influence at the tate 
level, as well as at the global level. Uniquely, among religions, the Roman Catholic Church 
is also 'state-like', with its own diplomacy, centre of government, bureaucracy, and system 
of rules. Its participation in international politics as a state, guided by the Church's 
visibility, image, and importance in global politics, allows the Church to maintain 
diplomatic relations with a multitude of states, while simultaneously existing as a religious 
organization within those states. 14 The Church's duality therefore provides an opportunity 
to pressure a state on the inside and from the outside. 
The Church adopted a new approach to the modern state during the 1960s with the 
Vatican II and its declaration of Dignitatis Humanae, the right of the individual to religious 
freedom. This initiated a process in which the Church came to oppose regimes which 
violated individual freedoms, even if those regimes maintained formal relations with the 
Church.15 Thus, the Church shifted its allegiance from authoritarian government to 
constitutional government. 16 This transformed the Church from "the paradigmatic form of 
13 Hoeber Rudolph, 255-256. 
14 Jose Casanova, "Global Catholicism and the Politics of Civil Society," Sociological Inquiry 
66, no. 3 ( 1996): 358. 
15 Andrzej Flis, "The Catholic Church and Democracy in Modem Europe," Religion and 
Politics: East-West Contrasts From Contemporary Europe, eds. Tom Inglis, Zdzislaw Mach, and Rafal 
Mazanek (Dublin: University College Dublin Press, 2000), 45-46. 
16 Charles E. Curran, "Roman Catholic Christianity," in God 's Rule: The Politics of World 
Religions, ed. Jacob Neusner (Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 2003),76-78. 
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antimodern pub I ic religion"17 to a key player in the democratization of authoritarian states 
from the 1970s onward, known as the 'Third Wave' of global democratization. Casanova 
considers the Church's role in these events to be so significant that he refers to the 'Third 
Wave' as the 'Catholic Wave.' 18 However, this move disentangled Church and state from 
each another to such an extent that the Church was transposed to civil society. 19 According 
to Casanova, the Church's evolution allows it to serve as the moral conscience for states 
caught in the throes of globalization, encouraging societies to reflect on their political, 
economic, and social development such that they can moderate some of the negative effects 
of economic globalization.20 Thus, in this sense the Church's move toward support of 
human rights and democracy can be viewed as a positive development because it can 
continue to serve society even when its privileged position vis-a-vis the state has been 
eroded. 
Conversely, the Church's role as moral conscience often leads to conflict with 
democratic principles. The Church's separation from the state was also a separation from 
the privileged position of power that it had held in many authoritarian systems. This forces 
the Church to pursue its objectives constrained by democratic government and public 
17 Jose Casanova Public Religions in the Modern World, 8-9. 
18 Jose Casanova, "Civil Society and Religion: Retrospective Reflections on Catholicism and 
Retrospective Reflections on Islam," Social Research 68, no. 4 (200 I): I 041 -1 042; Jose Casanova, 
"Global Catholicism and the Politics of Civil Society," Sociologicallnquby 66, no. 3 (1996): 356-357. 
19 Casanova, Public Religions in the Modern World, 62-63. 
20 Jose Casanova, "Civil Society and Religion: Retrospective Reflections on Catholicism and 
Prospective Reflections on Islam,"I048-1049. 
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optruon. When prevailing public opinion and the Church's goals clash, the Church's 
ambitions cause it to pursue activities which are antagonistic to democratic development 
and increase the Church's distance from contemporary democratic culture.21 Further, the 
Church's rigid stance on some issues prevents its message from attaining a broad appeal in 
many societies.22 This leads Flis to contend that "in its obsessive 'dream of power' the 
Roman Curia has alienated itself, probably for ever, not only from western secular culture, 
but from Christianity."23 In this sense, we see the Church adopting a dual stance toward 
democracy. On the one band, democracy is supported because it serves the principles of 
human rights, while on the other, democracy is disdained when it fails to serve the 
objectives of the Church. 
The Church 's prominent role in political change in eastern Europe, especially 
Poland, during the late 1980s and early 1990s, encouraged Pope John Paul II to aspire to a 
prominent role for the Catholic Church in these states.24 Although the Church possesses 
vast material and moral resources, this vision was unrealistic for a number of reasons. 
First, tension between the centre and the periphery in the Church leads to different 
interpretations and applications of Church goals: 
21 Flis, 46-48. 
22 Jose Casanova, "Globalizing Catholicism and the Return to a Universal Church," in 
Transnational Religions and Fading States, eds. Susanne Hoeber Rudolph and James Piscatori (Boulder: 
Westview Press, 1997), 13 7. 
23 Flis, 48. 
24 Timothy A. Byrnes, Transnational Catholicism in Postcommuni t Europe (Lanham, MD: 
Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, 200 I), 3-6. 
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As national conferences of bishops take an active role in defining national issues, 
there emerges a dynamic tension between Roman and national centralization. Such 
a tension accounts for both the globalization of a Catholic position on many issues 
as well as the particular reflections that the general Catholic position assumes in any 
given national context.25 
Policies formulated at the Vatican are tempered not only by national Churches, but also the 
particular circumstances within each society.26 As a result, the Church is a transnational 
actor constrained by the unique circumstances of each country. 27 Also, regulatory laws 
have been enacted in many states to limit the relationship between church and state, define 
the status of religious organizations, and control the growth of religious organizations.28 
Moreover, religious organizations' attempts to influence politics through support of 
political parties and pursuit of other avenues of influence have aroused the suspicion among 
political elites and citizens that religious organizations are attempting to dominate political 
discourse.29 Further, dominant religious faiths, especially Roman Catholicism, are facing 
threats to their traditional cultural role from the influx and diversity of ideas that have 
penetrated east-central Europe since the breakup of the communist monopoly on power in 
25 Jose Casanova, "Globalizing Catholicism and the Return to a Universal Church,"l36. 
26 Byrnes, Transnational, 18- 19. 
27 Byrnes, Transnational, 24. 
28 Vedran Horvat, "Church in Democratic Transition Between the State and the Civil Society," 
Religion in Eastern Europe 24, no. 2 (2004 ): 1- 18 [online] . Available from 
http://www .georgefox .edu/academi cs/u ndergrad/ departments/soc-swk/ree/2004/horvat. pdf Internet: 
accessed I March 2005, 4-5; Irena Borowik, "Religion and Religious Conflict in Contemporary Eastern 
Europe," in The Future ofReligion. East and West. eds. Irena Borowik and Przemyslaw Jablonski 
(Krakow: NOMOS, 1995), 148-152. 
29 Borowik, "Religion and Religious Conflict in Contemporary Eastern Europe," 148- 152. 
16 
1989.30 Therefore, it is clear that the Church faces a number of challenges as it adapts itself 
to contemporary democratic politics in east-central Europe, but the Church's most 
significant challenge is to balance its goals with those of the democracies in which it 
operates. 
Confronting Change: The Roman Catholic Church in Post-1989 Poland 
Almost immediately after the Round Table negotiations between the opposition and 
the Communist authorities in 1989 and the subsequent formation of the transitional 
government, the Church's role in the new political order became a topic of intense interest 
for academics and many others. This interest has continued, perhaps even grown, such that 
a large number of studies exist. However, despite the amount of studies, many are 
repetitive such that this review considers a select group that represents the majority of 
these works, as well as those that are unique. The analyses in these studies cover a wide 
variety of topics, ranging from discussions ofthe Church's social and religious functions to 
discourses about its various political roles. Many authors focus on the behaviour of 
Church officials, the structure of the Church, and the political activities of the Church, to 
discern how the Church sees its role in democratic Poland and, then, proceed to evaluate 
the Church's political success by comparing the difference between intention and reality. 
Some also consider the Church's environment as an important influence over the Church's 
status in Poland, but almost always as a minor focus. Therefore, this is very much a 
30 Zdzistaw Mach, "The Roman Catholic Church and the Transfonnation of Social Identity in 
Eastern and Central Europe," in New Religious Phenomena in Central and Eastern Europe, eds. Irena 
Borowik and Grzegorz Babinski (Krakow: NOMOS, 1997), 65-66. 
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discourse about the internal workings of the Church and how the Church's intentions 
interact with its environment. 
Reaching for the Inconceivable: 
The Church's Expectations for Democratic Poland 
After the Round Table talks of 1989, Poland became a fledgling democratic state; a 
goal that so many, including the Church, had fought to realize. Now that Communism bad 
been vanquished what would the Church look for from democratic Poland? Many 
observers share a common assumption that Church officials were certain that once the 
shackles of the Communist state were removed the Church could expand its influence in 
society and politics. Although this idea is both implicit and explicit in a number ofworks/ 1 
it is most evident in Pasini's examination of the Church's political strategy. Pasini asserts 
that the Church's approach to democratic politics bas been formulated around two main 
goals: ( 1) "influence the development of a new sociopolitical system based on its [the 
Church's] interpretations of Christian Values," and (2) "sustain the broad-based support 
and influence they [the Church] had as the linchpin of civil society under communism."32 
To achieve these objectives, the Church applies a three-pronged strategy: (1) intensify the 
Church's meaning to society and its parishioners by initiating internal structural changes 
31 According to Byrnes, "consolidation of the victory over communism involved two closely 
related projects: the deepening of the Church's institutional viability and independence, and its ability to 
shape public policy." Byrnes, "The Polish Church: Catholic Hierarchy and Polish Politics," I 06. 
32 Rebecca Ann Pasini, "The Political Strategy of the Roman Catholic Church in Post-Communist 
Poland," (Ph.D. diss., fndiana University, 1996), I. 
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and by raising adherents' comprehension of Catholic values; (2) attempt to impress 
Catholic values on Poland's emerging legal system, mostly on moral issues such as 
abortion, contraception, and education; (3) ensure that the Church's role remains stable as 
the system evolves by securing constitutional provisions, as well as constitutional 
incorporation of the Concordat.33 Thus, the Church intended to leave its mark on almost 
all aspects ofPoland's development and to secure its own position as an influential player 
in the system. However, the Church's strategy bas only shown partial success: 
[I]n spite of the legislative passage of much of its policy agenda ... it [the 
Church] is clearly losing the much larger and in the long run more 
significant battle for the support and understanding of Polish society.34 
Pasini 's analysis shows the Church as a self-interested actor, striving to satisfy its own 
goals, even against the popular will. Is this self-interest motivated by a concern with the 
continuity of Roman Catholicism and its attendant value system or with the continuity of 
the institution itself? · 
Osa provides a different perspective about the Church's political intentions and 
actions in the post-Communist era. She disputes the two leading hypotheses that seek to 
understand the Church's motives for influencing politics and society, instead positing that 
the Church aspires to ultimately effect political culture rather than politics. The two 
disputed hypotheses take for granted that the Church must engage in politics, but explain 
33 fbid., 6-7. After Pasini composed her thesis, the Constitution and the Concordat were finally 
passed in 1997. 
34 Ibid., 287. 
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the Church's motivations as either self-interested or divinely-motivated.35 Alternatively, 
Osa, based upon her research into the Church's past in Communist Poland, makes the 
following proposition: 
In the course of adapting to the changing social, political, and economic 
conditions brought about by state/regime formation ... religious 
organization is reinstitutionalized; in so doing, the church repositions itself 
in the political sphere and redefines its place in the new, emerging political 
culture.36 
This process is characterized by three phases: organizational adaptation, political 
accommodation, and pastoral mobilization. Organizational adaptation, characterized by 
altering the structure of the Church's institution to compensate for contextual 
transformation, is essential for the survival of the institution.37 Next, political 
accommodation, signifies the process whereby the Church compromises with the political 
powers to obtain resources necessary for the Church to sustain itself.38 Finally, pastoral 
mobilization, marked by "programs designed to strengthen the church-society link by 
involving believers in intensive religious activities"39 involves the most strident political 
35 Maryjane Osa, "Ecclesiastical Reorganization and Political Culture," Polish Sociological 
Review 3, no. Ill (1995): 194. 
36 Ibid., 206. 
37 Following World War II, this first phase, organizational adaptation, began when the Church 
reorganized its dioceses to acconm1odate the border changes of the Polish state. Ultimately, the Church 
was less vulnerable to repression from the authorities because of its altered structure. Ibid., 195-197. 
3
M Osa find that the Church previously engaged in this process when it accommodated the 
Communist political order in return for concessions from the state. Ibid., 197- 198. 
39 Ibid., 198. 
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claim-making. It demonstrates society's endorsement of the Church and its ideals and, by 
implication, society's disapproval of the political regime.40 Osa applies this process to 
contemporary Polish politics and finds that the Church has failed to engage in this adaptive 
process. Instead, during the political transition, the Church successfully engaged elites on 
both sides of the divide to gain advantages; however the Church cannot sustain its influence 
based on this elite-centred, overtly political phenomenon.41 Thus, the Church needs to 
replicate its efforts during the Communist period and adaptation to its new context once 
again.42 Osa' s analysis is concerned with process and structure over intentionality, 
avoiding the multitude of potential pitfalls involved in trying to extrapolate intentions from 
activities. She also makes it clear that the Church needs to adapt itself to the reality of its 
context and seek subtle means of influencing political culture instead of pursuing lofty, 
perhaps unobtainable goals in democratic politics. 
Did the Church expect too much from Polish democracy and reach too far in its 
pursuit of its goals to make Poland a Roman Catholic state? Was it truly inconceivable that 
the Church would accomplish all of its goals? As events unfolded and the Polish state 
continued to develop, the Church experienced a mixture of results and a troubling picture 
40 Pastoral mobilization was evident under the leadership of Cardinal Wyszynski during the 
planning of the Great Novena of the Millennium celebrations, ten year long celebrations, from 1956 to 
1966, to commemorate one thousand years of Polish Catholicism. The event consisted of mass public 
gatherings, the procession of icons, masses, and many other ritual gatherings. This resulted in a large-
scale mobilization of Poles. Ibid., 198; 202-205. 
41 Tbid., 206-207. 
42 Ibid., 207. 
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began to emerge. 
The Church in Action: 
Defining the Church's Role in Polish Politics 
In an early evaluation of the Church's political situation Morawska points out that 
Church's essential goal has remained consistent throughout most of its history; to preserve 
the institutional Church by means of the diffusion of Catholic values throughout Polish 
society.43 During the communist era, the Church exploited the association between 
Catholicism and nationalism such that Poles filtered the Church's behaviour through a 
patriotic lense, leading to the false perception that the Church was the sole defender of the 
Polish nation.44 In the immediate period after 1989, the Church enjoyed more freedom and 
greater political power because it was able to exploit Poles' perceptions of its role during 
the Communist era and politicians required its input into the political process to stabilize 
the new system.45 The strength of the Church's political power at that time is indicated by 
its victories in the areas of religious education and abortion.46 Nevertheless, at the time of 
this article's publication in 1995, Morawska perceives a growing discontent over the extent 
43 Ewa Morawska, "The Polish Roman Catholic Church Unbound: Change of Face or Change of 
Context," in Can Europe Work? Germany and Reconstruction of Poslcommunist Societies, eds. Stephen 
E. Hanson and Willifried Spohn (Seattle: Washington University Press, 1995), 48; 50-53. 
44 fbid ., 52-56. 
45 Ibid., 61-62. 
46 Ibid., 62-64. 
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of the Church's political influence.47 This is connected to Poles' increasing disengagement 
from Catholicism, part of an inevitable tendency toward secularization that was postponed 
by the Communist period.48 Also, policies which prioritize Catholicism's moral values over 
individual rights arouse suspicion among Poles, especially as the Church appears to be 
critical of the democratic state.49 Accordingly, the Church's right to interfere in politics, 
based on its association with the definition of Polishness, is no longer so easily accepted by 
either society or politicians as it was during the initial period of the transition. In this 
analysis, changes in the political and civil environment undermine the extent of the 
Church's power in the post-communist period; as society transforms and follows a path 
that was disrupted by communism, the Church's ability to influence Poles attenuates. 
Moreover, the Church's activities create a reaction in society and politics that further 
undermines the Church's power. 
Similarly to the previous authors, Eberts argues that, early in the transition era, the 
Church's high political status gave its leaders the confidence to demand a political role for 
the Church.50 The Church's agenda called for Polish democracy to reflect the Church 's 
moral teachings in its decision-making processes, thereby requiring a close relationship 
47 [bid., 66-67. 
4H Ibid., 68. 
49 [bid., 65-67. 
50 Mirella W. Eberts, "The Roman Catholic Church and Democracy in Poland." Europe-Asia 
Studies 50, no. 5 (1998) : 819-820. 
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between the religious and the political.51 The realization of this agenda is evident in the 
state's decision to reinstate religious education in Polish schools, subject to substantial 
Church influence and control, and also in the passage of an extremely restrictive abortion 
law, which the Church has vehemently defended from subsequent attempts at 
liberalization.52 The Church has not confined its political interference to issue-oriented 
lobbying, broadening its activities to have widespread effects on government and society. 
First, the Church has engaged in blatant interference in party politics, supporting certain 
parties and denouncing others, mostly on an unofficial level, from the pulpits of local 
churches. 53 Also, the morality of the Polish media receives a great deal of attention from 
the Church. Control of the media's content features high on the Church' s list of priorities, 
which Eberts contends is a form of Catholic censorship.54 Even though the Church 
achieved great gains in particular areas of policy, such as religious education and abortion, 
and it aggressively pursues broader areas of influence, it seems to have already reached the 
peak of its power. As Polish democracy consolidates and secularization continues, the 
Church's strong role will diminish and the Church's views will be less likely to form an 
integral part of state policy.55 Consequently, it appears that the Church's level of influence 
51 Ibid., 83 1-836. 
52 Ibid., 822-826. 
53 Ibid., 826-830. 
54 Ibid., 831. 
55 Ibid., 838. 
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is fated to decrease. 
Byrnes, through several different works, manages to put a slightly different spin on 
the previous themes. He contends that the enduring connection between Roman 
Catholicism and Polish nationalism, even if somewhat weakened, as well as the work of 
Karol Wojtyla, Pope John Paul II, even posthumously, have and continue to provide the 
Church with a basis to assume a public role. 56 The Church utilized its power during the 
first decade of Polish democracy to secure its position, mainly through the protection of its 
special status in the new Constitution and the ratification of a Concordat. 57 The Church 
demanded that Roman Catholic values be incorporated at the heart of Poland's democracy 
in the 1997 Polish Constitution; 58 however, the Church only achieved partial victories on 
some of the language and, ultimately, moral law was not elevated above constitutional 
law. 59 The separate document governing Church-state relations, the Concordat, which was 
approved as an attachment to the Constitution, grants the Church a number of legal rights 
56 Byrnes, "The Polish Church: Catholic Hierarchy and Polish Politics," 103; 108. 
57 Timothy A. Byrnes, "The Challenge of Pluralism: The Catholic Church in Democratic 
Poland," in Religion and Politics in Comparative Perspective: The One, the Few, and the Many, eds. Ted 
Gerard Jelen and Clyde Wilcox (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 30-34; Timothy A. 
Byrnes, Transnational Catholicism in Postcommunist Europe (Lanham, MD: RoWlnan and Littlefield 
Publishers, 200 1), 36-4 1; Timothy A. Byrnes, "The Polish Church: Catholic Hierarchy and Polish 
Politics," 106- 107. 
58 Byrnes engages in an extensive discussion of each ofthe Church's demands. These items 
include "a clear reference to God in the Preamble;" "prominent reference to the role of the church in 
Polish history;" constitution should not be declared as "the highest law in the land;" "ban abortion from 
the point of conception;" "declare marriage open only to relationships between a man and woman;" and 
abstain from using "any constitutional language requiring a 'separation ' of church and state in democratic 
Poland." Byrnes, "The Challenge of Pluralism," 30-31. 
59 Ibid., 38. 
and gives it control over a number of activities. 60 But, the level of these concessions 
proved unsatisfactory for the Church, mainly because the entirety of its goals were not 
fulfilled. The Church leadership perceives the Church as a victim because they cannot 
tolerate this level of compromise on the Church's moral mission.61 Later, the issue of 
European integration pulled the Church in two directions as the risk of Poland acquiring 
secular, western values from the EU competed against the hope of restoring Catholic 
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values to the EU.62 In the end, the Church decided to support EU expansion as Pope John 
Paul ll "wanted Poland and the others to join the West in order to transform the West."63 
The increasing sophistication of both state and society create barriers to the Church's 
continuing political involvement because the Church is no longer the sole outlet for 
political expression- multitudes of options exist.64 Nevertheless, Byrnes concludes that the 
Church remains relevant to Polish politics: "[t]he Church in Poland today is ... an 
important organized interest, among many others, that has the historical standing, 
institutional weight, and (still) popular support needed for significant participation in a 
rapidly changing polity."65 Even though Byrnes acknowledges that the Church's attitude 
6{) fbid. , 38-40. 
61 Tbid., 40-41; 46. 
62 Byrnes, "The Polish Church: Catholic Hierarchy and Polish Politics," 110-113. 
63 Tbid., I I 0. 
64 Byrnes, "The Challenge of Pluralism," 46. 
65 Ibid., 52. 
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and the changing environment are impediments to Church power, he still sees the Church 
as a significant political force, endowed with many attributes that make it an essential 
player in Polish politics. 
The preceding analyses have shown that the Church has the ability to influence 
political decisions on single issues, including religious education and abortion, and broader 
policies, including Constitutional reform. The Church's influence is evident in other realms 
as well. For instance, Korbonski utilizes the issue of taxation to demonstrate that the 
Church possesses a substantial amount of power vis-a-vis the state, insofar as it can prevent 
the state from scrutinizing its financial operations. The Church has been reluctant to allow 
its accounts to be inspected by state officials for taxation purposes. 66 At the same time, 
public claims of financial strain appear to be at odds with physical manifestations of the 
Church's wealth: Church buildings, land holdings, precious objects, and clerical 
resources.67 Despite this apparent disparity, Church officials have successfully opposed any 
serious scrutiny of the Church's internal finances and maintained tax exemptions on most of 
the Church's resources; this qualifies as a victory against state regulation.68 Although this 
is a minor issue, it highlights the Church 's power to resist attempts to place it on an equal 
footing with other groups and individuals through the levy of taxes and demonstrates the 
66 Andrzej Korbonski, "Poland Ten Years After: The Church," Communist and Post-Communist 
Studies 33 (2000): 132-133. 
67 Ibid. 133. 
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lack of government constraint on the Church's resource base. This issue also shows that 
the Church has the ability to make state officials retreat from any action which can be 
construed as an attack on the Church. 
The Church also enjoys a comparatively greater level of power vis-a-vis other 
religious organizations and also receives preferential treatment from the state. Pietrzak 
contends that in spite of the enactment of constitutional and legal provisions which 
guarantee religious freedom and regulate the activity of religious organizations, differences 
between religious organizations arise during the application of these legal guarantees. 69 
Often, interpretations of these laws by state officials negatively affect non-Catholic 
religious groups, particularly during the registration process.70 Also, the Catholic Church 
receives proportionately more benefits than other religious organizations, mainly because 
the state is inclined to control new religions and promote cultural traditions.71 This 
deference to the Church is also supported "by the numerical domination of Catholics and 
by the formidable role that the Roman Catholic Church has performed and continues to 
69 According to Pietrzak, three different type of rules are involved: Constitutional, [nternational, 
and legislative. Articles 25 and 53 of the Constitution upport freedom of religion and regulate relations 
between the Catholic Church and the state through a reference to the Concordat. Poland ' participation in 
various international declarations also binds it to respect freedom of religion and religious practice; 
however, the Concordat with the Vatican is the most significant international document, setting out the 
rules of interaction between the Roman Catholic Church and the Polish tate. Finally, Jaws passed in 
Poland's legislature provide for the recognition and regulation ofreligiou organizations through a 
registration process. Michal Pietrzak, "Church and State in Poland," in Law and Religion in Post-
Communist Europe, eds. Silvio Ferrari and W. Cole Durham, Jr. , and assoc. ed. Elizabeth A. Sewell 
(Leuven: Peeters, 2003) 220-22 I; 236-23 7. 
70 Pietrzak, 237. 
71 Ibid., 237. 
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perform in Polish public life, which has reflected on the choices of all administrations after 
1989."72 Despite these and other instances in which the state has acceded to the Church's 
demands, it is apparent throughout the literature that the Church is experiencing difficulties 
in meeting its objectives and gaining the political clout that it desires. This suggests that 
the Church's powerful appearance is merely a facade, hiding a reality that is much different 
and more troublesome for the Church. 
Religious Dysfunction 
The political transition to democracy has also affected the Church's ability to 
control the use of its doctrine and symbols. According to Zubrycki: "[t]he decade 
following the fall of communism has witnessed an unprecedented drop of popularity of the 
Church, as well as a rise in anticlericalism and a crisis within the Church: the monolith is 
breaking into a colorful, clashing mosaic, into a whole that is less than the sum of its 
parts.'m Alternative modes of personal expression, as well as society's condemnation of 
the Church's attempts to assume an overtly political role, have strained relations between 
the Church and its adherents.74 As a result, the divisions between the Church and Polish 
society, which were subsumed in favour of displaying a united front for the opposition 
72 Ibid., 237. 
73 Genivieve Zubrycki, "With or Without the Cross? Nationalism and Religion in Post-
Communist Poland," (Ph.D. diss. , University of Chicago, 2002), 252. 
74 fbid., 252-255. 
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movement, are becoming apparent and affecting Poles' adherence to the Church.75 
Moreover, "Catholic identity, symbols, and acts, were secularized through their 
politicization and ultimate fusion with national identity."76 The controversy over the Papal 
Cross at Auschwitz demonstrates that the Catholic cross became a symbol of Polish 
nationalism.77 Thus, the Church is weakened because its main vehicles of religious 
symbolism have been transferred to the public sphere: 78 in effect, misappropriated for 
political and social applications rather than for religious purposes. 
As a continuation of Zubryck.i 's findings, Zaleck.i demonstrates that Roman 
Catholic clergy and parishioners79 tend to identify the Church's past with opposition, 
nationalism, and patriotism, rather than religion.80 Additionally, Zalecki shows a Church on 
the defensive against perceived threats to its existence. Many clergy perceive that they are 
being maligned by enemies who want to undermine the Church's place in society81 by 
emphasizing the association between the Church and Catholic fundamentalists,82 by blaming 
75 Ibid., 255-26 1. 
76 Ibid., 302. 
77 Ibid. , 289-292. 
?H Ibid., 304. 
79 The data set consisted of in-depth interviews with a sample of representatives from the Roman 
Catholic Church. 
Mo Pawel Zaleck:i, " How the Polish Roman Catholic Church ' s Representatives Explain Decline of 
the Positive Estimations of the Church 's Public Activities," Sociologia 35, no. 6 (2003): 536. 
Ml Ibid., 550-552. 
R2 fbid., 543. 
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the Church for Poland's transitional problems,83 and by stressing the Church's political 
redundancy. 84 They condemn the accuracy of public opinion polling data which casts the 
Church in a negative light and blame the Church's problems on Catholic parishioners who 
misperceive the Church's intentions, and have either abandoned or altered the Church's 
conservative values.85 In this way, Church officials appear to perceive Polish society and 
many of its own parishioners as hostile to the Church and its mission. How can the Church 
possibly fulfill its religious functions when a significant proportion of the leadership is 
suspicious of many of the Church's adherents? It seems unlikely that such an atmosphere is 
conducive to the formation of a strong spiritual bond. Fortunately, some clergy and 
parishioners acknowledge that the Church has many failings: departure from its religious 
mission, inaction on important societal issues, excessive focus on the language of politics, 
and paternalistic attitudes toward the laity.86 Perhaps this acknowledgment of the Church's 
problems promises to help the Church better its connection to its parishioners and thereby 
increase the Church's ability to fulfill its religious functions. 
Pater's work indicates that the Church is attempting to ameliorate some of the root 
causes of its religious disconnection from Poles. To broaden Catholicism's constituency 
and reassert Catholics' links to the institutional Church, the hierarchy has encouraged the 
~J Ibid., 541 -543. 
H4 Ibid., 541 . 
85 Ibid., 538;547;549. 
M6 Ibid., 541 ;545-54 7. 
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creation of organizations such as Catholic Action, Catholic Youth , parjsh lay organizations, 
and the National Council of Lay Catholics, to draw youth and lay-people into the Church, 
as well as to serve as a communicative channel between the laity and the hierarchy.87 
However, along with these efforts, the Church continues to pursue goals consistent with 
the moral regulation of society, clashing with the idea of individual choice which is inherent 
to the democratic state.88 The Church also fails to contain extremists, indicating the 
Church's continuing sympathy for fundamentalism and its desire for political influence.89 
Therefore, despite Pater's account of the Church's efforts, on balance the Church appears 
to have lost some of its ability to fulfill the functions of a religious institution. Perhaps, as 
suggested by the national and political associations of Catholicism, the Church was pulled 
so far into the political arena during the Cornmurust period that it cannot separate its 
religious functions from its political activities. 
Institutional Dysfunction: A Church Divided 
On the outside the Polish Church gives the appearance of a monolithic entity with 
little dissent within its ranks . Large institutions, though, are seldom monolithic and it 
should cause little surprise that a number of authors have managed to fmd evidence of 
conflict within the Church's ranks, expecially around particular issues. Korbonski 's 
M? Dobroslaw Karol Pater, "Grandiose Visions: Changes in the Catholic C hurch in Po land After 
1989," Religion in Eastern Europe 15, no. 4 ( 1995): 5-7. 
MM fbid ., 7 - )1. 
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discussion of ideological divisions within the Polish Church's organization fonns a small 
part of his arguments, yet this discussion is compelling in its revelations of the weaknesses 
within the Church structure itself. Korbonski points out that the united front presented by 
the Church is merely an illusion because, in reality, the hierarchy is split into three groups 
that are divided along ideological lines. 9° Fundamentalists form the largest portion of the 
Church hierarchy, consisting of "older bishops and priests .. . who believe that arrogance 
and aggressive posture, which served them well in the past ... guarantee success in the 
future."91 The second group pursues a more realistic, moderate approach which allows for 
a degree of concession to the state on moral issues.92 Liberals form the last and smallest 
grouping and advocate the reform of Church structures for greater harmony with the 
democratic environment.93 These three groups form a dynamic within the Church that is 
characterized by an indeterminate level of conflict over divergent policy goals. 94 Korbonski 
successfully identifies these groupings, but is unable to present any definitive data about the 
degree of dissension and conflict that occurs around policy issues within the hierarchy. 
Nevertheless, Korbonski raises worthwhile questions about policy uniformity within the 
Church, as well as the Church's ability to cope with dissent in its highest ranks. 
90 Korbonski, l41 - 142. 
91 Ibid., 142. 
92 Ibid., 143. 
93 Ibid. 
94 Ibid., 142- 143. 
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Divisions within the Church hierarchy are further evident in Michlic's discussion of 
Catholic-Jewish relations. Mich)jc reveals similar divisions within the Polish Church, 
which are instead based on Polish integration with the West and the Church's anti-Semitic 
past. Internal divisions are polarized between two groups, which Michlic labels ' the Open 
Church' and 'the Closed Church.'95 The former group is associated with a progressive 
outlook which is characterized by cooperation with the democratic state, openness to the 
rest of Europe, and respect for other spiritual orientations. 96 The latter group is more 
traditional, highly conservative, and very focused on preserving the historical correlates of 
Polish national identity. Consequently, they endorse the Church's role as sole spiritual 
leader in Polish society and refuse to cooperate with other religions, especially Judaism.97 
Michlic's two groups bear a striking resemblance to, respectively, Korbonski 's 
fundamentalists and liberals; the only group missing is Korbonski's moderate group, which 
lies between these two polar groups. Michlic successfully supports her characterization of 
the Church hierarchy with an analysis of the content of Catholic journals. This analysis 
reveals that some journals appear to favour the views of ' the Closed Church,' evident in 
their omission of articles concerning Church reform and conflict with Jews, as well as their 
publication of negative articles. In contrast, others favour the views of 'the Open Church,' 
95 Joanna Michlic, '"The Open Church' and 'the Closed Church' and the discourse on Jews in 
Poland between 1989 and 2000," Communist and Post-Communist Studies 37 (2004): 467. 
% Tbid., 470. 
97 Tbid., 467-468. 
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evident in their publication of articles which openly discuss the same issues.98 Further, 
Micblic also identifies several prominent Church personalities who are associated with each 
group.99 Like Korbonski, Micblic determines that this split exists within the Church, but 
cannot determine the proportions of the hierarchy and the laity which are allied with either 
side. Also, Micblic sees the 'Closed Church' as the proportionately larger group because 
traditional views dominated during the Communist period and more liberal orientations 
only entered the Church after 1989. 100 However, since the late 1990s, the Church bas 
become more open to normal discourse with Jews in Poland, indicating that the ' Open 
Church' may be gaining influence over the Church hierarcby. 101 Michlic asserts that this 
development is an important change for the Church: "[c]hallenging and deconstructing 
these anti-J ewisb prejudices is a crucial process in the elimination of the Closed Church's 
influence on both the clergy and the lay Catholic community at large." 102 In combination 
with Korbonski's argument, Michlic's work raises questions about how much conflict 
exists within the Church that is hidden from public view. Power struggles between 
different factions and ideological groups within the Church threaten the Cburcb's 
cohesiveness and perhaps its effectiveness as a political player. Simultaneously, ideological 
98 Tbid., 467-470. 
99 Michlic briefly discusses several personalities that are known to be associated with each side in 
her article. Ibid. 
100 Ibid., 470. 
101 Ibid., 478. 
102 Ibid., 479. 
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discourse can also move the Church toward progressive policies that resonate with Polish 
society. Because of the closed nature of the Church hierarchy and the consequent difficulty 
of gathering information, it is unlikely that the Church's inner workings will be revealed in 
the immediate future. 
Democracy: Friend or Foe? 
Of all of the facets of the Church's political activities, the widest agreement exists 
about the Church' s uncomfortable relationship with Polish democracy. The nature of this 
relationship, according to Michnik, is one of suspicion: "The Church has assumed a 
position of mistrust toward democracy, while democracy has assumed a position of deep 
distrust toward the Church."103 This antagonism originated in the Communist period when 
Catholics and liberals joined the opposition and created a discourse that contrasted the 
'evil' Communist authorities with the 'good' heroes of the opposition. 104 Although this 
period has been left behind, the Church continues to utilize this antagonistic relationship so 
that it can "take advantage of all the amenities that the democratic order provides . ... [a]t 
the same time, it [the Church] proclaims that the democratic order is bereft of values; hence 
it attempts to impose upon the democratic order its own system ofvalues." 105 In this way, 
the Church continues to cast itself as morally superior to other political actors, even while 
103 Adam Michnik"Church and State in Eastern Europe: The Clean Conscience Trap," East 
European. Constitutional Review 7, no. 2 ( 1998) [online]. Available from 
http://www. law.nyu.edu/eecr/vol7num2/feature/cleanconscience.html Internet: accessed 29 January 2005. 
104 Ibid. 
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it attempts to circumvent the rules of democracy so that its enemies do not gain control of 
government policy; however, continued use of this bipolar characterization stretches 
beyond the limits of credibility. 106 Simultaneously, the Church refuses to assume any hare 
of the blame for Poland's transitional difficulties. Instead, the Church ascribes the blame 
for any lingering difficulties to the Communists and the new "liberal" threat. 107 Thus, it 
appears that the Church' s negative interactions with democracy arise not only from its 
dismay with there ults of democratic processes, but could also be the outward 
manifestation of a concerted strategy which attempts cast the Church in a positive light a 
compared to its opponents, such that the Church deserves the right to interfere in 
democratic processes. In any event, the Church ' s distrust of democracy is clear. 
Anderson proceeds a step further, arguing that the Catholic Church has tremendous 
potential to affect democratization in Poland, mostly because of its rank in society and it 
substantial resources. 108 At the same time, the Church is unable to completely accept 
democracy because its opposition to the democratic system entailed a definition of a 
desirable condition in terms of Roman Catholic values; that is, one where religious 
principles prevail over social structures. 109 Since, by its very nature, democracy requires 
106 Ibid. 
107 Ibid. 
IOK John Anderson, "Catholicism and Democratic Consolidation in Spain and Poland," West 
European Politics 26, no. I (2003): 151 -152. 
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accommodation between groups, it is difficult to ensure that a certain set of values is 
reflected in government policy. This condition is untenable for the Church, since it places 
Roman Catholic values at risk. 110 Therefore, Church attitudes toward democracy seem 
mixed: the principles of democracy are utilized to secure the Church' s position in society as 
the religion of the majority but, simultaneously it promotes the circumvention of majority 
consent on matters concerned with morality. 111 In this sense, the Church is an impediment 
to the consolidation of democracy because it is unwilling to leave decisions to the vagaries 
of an elected assembly, which could decide against the Church. 
Gilarek attributes the Church's tendency to bisect political relations in an absolute 
manner and its inconsistent treatment of democratic rules and procedures to a different 
dimension. According to Gilarek, the Church's approach to contemporary Poland is 
defined by a dichotomy between the old and the new wherein "new inevitably means 
worse." 11 2 By contrasting the current condition of Polish state and society with Polish 
tradition, the Church treats the modem democratic state as problematic and threatening to 
the old ways. This attitude, coupled with the Church's hierarchical structure, moral 
absolutism, and religious dominance, makes the Church look less progressive than religious 
institutions in other contexts to the extent that the Church could threaten Poland' s 
11 0 Ibid. 
Ill Ibid., 152-153. 
112 Katarzyna Gilarek, "Coping with the Challenges of Moderni ty: The Church of England in 
Great Britain and the Catholic Church in Poland," in Church-State Relations in Central and Eastern 
Europe, ed. Irena Borowik (Krakow: Nomos, 1999), 202. 
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democratic restructuring. 113 Commonalities between these two authors' work suggest that 
the Church has a tendency to simplify its political relations into an 'us versus them' 
mentality. 
Like Gilarek, Mach finds the root of the Church's problems in the past, but the 
more recent past. Mach attributes much of the Church's difficulty with democracy to its 
inheritance of a legacy from the communist period that retards its development as a 
political institution. According to Mach: 
the Roman Catholic Church was busy trying to mobilise society against 
Communism, and ... did not have a chance to become an established 
Church with links to government, and ... enjoyed a lot of support and a 
position of moral authority because of its political role, without having to 
influence the state. 114 
In effect, the Roman Catholic Church was able to rely on its prestigious cultural position to 
initiate mobilization against an unwanted presence and thus never developed a large 
repertoire of methods of relating to the state. As a result, the Church was not prepared to 
meet the challenge of contending with other actors who now wanted to take advantage of 
democratic freedoms to communicate their own demands to the state; instead, the Church 
relied on the status and authority it had gained during the Communist period to make 
113 Tn comparison to the Anglican Church in Great Britain, which has adopted a policy of 
negotiation with modem forces, the Catholic Church in Poland looks especially rigid in its views as it 
resists a changing society. Ibid., 202-203 . 
114 Mach, "The Roman Catholic Church and Transformation of Social Identity in Eastern and 
Central Europe," 71. 
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political gains. 115 These gains have not been achieved without sacrifice; the Church has 
merely exchanged its unconventional influence over Polish society for conventional political 
guarantees.116 In the end, this strategy and its results have negative implications for the 
Church's ability to adapt to continuing change. 117 
Moreover, the antithetic relations engendered in communist-era politics have also 
persisted. Mach describes these relations: 
The symbolic political discourse of the Church and anti-state dissidents 
presented society as ideologically polarised into two segments clearly set 
apart and in permanent conflict: the communist, atheistic state and the 
PoUsh, Roman Catholic nation with its Church.118 
This bipolar division lost validity as political transformation ushered in democracy and 
pluralism and exposed the hidden fissures within Polish society. Consequently, the Church 
is no longer the sole resource for citizen advocacy because many groups, both religious and 
secular, now represent a multitude of interests. 11 9 In addition, some Poles, who connected 
with the Church only to express their political opinions, became dissociated from the 
115 Ibid., 75-76. 
116 Ibid., 76. 
117 Ibid., 78-79. 
1 1 ~ Mach also asserts that this division of society was superfic ial: " In this clear and coherent 
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institution, thereby decreasing the Church's number ofadherents. 120 However, the Church 
appears ignorant of these fundamental changes; it is overly-confident in the security of its 
power and assumes that it can influence politics and social construction as it did during the 
Communist period. 121 In this vein, the Church continues to see itself as the defender of 
Polish society and its best interests, regardless of democratic rules and procedures: 
[ o ]n the one hand it argues that the views and interests of the Catholic 
majority should be reflected in state law and policies. On the other hand, 
the Church argues that the principle of majority should not be applied to 
essential questions such as abortion where religious beliefs are involved. 122 
In this sense, the Church's monumental role in political change during the communist 
period has impaired its ability to function in democratic politics and blinded it to the 
realities of a multi-polar system, full of competing interests. 
Similarly, Herbert attributes the current status of Church-state relations to the 
Church's development of a "parallel society" during the Communist period. 123 This may 
have served the Church well at the time, but it prevented the Church from developing 
normal relations with the state. 124 That is, the Church, accustomed to getting its way by 
120 Ibid., 120-21. 
121 Ibid., 121-125. 
122 Ibid., 128. 
123 This parallel society, with the Church at its centre, was constructed in opposition to the 
official communist society desired by Poland's leader during the communist period. David Herbert, 
Religion and Civil Society: Rethinking Public Religion in the Modern World (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2003), 
227-228. 
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appealing to religious symbolism and this parallel society, failed to develop expertise in 
navigating the subtle nuances inherent to relating with a democratic state. Consequently, 
the Church is now learning how to conduct relations with a democratically elected state: a 
new and difficult process. As a natural continuation of this line of argument, Diskin 
recognizes that the Church is out of touch with the changes that have taken place in the 
political system: " it appears to have been easier for the church to face a despotic regime 
lacking any moral base than to face democracy, which it has found threatening and 
potentially dangerous."125 Therefore, the Church engages in what Diskin describes as a 
' religious Cold War,' which has reduced political relations to a battle between the Catholic 
Church and its opponents. 126 Accordingly, the Church does not regard democratic rules as 
applicable to its own goals because some political decisions are related to inflexible 
Catholic principles and, since Roman Catholicism is the declared religion of a majority of 
Poles, should therefore be guaranteed, exclusive of the uncertainty of democratic debate 
and the persuasiveness of opponents.127 Nonetheless, the Church is capable of compromise 
on certain issues, notably Poland's membership in the European Union (EU). 128 Therefore, 
125 Hanna Diskin, Th e Seeds of Triumph: Church and State in Gomulka 's Poland (Budapest: 
Central European University Press, 200 I), 249. 
126 Ibid., 249-250. 
127 fbid., 250. 
128 Diskin argues that the Church's position on EU membership altered considerably since the 
early 1990s. The Church has moved from its initial state of opposition to support for Poland 's inclusion 
in the European Union because the country' s membership is regarded as important to the preservation and 
promotion of Catholic values in Europe. Tbid., 257-258. 
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despite its initial stumbles in the democratic system, the Church is showing some signs of 
adjustment to the new regime; 129 however, the Church ' s continuation of communist-era 
conflicts adds a troubling element to Poland's political discourse. 
Aside from the dominant description of the Church's attitude presented by the 
previous authors, "that the Church supports democracy and democratic decision-making 
processes only as long as the results achieved are in agreement with its position or serve its 
interests,"130 another view of the Church' s problems with democracy also exists. 
According to Szawiel, the Church 's irritation with the democratic system represents its 
objection to democratic rules and procedures rather than the idea of democratic 
governrnent. 131 Szawiel points out that majority rule, or the ability of a majority of citizens 
to have input into political decisions, downplays the importance of tradition and ignores the 
processes that modify this principle when it is put into practice. 132 The oversimplification 
of democracy into nothing more than "appointing governments and reaching binding 
decisions" is also problematic for the Church's spiritual reverence. 133 The Church presents 
an alternative view of democracy: " rather than conceiving democracy procedurally, the 
129 Ibid., 258-259. 
130 Eberts, 836. 
131 Tadeusz Szawiel, "Religion and the Church in the New Democracy," Polish Sociological 
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church conceives it as a system for the implementation of the common good"; 134 however, 
the interpretation ofthis 'common good' is often unspecified, general, and debatable. 135 
Furthermore, democracy has also opened up the political arena to an extent that is 
unprecedented in Polish history, such that the Church must cope with the presence of 
alternative modes of political expression. 136 Poles have other resources at their disposal 
which are unconnected to the Church or Church doctrine. Consequently, the Church 
appears ineffectual; it cannot adjust its methods and policies to the new reality or counter 
the problems associated with the introduction of market reforms, such as increasing 
materialism. 137 Overall, "[t]he church's strategy has been to cope with threats, not to take 
advantage of opportunities .... " 138 This defensive posture lacks the long-term adaptability 
inherent in a more forward-thinking approach. Thus, the Church's continuing political 
relevance is dependent upon the adoption of a positive attitude toward the operation of the 
system. 139 Otherwise, the Church faces political marginalization. 
Summary: The Church in Poland 
The Church had great expectations for Polish democracy to provide it with the 
134 Ibid. 
135 Tbid., 454-456. 
136 Ibid., 456-458. 
137 Tbid., 457. 
m Tbid., 460. 
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means to craft a state that reflects Roman Catholic values. Through the twists and turns of 
the Church's activities in post-Communist Poland, these many works have painted a picture 
of the Church that consistently emphasizes the Church's difficulties coping with the 
political and social changes that have taken place since 1989. Further, the Church, 
represented publicly by Church officials, has openly stated its disappointment with the 
outcomes of democratic decision-making in Poland. Although the Church possesses many 
attributes which make it a significant political actor and it has shown a great ability to 
influence the direction of policy in Poland, many of its achievements occurred early in the 
development of Polish democracy and represented incomplete realizations of the Church's 
goals. Simultaneously, the relationship between society and the Church, traditionally 
strong, has eroded over the post-Communist period such that the Church is no longer 
viewed as the embodiment of Polish nationalism nor are its activities viewed with trust and 
approval. On top of that, the Church's ability to fulfill its religious mission has deteriorated 
and the institution is challenged by a modest, but important debate over the shape of 
Church policy and its future course. Finally, for a number of reasons, the Church has 
experienced a great deal of difficulty adapting to democracy, threatening its long-term 
viability as a political power. The underlying idea that is consistent throughout these 
works, despite disagreements over cause and form, is that the Roman Catholic Church in 
Poland is a powerful, yet troubled institution, unable to cope with its changing 
environment. 
The Church's expectations, intentions, strategies, and activities have been 
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established by these scholarly works; however, this focus on the Church itself minimizes the 
effects of context on the Church's options. Few have focused exclusively on the context as 
it relates to the Church using a substantial explanatory framework. Pursuit of this line of 
investigation may help to explain why the Church's past, present, and future in Polish 
politics are unfolding in a particular manner. So, the questions become, how much 
influence does context have on the Church's political role at any given time and what are 
the most important components of that context? Discovering the answers requires 
somewhat of a departure from the literature, geographically and theoretically. 
Independence and Democracy: The Church 
in Contemporary Slovene Politics 
In Slovenia, the Roman Catholic Church received much less attention from 
academics and scholars. For various reasons, including Slovenia's relatively small size and 
the dramatic events occurring in the other former Yugoslav republics, few works consider 
Slovenia's post-communist development. Even fewer specifically consider the Church's 
role in post-Communist Slovene political development. 
The Church's Plans for Independent, Democratic Slovenia 
As Slovenia emerged from its relatively nonviolent conflict with Yugoslavia in 
1991, becoming both a newly independent state and a newly democratic state, the Church 
needed to determine its goals and how it would achieve them in the new order. The 
Church wasted no time in setting itself a lofty goal. According to Velikonja, the Church's 
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central goal has been to restore itself as a dominant influence in politics and society, 140 
much as it had been prior to World War II. To this end, the Church demands action on 
several contentious moral issues, such as abortion and Church-state separation. 141 At the 
same time, the Church sculpts its own version of reality, by promoting the idea that it is the 
purveyor of the only legitimate moral course in modem Slovenia and by depicting itself, as 
well as its followers as victims of state socialism. 142 In essence, the Church is promoting 
itself as the embodiment of the Slovene nation, even if there are realities which contradict 
such a premise; a strategy which Velikonja views as inherently dangerous to Slovenia's 
development. 143 
Ocvirk adopts a disparate approach to the Church's ambitions in post-communist 
Slovenia, justifying the Church's calls for special consideration as arising naturally from the 
Church's historical role and casting those who deny the importance of the Catholic Church 
as "liberals." 144 He also asserts that the Church has no real interest in interfering with 
140 Mitja Velikonja, "Historical Roots of Sloven ian Christoslavic Mythology," Religion in 
Eastern Europe 19, no. 6 (1999) [on line], available from 
http://www.georgefox.edu/academics/undergrad/departments/soc-swklree/velikonja.htmJ Internet: 
accessed I March 2005. 
141 Ibid. 
142 Ibid. 
143 Ibid. 
144 Ocvirk characterizes " liberals" as intolerant of religion, jealous of the Church's level of 
legitimacy, and an enemy to democracy; he even goes so far as to cast them as communists. In addition 
he also states that the Church is kept from assuming any important role because the "liberals" fear the 
Church's organized power and see the Church as a potential opponent. Drago Ocvirk, "The Problem of 
Proselytizing in Slovenia," Religion in Eastern Europe 17, no. 5 (1997) [online]. Available from 
http://www. geo rgefox. edu/ departmen ts/u ndergrad/soc-swk/ree/OCV TRK2 -PRO. h tml In temet: accessed I 
47 
politics, except that it must do so to neutralize the "liberal" threat to Slovenia's future. 145 
In contrast to Velikonja, Ocvirk views a politicalLy active Church in a positive light, 
associated with the potential to w1ite society and provide moral guidance. 146 But, does 
contemporary Slovene society want or need the Church to supply it with the Roman 
Catholic brand of moral guidance? Interestingly, in both of the preceding works, the 
Church is portrayed as an ambitious actor, pursuing a significant role in Slovenia's post-
communist development. However, while Velikonja perceives this as an illegitimate 
phenomenon, Ocvirk sees the Church's actions as legitimate and commensurate with the 
Church's natural role as Slovenia's protector. 
Leadership changes also appear to have a profound effect on the nature and level of 
the Church's demands, as well as some of the tactics with which it pursues its goals. 
Notably, this contrasts with the literature on the Church in Poland, which rarely mentions 
anything except the consistency of the Church's demands and tactics. This is not surprising 
considering that the Church has been under the leadership of Cardinal Glemp for the 
entirety of the post-communist period. Since 1991, the Slovene Church has been beaded 
by three different archbishops: Alojzij Sustar, Dr. Franc Rode, and Alojz Uran. Each 
leader bas shown his own distinct style. Smrke pays special attention to Dr. Rode, the 
March 2005. 
145 Ocvirk is a Roman Catholic Priest in Slovenia, so it is not unexpected that he would defend 
the Church ' s actions; however biased his view appears, his argument still represents the converse of the 
many critical and suspicious views of the Church ' s activities. 
146 Ocvirk. 
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leader of the Slovenian Church since 1997, as one of the main progenitors of the Church's 
adoption of a new aggressive approach which attempts to recast Slovene history in favour 
of the Church, insists on a total ban on abortion, and portrays Slovenia as a homogeneous 
Catholic society. 147 The disparity between the Church's view of itself, its goals, and its 
means, as compared to those of Slovene society, appears to be one of the central factors 
which motivates low levels of trust and, alternatively, high levels of distrust toward the 
Church. 148 Smrke concludes that the Church's present course is highly maladaptive to the 
circumstances of the Slovenian social environment and will thus ultimately end in failure; 
modernization is the only chance that the Church has for preserving itself. 149 
Similarly, two recent works, one by Rizman and the other by Klemencic, also see 
leadership as a fundamental factor in altering the Church's strategy. Although the Church's 
aims have remained consistent, "opposition to modernity as such and to secular values,"150 
its approach to realizing these aims has changed. Initially, under the leadership of 
archbishop Sus tar, who had led the Church during the latter part of the communist period, 
the Church was much less outspoken in its demands. However, with the ascension ofRode 
to archbishop in 1997, the stridency of the Church's demands increased and "Slovenia's 
147 Marjan Smrke, "Trust in the Church and C lergy in Slovenia During the 1990s," in Church-
State Relations in Central and Eastern Europe, Irena Borowik, ed. (Krakow: NOMOS, 1999), 329-330. 
148 Ibid., 330. 
149 Ibid., 33 1. 
150 Rudolf Martin Rizman , "The Church and Religion after Communism," in Uncertain Path: 
Democratic Transition and Consolidation in Democratic Slovenia (College Station: Texas A & M 
University Press, 2006), Ill. 
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Catholic Church radicalized its antisecular stances."151 This stemmed from the Church's 
dissatisfaction with the installation of liberalism, as opposed to Catholicism, as the guiding 
influence over the development of the Slovene democratic state, as well as the Church's 
dissatisfaction with its marginal political role. 152 This period of increased outspokenness 
appears to have ended with Rode's departure in 2004. According to Klemencic, the new 
archbishop, Alojz Uran, has publicly stated that "he would emphasize the pastoral 
dimensions of the church, which he considers his most important duty."153 Overall, Uran 
appears to be more moderate than his predecessor and less focused on political activity as a 
means to realize the Church's goals. The changing leadership of the Slovene Church 
appears to have had a profound effect on the aggressiveness of the Church's political 
activity, but what is the link between leadership and the Church's progress in attaining its 
goals? 
Political and Religious Reality 
Ivekovic argues that the critical change in the Archbishop position from the 
moderate, Sustar, to the outspoken Rode resulted in a strengthening of the Church's 
position. 154 This leadership change coincided with the weakening of the left and the 
151 Ibid. 115. 
152 [bid. 
153 Matjaz Klemencic, "Conclusion: Slovenia between Liberalism and Clericalism," in 
Democratic Transition in Slovenia: Value Transformation, Education, and Media, eds. Sabrina P. Ramel 
and Danica Fink-Hafner (College Station: Texas A & M University Press, 2006), 269. 
154 Ivan Ivekovic, "Nationalism and the Political Use and Abuse of Religion: The Politicization 
of Orthodoxy, Catholicism and Islam in Yugoslav Successor States," Social Compass 49, no. 4 (2002): 
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ascension of the centre-right in the government and, during the following period, the 
church attained "unprecedented concessions in education and extracted from the 
Constitutional Court a ruling which will allow it to regain its property nationalized by the 
communists."155 However, the Slovene People's Christian Party, which the Church openly 
supports, did not attain a significant share of the electorate's votes in 2000. 156 lvekovic is 
pessimistic about the state's ability to regain the upper hand in its relationship with the 
Church because once the Church gains legal privileges, it becomes more difficult to take 
them away, rather than to deny them in the first place. This places liberals in a perplexing 
position if they want to reverse the Church's gains. 157 
Interestingly, Flere's work, published shortly after Rode's ascension to archbishop, 
views the Church's activities as largely unsuccessful. In post-communist Slovenia, two 
prominent issues have exacerbated the level of contention between the Church and the 
state: the return of Church property and the definition of the Church's role in education.158 
Some ofthe Church's confiscated properties have been returned, but the state is 
529-530. 
155 Ibid. 
156 [bid., 530. 
157 Ibid. 
1 5~ Sergej Flere "Church-State Relations in Slovenia in the 1990s," Facta Universitatis: 
Philosophy and Sociology 2, no. 6 ( 1999): 23-26 [online]. Avai lable from 
http://facta.junis.ni.ac.yu/facta/pas/pas99/pas99-04.pdf Internet: accessed 18 February 2005 : 23-24. 
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withholding significant holdings because of their necessity to the state for other purposes. 159 
In addition, the state retains its reluctance to allow the Church to have any significant input 
into the education issue, which leaves the issue unsettled, at least to the Church's 
satisfaction. 160 The Church's inability to secure satisfactory results on these issues leads 
Flere to conclude that the Roman Catholic Church is a weak institution in Slovenia, 
especially when compared to bordering countries in which "the role of the Roman Catholic 
Church is more hegemonic."161 As a caveat, Flere notes that the Church's position could 
change with the ascension of Archbishop Franc Rode, who seems determined to pursue 
policies which would place the Church in a dominant social and political position; however, 
this has not occurred yet. 162 Although the leadership change from Sustar to Rode appears 
to have had positive results for the Church, the reality is more complex and tempered by 
many different factors. 
The complexity of this reality is evident in Flere' s subsequent work. First, Flere 
delineates the Church's rigid stance: "[t]he church is not changing the traditional Catholic 
product . . . it makes no compromises with postmodern attitudes, instead continuing to 
insist on traditional values, traditional piety and church authority .. . " 163 This is consistent 
159 Ibid., 24. 
160 Ibid. 
161 Ibid., 25. 
162 Ibid. 
163 Sergej Flere, "Slovenia : At a Distance from a Perfect Religious Market," Religion, State & 
Society 32, no. 2 (2004): 156. 
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with previous statements about the Church's stance. Moreover, the interaction between 
the Church and governing authorities is consistent with the 'Latin pattern' , a system in 
which bipolar relations between Catholicism and liberalism are routine. 164 This forces the 
Church to adopt an overly conservative stance which is opposed to any potential 
devaluation of its traditional role in Slovene culture. 165 Opposing 'liberal' parties are often 
forced to form alliances with Church-oriented parties, who force their preferred policies to 
be put forward at the expense of other religious denominations. 166 Flere views the 
continuing negotiations of a comprehensive Concordat between the state and the Vatican 
as an indication of unequal treatment of religious organizations; the dominant, historical 
institution, the Roman Catholic Church, is being elevated above other religious 
organizations through the negotiation of a separate, international agreement. 167 However, 
despite the Church's privileged position in the religious community, the government has 
maintained a significant degree of separation between the Church and the state by 
prohibiting religious interference in public education and forming the Office for Religious 
Communities.168 Therefore, the state should not be characterized as open to the Church's 
demands; rather, the state has continued to resist fulfilling the remainder of the Church's 
164 fbid ., 153. 
165 Thid., 153- 154. 
166 Ibid., 154-1 55. 
167 Tbid., 155. 
168 Ibid., I 52- 153 . 
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agenda. Thus, Flere concludes that, even as the Church maintains its dominant position, it 
is increasingly affected by religious pluralism and continues to lose ground to alternative 
religions and social change. 169 In this interpretation, the Church is represented as religiously 
dominant, but politically under control and, this is in spite of Rode's aggressive leadership 
during the time. 
Cmic and Lesjak also see the Church's dominance as largely confined to the 
religious realm, but are intensely critical ofthe state for facilitating the Church's religious 
dominance. The Roman Catholic Church is indifferent to the presence of new religions 
insofar as they do not interfere with its own efforts to secure a "special role in Slovene 
society."170 However, the Church distinguishes between the relative and absolute equality 
of religious organizations. It posits that equality between organizations should be based on 
an assessment ofmembership and linkage to Slovenia's history. 171 In other words, 
according to the Catholic Church, all religions are not equal in practice, as in absolute 
equality; rather, each religion's legal position should be based on a relative judgement of 
specific features. 172 There is a great deal of evidence to support this view. First, the 
Roman Catholic Church, as well as the Evangelical Church, which are historically-based 
169 Tbid., 156. 
170 Ales Crnic and Gregor Lesjak, "Religious Freedom and Control in Independent Slovenia," 
Sociology ofReligion 64, no. 3 (2003): 36 1. 
171 Ibid., 362-363 . 
172 Tbid. 
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Slovenian religious organizations, have attained privileges from the state which allow them 
to provide clerical service in the armed forces; a benefit which was not granted to any other 
religious organization. 173 Additionally, although the Church-state agreement, signed in 
2001, appears to have been replicated in other agreements with the Lutheran Church, 
Serbian Orthodox Church, and Pentecostal Church, the language of the other religious 
agreements is basically the same as in previously existing laws. 174 Moreover, state 
inactivity in the obligatory registration process for religious communities, such that for long 
periods of time applicants received no response to their registration requests, also suggests 
that the state is applying the Church ' s idea of relative equality. 175 Crnic and Lesjak 
conclude that the state bas departed from adherence to legal and Constitutional principles, 
dividing religious organizations into a "hierarchy of, first, the 'more equal' dominant 
Roman Catholic Church, followed by the socially acknowledged 'traditional' Evangelical 
Church, which is, in turn followed by all other, registered and non-registered, 
communities."176 However, the basis of the Church' s dominance over other religions is 
more tenuous than this hierarchy suggests. First, although the Yugoslav state possessed a 
negative attitude toward religion, Slovenia was generally less oppressive than other 
173 Ibid., 363-364. 
174 Ales Cmic and Gregor Lesjak, "0 , Holy Simplicity! Registering a Religion in Slovenia," 
Religion, State & Society 35, no. I (2007): 71 . 
175 Ibid., 76-77. 
176 Crnic and Lesjak, "Religious Freedom and Control in Independent Slovenia," 364. 
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Communist countries and new religious organizations have been growing since the early 
1970s, although data on their membership is scarce. 177 Therefore, increases in religiosity 
during the transition period reflect trends which began during previous eras. 178 This means 
that gains in religiosity that have appeared in statistical data may have arisen from other 
religions besides Roman Catholicism. Also, since it is so weak in Slovene society, the 
Church has been forced to avoid "the powerful rhetoric of being a 'traditional,' 'national,' 
or 'state-Constitutional' Church ... " 179 Therefore, although the Church has attained both 
legal and social dominance in Slovenia relative to other religions, the reasons for this 
dominance are questionable. 
Many of the previous authors' works suggest that the Church has been confmed to 
dominate the religious sphere, suggesting but not openly stating that the state has made 
concerted efforts to keep the Church out of politics. Stres and Gergolj attribute the 
Church's failure to make political gains to the state's hostile attitude toward the Church. 
In his discussion of religious education in Slovenia, Gergolj blames the Communist period 
for creating confusion about religious practice and discouraging religious teaching to 
subsequent generations. 180 He also equates the current democratic system with that of the 
177 Ibid., 356; 358-359. 
178 Ibid., 357. 
179 Ibid., 361 . 
IHO Stanko Gerjolj , "Modes of Religious Education in Slovenia," in Religion During and After 
Communism, Miklos Tomka and Paul M. Zulehner, eds. (London: SCM Press 2000), 82-84. 
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atheistic Communist state, stating that although the education system excludes religious 
organizations on the basis of avoiding extensive religious interference in public life, it is 
simultaneously used to spread "the ideology of the liberal party which has been in power 
since 1991 ... " 18 1 Thus, rather than blame the democratic system as a whole, Gergolj 
blames the liberals. This is suggestive oftbe 'us versus them' mentality which was evident 
in the Polish review. 
Stres argues that the Slovenian state is unreasonably antagonistic toward the 
Roman Catholic Church, especially in its opposition to granting the Church a role in 
religious education and its refusal to sign an extensive deal with the Vatican. 182 Stres 
interprets this situation as a fault in the democratic system, especially considering that "[i]f 
a Slovene is religious, be is a Catholic, save for the border region with Hungary." 183 At the 
same that Stres characterizes the state as a hostile opponent, he acknowledges the state' s 
role in maintaining Slovenia's culture, 184 but this is the only praise which the state receives. 
The outcomes of two issues that have generated the greatest level of contention between 
the Church and state, namely the return of Church lands confiscated by the communist 
181 Jbid. , 85-86. 
182 Anton Stres, "The Church in a Democratic State after the Model of Slovenia," Religion, State 
and Society 28, no. 3 (2000): 291 . 
183 Jbid., 291 -292. 
184 fbid ., 296. 
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regime and religious education, are particularly unsatisfactory for Stres. 185 This leads 
Stres to conclude that "[t]he essential difference between the current situation and that 
under the previous communist regime is only that there is no ban on church activities in the 
current democratic state."186 Stres's account of events serves as a scathing indictment of 
the current relationship between the Church and state, which blames the Church's failure to 
secure its goals in politics and society on the intransigence of the current political regime. 
Cox's recent work on Slovene politics contains a short discussion of the Church's 
political role in post-Communist Slovenia, focusing on the Church's status and position as 
defined by the legal and political gains it has made since the transition, as well as the 
Church's historical role in Slovenia. Documenting the ups and downs of the Church over 
the period from 1990 to 2004, Cox notes that as the Church bas "regained considerable 
prominence since 1991."187 Notably, it has achieved some major political victories in the 
restitution of Church property, parochial education, in vitro fertilization, army chaplaincies 
and, finally, the recent Slovene-Vatican agreement. However, at the same time, these gains 
have been diminished by the Church's exclusion from Slovenia's public education system, 
185 Stres is particularly adamant that the addendum to the law advocating the return of 
confiscated lands is unfair to the Church. He notes that "only a small proportion of the church ' s property 
has been returned to it in natura, because under the same law the state is not obliged to return property 
that is currently used for cultural, health or educational purposes." Although the Church is supposed to 
receive monetary payments for these non-returns, the fund is inadequate to cover such costs. Stres is also 
highly critical of democratic procedures, stating that " the Liberal Democratic Party forced through its own 
model for Slovene education for the whole state," in spite of the introduction of religious education in 
other post-Communist states. Ibid., 296-297. 
186 Ibid., 298. 
187 John K. Cox, Slovenia: Evolving Loyalties (London and New York: Routledge, 2005), 125. 
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the Church's failed campaign against abortion, and the government's failure to return all of 
the Church's property. 188 Cox also directs a mild criticism toward those who oppose the 
Slovene-Vatican agreement189 arguing that "[ d]ue to the considerable historical significance 
of Catholicism in Slovenia, and the persecution of the Church after 1945, such opposition 
would seem exaggerated." 19° Cox's argument is balanced, discussing both the negatives 
and positives for the Church and some of the most recent developments in the Church's 
status; however, the reasons behind the Church's evolving role are not clear. 
Two other recent analyses also figure into this emerging picture of the Slovene 
Church. Klemencic is unique in the Slovene political literature in that be sees Catholicism 
as one side of the deepest, defining division in contemporary Slovene politics. Throughout 
most works on Slovene politics, the Church is always a peripheral figure, briefly mentioned, 
if at all. However, according the KlemenCic, contemporary Slovene politics is defined by 
the contention between clericalism and liberalism. Clericalism, which is associated with the 
Roman Catholic Church and some right wing parties, asks that the "parameters of the state 
be defined in accordance with the strictures of a particular church .. . " 191 This has far-
reaching consequences for the interpretation of law, individual rights, equality, and 
IMM Ibid., 124-125. 
189 Briefly described by Cox as follows: "defines the legal status of the two independent parties, 
commits them to follow certain procedures for resolving issues and disputes, and guarantees the status of 
Catholic schools, charitable institutions, mass media, and pastoral presence as equal to other privately 
sponsored initiatives." Ibid., 125. 
1
'10 Ibid. 
191 KlemenCic, 277. 
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tolerance, such that they contravene those of liberalism. 192 Liberalism, represented by the 
Liberal Democratic Party (LDS) and other left-wing parties, seeks to avoid religious 
influence on state structures. Despite the Church being favoured over other religions in 
Slovenia, it has had great difficulty impressing its values on Slovene politics, suffering 
defeats in the areas of media censorship, constitutional construction, religious education, 
and abortion. 193 Moreover, the Church's political involvement is not supported by most of 
Slovene society. 194 Thus, it appears that in this "struggle to define the content of the 
dominant political culture,"195 ljberalism is ahead and clericalism is far behind. However, 
according to Klemencic, the contest is far from over and the "ultimate shape of Slovenia' s 
political culture will be defmed by the outcome of the contest . .. " 196 This is curious, 
given that throughout the rest of the book within which Klemencic 's article appears the 
Church is mentioned sparingly and then, usually only briefly. If the Church were such an 
important element in Slovene politics, would it not command a larger role in the 
discussions contained in the rest of the book or, indeed, the rest of the literature? 
Rizman, tracking the Church through Slovene history into the present, lays out a 
picture of the Church which contradicts that painted by KlemenCic. Although the Church 
192 Tbid., 277-278. 
19 Ibid., 27 1-274. 
194 Ibid., 270. 
195 Ibid., 277. 
196 fbid., 278. 
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once held a prominent political role in Slovenia, events during WWll and the early years of 
the Yugoslav communist regime, altered the Church's status, effectively moving it to the 
political periphery. 197 According to Rizman, the Church seems destined to remain at the 
periphery: despite the Church's "claims to be not only a representative but the morally 
legitimate arbiter of the Slovene nation," 198 as well as the Church's political activity on 
issues such as the constitution, abortion, religious education, and confiscated Church 
property, the Slovene political and social environment fails to support the Church's 
aspirations. 199 This conclusion is consistent with the literature and it also acts as a perfect 
summary of the majority of works concerning the Slovene Church. Rizman' s work also 
makes it clear that the conflict between liberal and Catholic values is not as significant as 
Klernncic suggests; for the most part, liberal values have prevailed over Catholic values on 
nearly every occasion. In addition, Rizman's work underscores the importance of context 
in shaping the Church ' s role, providing for further investigations of the Slovene context as 
it relates to the Church. 
Summary: The Church in Slovenia 
Much like its Polish counterpart, the Slovene Church expected that the political 
changes of the early 1990s would generate political influence for the Church such that the 
legal, political, and social structures of the new state would reflect Roman Catholic values. 
197 Rizman, I 03-106. 
19~ Ibid., 11 2. 
199 Ibid., 115-116. 
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However, as consistently agreed to by numerous authors, the reality that has developed is a 
disappointment to these goals. The Church remains predominant over other religious 
organizations, enjoying political and legal favouritism relative to other religious 
organizations in Slovenia, but little of this dominance extends beyond this area to become 
broad-based political influence. This is evident in the outcomes of several major issues, 
namely constitutional construction, religious education, abortion, and Church property 
repatriation. Furthermore, the Church's relationship with society, often fraught with 
difficulties in the recent past, is strained. Slovenes' generally ambiguous relationship with 
religion, combined with their distrust of the Church, makes society's link with the Church 
tenuous. Overall, the Church appears to operate from a position of weakness in 
contemporary Slovenia, laclcing both the constituency and the capacity to assume a 
powerful political role. 
Even with the detailed analyses provided in many of these scholarly works, the 
picture of the Slovene Church is much less complete than that of the Polish Church. 
Certainly, the Slovene Church's intentions, strategies, and activities have been delineated to 
some extent, but not in any great detail as most works regarding the Slovene Church are 
general in nature. The paucity of detailed investigations leaves many questions unanswered 
about the internal workings of the Church as well as the Church's political activities. Even 
though these matters are not the central concern of this thesis, analysis of additional 
sources during the course of the investigation will likely clarify some of these unknowns. 
Additionally, although many authors successfully place the Slovene Church in its context, it 
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is only ever accomplished in the most general, least detailed of manners. As in the Polish 
case, the utilization of a framework to examine contextual shaping of the Church's political 
role, will yield valuable results. This value will increase with the addition of comparative 
analysis between the Polish and Slovene contexts. 
Comparative Works 
Comparisons between Poland and Slovenia are relatively rare; no direct 
comparisons exist beyond the level of religiosity and nationalism. This paucity of directly 
comparative literature by necessity makes this section the shortest in the review. 
The only work which directly compares Poland and Slovenia examines the 
development of the association between religion and nationalism in the two countries, as 
well as the structure of this association. Velikonja studies this association using the 
concept of religio-national mythology, defined as "an organised, coherent and dynamic 
system or set of different myths, beliefs, stereotypes, symbols and images about ourselves 
and others, specifically concerned with national and religious issues."200 Using this 
concept, Velikonja finds that Roman Catholicism plays a much larger role in the 
construction of religio-national mythology in Poland than in Slovenia. 201 Specifically, both 
the Church's and the state's histories, as well as contemporary interpretations of 
Catholicism's role in preserving the Polish nation, support a strong nationalistic link 
200 Velikonja, "Siovenian and Polish Religio-National Mythologies: A Comparative 
Analysis,"Religion, State and Society 3 1 no. 3 (2003): 234. 
201 Ibid., 250. 
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between the Roman Catholic Church and Poland; essentially, the Church acts as an arbiter 
of national identity.202 In contrast, the very different course of the Church through Slovene 
history, combined with contemporary interpretations ofthe Church's relationship with 
Slovene identity, weaken the link between the Roman Catholic Church and the Slovene 
nation.203 For Slovenes, additional factors besides religion came to define what it was to be 
Slovene, especially language and culture.204 This disentanglement of Roman Catholicism 
from nationalism in Slovenia, especially when compared to the strong association between 
Roman Catholicism and nation in Poland, is intriguing with respect to Velikonja 's 
comparison between the contemporary situation of the two Churches. Although both 
Churches have made overt efforts to assume a significant role in the political and social 
development of their respective nations, the success of the Polish Church has greatly 
surpassed that of the Slovene Church.205 Even so, the Polish Church's success has not been 
complete and, like the Slovene Church, it faces a harsh reality. Both Churches "must adapt 
to new, increasingly differentiated situations and accept the fact that religio-national 
mythology is only one of many mythological constructions and conceptions in 
contemporary Slovenian and Polish societies, and that it cannot count on monopoly."206 
202 Ibid., 235-250. 
203 Ibid., 235-250. 
204 fbid., 250. 
205 Ibid., 244-245. 
206 Ibid., 251 . 
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Thus, through this comparative analysis, Velikonja repeats a theme that is consistent 
through the literature: both national Churches cannot remain stagnant, relying on their past 
to carry them into the future but, instead, they must accommodate the new reality. If they 
fail, they will become increasingly irrelevant. 
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Political Opportunities and Constraints 
The major theoretical orientation of this study relies on an interpretation of the 
theory of political opportunity and political opportunity structure (POS) to define and 
examine the major features of the Church's context. Therefore, this final section of the 
review examines the origins and development of this theory, as well as the reasons for 
modifying if for use in this study. 
The concept of political opportunity has undergone a number of modifications and 
clarifications since it first appeared207 but, it has mostly been utilized in the study of 
contentious politics, which is defined by Tarrow as collective opposition to the state or 
"direct challenges."208 Further, this type of political activity is considered to belong more 
within the realm of social movements, considered to exist outside of the conventional 
routes of political access that more organized, embedded entities enjoy in the political 
process.209 However, these groups do not act in isolation from the political system of their 
207 Kriesi provides a detailed account of the evolution of the concept, as does David Meyer. 
Hanspeter Kriesi , "Political Context and Opportunity," in The Blackwell Companion to Social 
Movements, eds., David A. Snow, Sarah A. Soule, and Hanspeter Kriesi (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing 
2004), 69-70; David S. Meyer, "Protest and Political Opportunities," Annual Review of Sociology 30 
(2004): 126- 13 1. 
208 Sidney Tarrow, Power in Movement: Social Movements and Contentious Politics, 2"d ed. 
(New York: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 2; 5. 
209 This is spelled out in Snow, Soule, and Kriesi 's definition: "social movements can be thought 
of as collectivities acting with some degree of organization and continuity outside of institutional or 
organizational channels for the purpose of challenging or defending extant authority, whether it is 
institutionally or culturally based, in the group, organization, society, culture, or world order of which 
they are a part." David A. Snow, Sarah A. Soule, and Hanspeter Kriesi, "Mapping the Terrain," in The 
Blackwell Companion to Social Movements, eds., David A. Snow, Sarah A. Soule, and Hanspeter Kriesi 
(Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 2004), II . 
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nation, which produces both constraints and opportunities to their activities. Tarrow 
describes this political opportunity structure (POS): 
By political opportunities, I mean consistent- but not necessarily formal, 
permanent, or national- dimensions of the political struggle that encourage 
people to engage in contentious politics. By political constraints, I mean 
factors- like repression, but also like authorities' capacity to present a solid 
front to insurgents -that discourage contention.210 
Even though this concept is associated with "structure," this does not mean that 
opportunities and constraints consist entirely of political structures; nor are they static. 211 
The POS at a particular time can be further clarified as "open" or "closed" based upon 
whether the prevailing system of opportunities and constraints is conducive or obstructive 
to the penetration of political actors, respectively.212 Therefore, as a constituent concept of 
a larger framework, POS provides an explanation for the effects of factors which are in the 
group's environment and beyond their control - in other words, context. 
According to Tarrow, political opportunity is guided by a number of factors, 
including ( 1) sudden expansions or breaks in the political system, (2) changeable alliances 
among political actors, (3) divisions among the political elite, ( 4) the presence of already-
established allies, (5) probability of state repression, (6) structure of and power 
210 Tarrow, 19-20. 
211 Ibid., 77. 
212 Kriesi, 69-70; DavidS. Meyer and Douglas R Imig, "Political Opportunity and the Rise and 
Decline of Interest Group Sectors," The Social Science Journal 30, no. 3 (1993): 256-257. 
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relationships within the state, and (7) state methods of reducing challenges.213 This list is 
partially derived from studies of the events which opened the Soviet state to challengers in 
the late 1980s21 4 and is therefore suitable to the study of the transitional contexts of east-
central Europe. 
Another interpretation shows how features of culture, society, politics, and the 
international environment fit into the political opportunity concept. The first of these 
involves the structure of"formal political institutions," described by the formal power 
relationships between different levels of the government and the party and electoral 
systems.215 Cultural factors enter into the political context by prescribing methods of 
dealing with contenders to the government and setting up the societal background through 
which ideas are filtered. 2 16 For any actor which has a stake in turning society's opinion in 
its favour, "political-cultural or symbolic opportunities ... determine what kind of ideas 
become visible for the public, resonate with public opinion and are held to be 'legitimate' 
by the audience."2 17 Additional factors can be added to the POS to provide for a more 
comprehensive picture; this includes significant societal and political cleavages, as well as 
213 Tarrow, 77-85; Charles Tilly and Sidney Tarrow, Contentious Politics (Boulder: Paradigm 
Publishers, 2007), 57-58. 
2 14 Tarrow,, 73-76. 
215 Kriesi , 70-71. 
216 fbid ., 71-72. 
217 fbid., 72. 
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the nation's international environment.218 Cleavages are important to the definition 
between different groups in society, but are not automatically available for exploitation; 
they must be drawn on by a political actor to assume political salience as well.2 19 The 
international context becomes an increasingly important component of political opportunity 
because of states' memberships in larger political and economic groupings in the 
international system. 220 Thus, "[ c ]hanges in the international context can, by altering 
political and economic conditions, and/or the perception of those conditions, change the 
opportunities for activists within a country."22 1 From this sampling of the literature it is 
apparent that the context of an organization, operating within a particular nation-state ' s 
political system, is determined not only by the features of that national context, it is also 
determined by larger elements, which lie beyond the borders of the state in which it is 
operating. 
Since this concept has been used primarily in the study of social movements, its 
ability to extend beyond that specific type of organization appears somewhat tenuous. Is it 
feasible to utilize the concepts provided by this framework to study more institutionalized, 
embedded political actors? Although social movements are considered outsiders in the 
218 Ibid., 72-73. 
219 Ibid. 
220 Ibid., 73; David S. Meyer," Po litical Opportunity and Nested Institutions," Social Movement 
Studies 2, no. I (2003): 2 1-22. 
221 Meyer, "Political Opportunity and Nested Institutions," 20. 
69 
political system, requiring specific opportunities to articulate their views, and interest 
organizations are considered insiders, possessing access to a wider range of channels and 
political actors, the political opportunity framework may be applied to the study of interest 
organizations as well. This idea is articulated by Meyer and Imig, who consider the utility 
of bringing interest group and social movement theory together to study the 
conglomeration of groups which make up a defined interest sector, such as 
environmentalism or feminism. Although this idea is not explicitly connected to the 
transference of political opportunity structure from the study of social movements to other 
types of groups, it does suggest that it is possible and desirable to do so. Moreover, Meyer 
and Imig's description of the activities of interest groups further suggest that this is a 
possibility: 
Interest groups make history . . . but not in circumstances they choose. 
Instead, they are aided, encouraged, and/or threatened in their efforts by a 
number of structural and strategic factors that shape their emergence, 
development, and demise. It is only by recognizing the contextual 
constraints on interest group activity that we can begin to understand their 
successes and failures, the utility and costs of various strategies, and most 
significantly, the role of organized groups in the larger policy process.222 
This notion of coupling an interest group' s interaction with the political world to its 
context expands political opportunity structure beyond the realm of the political outsider, 
who normally lacks access to the system. This has particular relevance to this comparative 
study of the Roman Catholic Church, a political insider, organized interest group, and 
222 Meyer and Imig, 253-254. 
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religious organization. 
Conclusion 
The multitude of works considered in this review have shed light on a number of 
issues in general Roman Catholic Church politics, as well as in the specific contexts of 
Poland and Slovenia. The religion and politics literature suggests that a religious institution 
is not an ordinary interest group; it possesses a unique set of characteristics that endow it 
with the power to influence its parishioners, as well as other actors in the political system. 
Further, among religious institutions, the Roman Catholic Church is uniquely endowed with 
its own state-like structure and an institutional reach that spans the globe. Such an 
exceptional interest group demands an analytical approach that is equally exceptional. 
Although only Velikonja 's work directly compares the two Churches, much of the 
literature suggests that the Polish Church and the Slovene Church have had divergent 
experiences with regards to realization of their goals for their countries. It was also 
apparent throughout that the literature that the Church in each context has pursued a 
similar primary goal: to imprint Roman Catholicism on the development of state and 
society. However, the Polish Church has procured many more goals to meet this end than 
the Slovene Church, particularly in the areas of abortion, religious education, and Church-
state relations. Aside from a difference in strategy pursued by different personalities 
heading each Church, what else can account for this divergent path? The current literature 
does not answer this question in any great detail, if at all. Moreover, although most of 
these studies utilize acceptable methodology and sources, few utilize a framework that 
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could help to systematically explain the disparity between the Church's situation in both 
countries. For this reason, as well as the Roman Catholic Church's unique features as an 
institution, the concept of political opportunity structure, drawn from the social movement 
literature, will be utilized to help construct an analytical framework to analyze the unique 
context that Poland and Slovenia present to the Church. 
CHAPTER3 
METHODS 
This thesis focuses on the components of society and politics which form the 
Roman Catholic Church's context in two countries- Poland and Slovenia. This context 
plays a crucial role in determining the structure of opportunities and constraints which 
confront each Church at any time. This means that fluctuations in single or multiple 
contextual components can have a profound effect on the Church's ability to enter the 
political process and achieve concrete policy outcomes. 
The contemporary situation of each national Church has been influenced by regime 
change, democratic institution-building, and routine democratic politics. The peculiarities 
inherent to this process in each country have resulted in a dissimilar structure of political 
opportunities and constraints, leading to a different role for the Church in each of Poland 
and Slovenia. Moreover, this structure is composed of factors which are constantly in flux 
and thus the Church seldom faces a political opportunity structure which remains stable for 
long. Thus, the Church's role in politics and society is also in flux. 
Research Hypotheses 
The substantial amount of literature which has been written about the interaction 
between religion and politics, and specifically, the role of the Roman Catholic Church as a 
participant in political change, suggests that the Church may have a substantial role to play 
in the shaping of the democratic state in post-Communist societies. However, 
simultaneously, the literature which concerns the Church in Poland and Slovenia suggests 
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that the Church's political context has an appreciable effect on how the Church is received 
into the political arena at particular times. Once this idea is connected to the conceptual 
framework of political opportunity structure (POS), it is evident that a further examination 
of the Church's context is required to illuminate how context has shaped the Church's 
access to the political system over the post-Communist period in each country. The totality 
of the studies considered in chapter 2 suggest that it is important to examine how the 
components of political opportunity structure change over time and affect the Church's 
role at various points in the development of each polity. This could serve to illuminate the 
particular circumstances in which a religious institution is most successful at engaging in a 
foray into the political arena. 
The literature review suggests that the Roman Catholic Church, although plagued 
by a constantly changing political environment, still had and has many opportunities to gain 
influence in the political arena. Based on this assessment, the Church in Poland is expected 
to be in a position of variability; sometimes it has many opportunities to play a significant 
role, while at other times, the constraints on political action preclude any significant 
penetration into the political arena. In contrast, the Slovene Church has been locked into a 
marginal, but stable, political role since the democratic transformation because at virtually 
every point in the development of the new polity, the constraints on political activity appear 
to have outweighed the opportunities. 
As a result, the following research hypotheses became the central focus of this 
thesis: 
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General Research Hypothesis. The political opportunity structure, or the structure 
of constraints and opportunities created by numerous factors in the context, circumscribes 
the political space in which the Roman Catholic Church can operate in a country, and, thus, 
plays a large part in determining the Church's political role in that country. 
Specific Research Hypothesis 1. The political opportunity structure in Poland 
produced an unstable and variable set of opportunities throughout the post-communist 
period, but the resulting political opportunity structure was generally positive for the 
Church, providing more operungs into politics and placing fewer constraints on the 
Church's activities. As a result, the Church made significant inroads in realizing its agenda 
and played an important political role. 
Specific Research Hypothesis 2. The political opportunity structure in Slovenia 
produced a stable and consistent set of opportunities throughout the post-communist 
period, but the resulting political opportunity structure was generally negative for the 
Church, providing fewer openings into politics and placing more constraints on the 
Church's activities. As a result, the Church failed to make significant inroads in realizing 
its agenda and played a noncrucial political role. 
Research Design 
The Church as a Unit of Analysis 
Since the Roman Catholic Church is the main focus of this study, specific limits 
have been defined to distinguish the institution from other manifestations of Roman 
Catholicism, mainly single-issue religious groups and other formations which, although 
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formed under the approval and control of the Vatican, 1 are considered to be outside of the 
Church's structure. For the purpose of this analysis, the Roman Catholic Church is 
considered to be composed of the institutional Church only, whose components are 
hierarchically arranged from the most powerful, the Vatican, to the least powerful, the 
laity.2 The specific dimensions of each level are not central to this study. Thus, the Church 
referred to in this study includes the institutional Church, its leaders, and its adherents only. 
The Roman Catholic Church as an Interest Group 
In this study, the Roman Catholic Church is considered to be an atypical interest 
group since its political role is shaped by factors which are not included in traditional 
conceptions of political interests. Since most interest group theory avoids organized 
religious groupings like the Roman Catholic Church, it is easy to recognize the difficulty 
which is inherent to the classification of such an organization. This situation is complicated 
by the disparity between established western democracies, from which most of the 
theoretical explanations of interest group activity have emerged, and the recently 
democratized states of eastern Europe, which are grafted onto the remains of the old 
Communist state. As a result, most western conceptions of interest group theory ignore 
the unique context in which religious organizations must operate in post-Communist 
1 Hoeber Rudolph, 253. 
2 Hoeber Rudolph, 17; Matthew Bunson, ed., 2005 Our Sunday Visitor 's Catholic Almanac 
(Huntington, IN: Our Sunday Visitor Ptiblishing Division, 2005), 27 1-272. 
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Europe, as well as the significance of their presence in some of these states. For instance, 
the concept of the institutionalized interest group, based upon the study of the American 
political system, seems to capture some of the Church's characteristics, especially the 
independence of the hierarchy's decision-making processes from the laity, as well as the 
substantial resources at the Church's command.3 Nevertheless, this conception, although 
plausible, fails to completely describe the Church because it stresses economic interests 
over all others. Certainly, the Church is concerned with its resource base, as well as the 
survival of the institution itself, but its political activities also revolve around its doctrine 
and teachings, which emerge from its spiritual purpose. This spiritual purpose gives the 
Church an advantage when organizing sanctioned collective activities; many adherents 
answer to the Church's connection with a spiritual power and resist arguments that refute 
the principles of this basic belief.4 With this in mind, the Church is classified as an interest 
group according to the guidelines laid out in Warner's study of the Roman Catholic Church 
in western European politics. 
According to Warner, the Roman Catholic Church's political activities relocate it 
from the realm of a simple religious organization. Its long history of political lobbying and 
3 This is reflected in Salisbury' s conception of corporations as institutionalized interest groups 
which possess different structures than member-driven organizations. Robert H. Salisbury, " [nterest 
Representation: The Dominance of fnstitutions," American Political Science Review 78, no. I ( 1984): 67-
68. 
4 Ron Aminzade and Elizabeth J. Perry, "The Sacred, Religious, and Secular in Contentious 
Politics: Blurring Boundaries," in Silence and Voice in the Study of Contentious Politics, Ronald R . 
Aminzade et al. (New York: Cambridge University Press, 200 I), 160- 16 1. 
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interference have embedded it into modem politics as an uncommon form of the political 
interest group.5 Certainly, the rigidity of the Church's doctrine, coupled with its perception 
of itself as "the ultimate moral authority," distinguishes it from other interests.6 As a result, 
democracy represents an obstacle to the Church's moral mission, simply because 
democracy necessitates a degree of compromise which the Church is hard-pressed to 
accept.7 The complexity inherent in straddling the line between religion and politics create 
a degree of ambiguity in the attachment of a particular concept or descriptive label to the 
Church; however, the label of an interest group seems the most appropriate for this study. 
The Church is simultaneously enmeshed in the political system, like many other organized 
groups who seek to influence government policies, but also distinguished from these 
groups by its connection to the spiritual realm. This allows it to pursue multiple cause 
simultaneously, using the justification provided by the demands of Catholic doctrine and a 
spiritual connection with a higher power. 
The Context of the Roman Catholic Church 
Features Which Define the Context 
Following from the theoretical dispositions of the literature on religion and politic , 
as well as the political opportunity structure literature, several contextual variables have 
5 Carolyn M. Warner, Confessions of an Interest Group: The Catholic Church and Political 
Parties in Europe (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000), 6-7. 
6 fbid., 7. 
7 Ibid., 8-9. 
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been extracted and modified for this analysis: (I) history and society; (2) political parties; 
(3) electoral politics; ( 4) government dynamics; (5) legal and constitutional dimensions; and 
(6) transnational dimensions. The Roman Catholic Church is also somewhat unique among 
institutionalized political interests in that it has multiple levels of spiritual and administrative 
authority at both the national and intemationallevel.8 With these features in mind, the 
Roman Catholic Church in Poland faces a context which is defined by religious 
entanglements, a developing political system, and the transnational integration of the state. 
A basic diagram of the Church's context in this analysis is presented in figure l. A 
description of each of these variables, along with the means of qualitatively measuring them 
follows. 
8 According to Warner, "national Catholic Churches arose with their own histories, institutional 
structures, even ideologies, and often have been at odds with the Vatican over maintaining some degree of 
autonomy." Ibid., 8. 
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Figure 1 Components of the Roman Catholic Church's Context 
1. The Power of Roman Catholicism: History and Society 
This variable has been derived from the cultural aspect,of political opportunity, 
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which describes "political-cultural or symbolic opportunities that determine what kind of 
ideas become visible for the public, resonate with public opinion and are held to be 
'legitimate' by the audience."9 As a religious institution, the Church holds a special 
relationship with its parishioners and the surrounding society that is defined by spiritual 
beliefs and the Church' s doctrine. Society' s level of openness to the Church will be 
measured by adherence to the Catholic faith, participation in religious practice, trust in the 
9 Krie i, 72. 
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Church, and approval of a Church political role. These measures are qualitatively examined 
and compared to determine society's level of openness. If the Church sustains support in 
society, then its views are likely to be granted legitimacy, meaning that society would be 
more open to the Church's opinions on issues and its political participation. 
Additionally, because of the influence of history on the construction of symbol ism 
and the Church's relationship with society, the Church's history in each country is also 
important. It is this history which feeds into national associations with Roman Catholicism. 
For the Roman Catholic Church, the two major historical eras that are important for the 
construction of nationalistic histories and associations stretch, first, from the beginning of 
Roman Catholicism up to World War II and, second, through the communist period up to 
democratization. The use of the Church institution, symbols, and religion to manufacture a 
nationalism with either a strong or a weak association with Roman Catholicism is strongly 
dependent on this history. 
2. Political Parties 
Since political party actors and electors have acquired roughly 15 years of 
experience in developing strategies for electoral contests and choosing among party 
choices, respectively, it is assumed that both have gained knowledge about the practice of 
democratic politics. This is similar to the concept of democratic assimilation advanced by 
Kitschelt eta!., which is characterized by "a non-equilibrium process of learning in which 
political actors employ resources, legacies, and new institutional rules to explore particular 
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patterns of democratic political interaction."10 Therefore, this analysis examines shifts in 
the number of parties, the composition of party programs, changes in leadership, and 
different electoral results to arrive at an assessment of the prevailing patterns of political 
party interaction and major political cleavage structure, as they relate to political parties. 
This is connected to Kriesi's conception of"protagonists, antagonists, and bystanders- that 
is, the configuration of allies (policymakers, public authorities, political parties, interest 
groups, the media, related movements), the adversaries (public authorities, repressive 
agents, countermovements) and the not directly involved, but nevertheless attentive 
audience ... " 11 In this case, the focus is on political parties as allies, enemies, and 
neutrals, as well as other significant political actors which act either for or against the 
Church. 
3. Electoral Politics 
This variable augments the political party variable in that elections initially 
determine which parties have power in the Parliamentary process. According to Kriesi , 
"proportional electoral systems are more easily accessible for emerging political actors than 
10 This concept is utilized in Kitschelt et al. 's comparative study of the development of party 
systems in four postcommunist states: Hungary, Bulgaria, Poland, and the Czech Republic. It arises from 
the understanding that institution-building is not the only factor which shapes the development of a party 
system; political actors also "need sufficient chances to play the game repreatedly before their conduct 
may be accounted for by equilibrium models." Herbert Kitschelt, Zdenka Mansfeldova, Radoslaw 
Markowski, and Gabor T6ka, Post- Communist Party Systems: Competition, Representation, and Inter-
Party Cooperation (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 12. 
11 Kriesi, 74. 
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majoritarian or plurality systems."12 The Church does not exactly qualify as an "emerging" 
actor and is thus not as likely to be affected by this phenomenon. As a political actor which 
can form its own political parties or support cho en political parties, the Church is affected 
by both the negatives and positives associated with the degree of proportionality in the 
system. This variabl.e indicates how the particular structure of the electoral process and the 
consequences of that process affect the Church' s ability to achieve influence. Regardless, a 
democratic political order provides the Church with "far less certainty that its teaching will 
be promoted actively in the political order; electoral politics, in fact, may well yield 
antithetical policies. " 13 
4. Government Dynamics 
After elections are completed, parties must attempt to form a governing coalition 
within the legislature. According to Kriesi, the dynamics of coalition formation are such 
that "[h]ighly disciplined, single-party government ... provides limited access and strong 
capacity to act, whereas multiparty coalitions made up of undisciplined parties ... are 
likely to provide multiple access points and to have a limited capacity to act." 14 In addition, 
political cleavages, discussed previously, also have an effect on the possibilities for party 
cooperation in the legislature, especially in these countries, where specific divi ions, based 
upon the past, still exist. Third, the power relationships between the executive and the 
12 Ibid., 70. 
13 Daniel Philpott "The Catholic Wave," Journal of Democracy I 5, no. 2 (2004): 44. 
14 Kriesi, 70-7 I. 
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legislature are also important. 15 Fourth, the number of levels of government, extending 
from the national level, affects how interests can influence the political process. 16 This 
means that in countries with many levels of government, political interests may be able to 
gain influence more readily. 
5. Legal and Constitutional Dimensions 
This variable is one of the most stable and enduring in the Church's context. It 
follows from the idea that the constitution sets up the nature of relations between Church 
and state, beginning with the degree of separation between the two and ending with 
restrictions on specific policies and activities which concern the Church. The presence or 
absence of legal statutes, which further define relations between the Church and the state, 
also indicate the degree to which the state is open to the Church's influence. Since social 
movement literature concerns political outsiders to a greater extent than an embedded 
interest group, the legal and constitutional context is not explicitly mentioned, but it can 
follow from the idea that the structure of the country's political institutions is important, 
simply because legal and constitutional mea ures set up that system and define its 
components. The measurement of the Church's context in this area will consider portions 
of the state Constitution which specify the nature of relations between re ligion and the state 
and regulate moral issues that are of concern to the Church. In addition, the degree to 
15 Although Kriesi also includes the judiciary in his conception, it is not included in this 
instance, simply because it widens the scope of the analysis to an unnecessary degree. Tbid., 70. 
16 Ibid. 
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which legal statutes regulating the activity of religious organizations provide the Church 
with an advantage over other groups, as well as the separate negotiation of agreements 
between the Church and the state, is considered as part of the degree of political openness 
to the Church. 
6. Transnational Dimensions 
Many of the former Communist countries of east-central Europe, including Poland 
and Slovenia, have joined international institutions as they have proceeded through the 
process of political and economic change. These institutions impose a set of rules for 
membership, becoming more stringent as the degree of integration among the members of 
the institution increases. 17 The two countries considered in this analysis have recently 
joined the EU. Because of the integrative economic and political structure of the 
organization, as well as the specific demands placed upon member states to conform to a 
specific set of norms, the political context is considerably altered. This can, in tum affect 
the state's ability to implement specific policies, which do not conform with these norms, 
or increase the implementation of specific policies, which conform to the EU's norms, but 
not necessarily the country's. Membership in this institution is considered as it guides the 
policies which the state can implement and how this affects the Church's potential for 
realizing political influence. In addition, it also introduces a greater degree of economic, 
political, and social influx from the West, which is sometimes considered to be a danger to 
17 Meyer, "Political Opportunity and Nested Institutions," 23. 
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the Church's political goals, mainly because the West is associated with the tendency 
toward secularization of the state. 18 
Specifying the Nature of the Political Context 
Rather than describing the context, and hence the POS, to be open or closed to the 
Church over a specific period of time, the relative degree of openness or closure will be 
considered instead. This is because the context consists of both unstable elements, which 
are present for a relatively short period of time, and more durable and stable elements, 
which are present for a relatively long period of time. Therefore, the degree of openness or 
closure of the context to the Church, .in each country, will have a base of reference at the 
time at which the major political transformation occurred, when the system presented a 
more obvious level of political opportunity; as each political system consolidated, more 
durable patterns of political interaction replaced those which were present at the outset, 
making the process of relating context directly to political influence more cornplex. 
The Utility of Comparative Analysis 
The situation of the Polish Roman Catholic Church could stand alone as a single 
case analysis, intended to illustrate the contextual variables which shape the Church's 
political position in that particular country; however, it is more instructive to compare the 
Polish situation to another country which shares some similar features. Comparison is 
valuable as a mechanism of discovering whether commonalities between different states 
18 In this in tance, secularization refers to a "process by which religious and secular institutions 
and norms are differentiated into separate pheres." Aminzade and Perry, 156. 
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lead to similar conclusions about the operation of the Church in those states. It is also 
valuable to contrast the situations between the two states to discover the reasons for the 
disparity between the two situations. Finally, it is instructive as to where to place the 
Church in both Poland and Slovenia, along the continuum that describes the degree of 
political opportunity for each Church. At its completion, the comparison reveals the 
contextual variables which have been most influential in conditioning the role of the Roman 
Catholic Church in these two post-Communist societies. 
Slovenia as a Comparative Model 
One appropriate case for comparison with the Roman Catholic Church's position in 
Poland is that of the Church in Slovenia. These two situations are suited to comparative 
analysis for a number of reasons: the predominance of the Roman Catholic faith, systemic 
transformation, political circumstance, and economic performance. 
The religious composition of society in each country is similar; Roman Catholicism 
is the dominant religion. One of the latest publications about the Catholic Church show 
that both Poland and Slovenia are predominantly Roman Catholic: Roman Catholics 
comprise 96 percent of the population in Poland and 82.6 percent in Slovenia. 19 Although 
the size of the population differs somewhat between the two countries, this is not an 
insurmountable problem because the analysis is based on the traditional dominance of each 
Church rather than the actual size of the Roman Catholic population. 
19 Bunson, 322; 326. 
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The profound wave of democratic reform that swept across the Soviet Union and 
the Communist states of east-central Europe in the late 1980s and early 1990s propelled 
both Poland and Slovenia into a profound systemic transformation. Poland entered its 
transition from Communist to democratic politics in 1989 after the negotiated settlement of 
the Round Table. Slovenia arrived at this point at a later time, after it ultimately negotiated 
its way out of Yugoslavia in 1991, but the change was no less profound. The 
circumstances of these transitions are strikingly similar, yet remarkably different. Poland, 
hither too defined as an independent state within Soviet-controlled eastern Europe, was 
already structured to function as an independent state. However, Slovenia faced a dual 
transition from the last vestiges ofTito's Socialist dictatorship, inherited in the fractious 
Yugoslav federation, to a democratic, independent state. Since the Slovenian state had 
been designed to function within a federation rather than as an independent state, its 
transition was wrought with the challenges of extrication from a larger political system and 
construction of a democratic polity. The complexity of Slovenia's situation as compared to 
Poland's in the post-Communist era challenges the compatibility of the two cases. 
Nevertheless, a comparison is still feasible because of the similarity between the path that 
each country has followed. Despite Poland's previous status as an independent state, it 
was necessary to enact massive reform of political and economic structures in the country 
and to establish normal connections to the international community. Post-independence 
Slovenian politics have been consumed with analogous tasks. Each country has attempted 
to establish a fully functional democratic system, western-style economic model, and ties to 
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international institutions. Also, both countries have gained acceptance in the European 
Union (EU) and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in recent years, signifying 
their integration into the larger western community of states. It is this resemblance 
between the two cases which allows for a comparison between the Roman Catholic 
Church's context in each country. 
Aside from the broad goals of the reform process and irnilarity of each nation's 
path, the political development of each country shares similarities that lend credence to the 
comparison. Assessments of each country's progress in the reform process are consistently 
higher than those in neighbouring countries of this region. The latest Nations in Transit, a 
publication that provides an assessment of democratic reform in the former Soviet Union 
and other formerly Communist states/ 0 shows the consistency of democratic advancement 
in each tate. Between 1997 and 2004 the quantitative values which asse s democratic 
development have either held steady or continued to show improvement for each state, 
with both achieving a score of 1.75 in 2004, which places them into the highest strata of 
states in thi region, those achieving impending EU member hip.21 These scores qualify 
20 Alexander Motyl and Amanda Schnetzer, eds., Nations in Transit 2004 (New York, 
Washington, D.C. : Freedom House; Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Tnc., 2004), ix. 
21 This score is placed on a scale of I to 7, with I indicating the highest level of improvement 
and 7 indicating the lowest level of improvement. The "New Democracy Score" is based upon the 
numerical conglomeration of six factors: e lectoral process, c ivil society, independent media, governance, 
constitutional, legis lative, and j udicial framework and corruption. These numbers are generated by a 
qualitative analysis of each factor, accompanied by a common checklist of questions, and are conducted by 
the authors and experts on the region. Assessment of change are then assigned a numerical value which 
is based on the degree of change on that variable since the last report. A detailed description of the 
method is given in the "Methodology" section of the publication. Ibid., ix - xvii ; 26; 420; 560. 
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both states for the status of consoljdated democracy, wruch is associated with "[ e ]xistence 
of best practices that adhere to basic human rights standards, democratic norms, and the 
rule of law.'m Therefore, since each state is at a similar, but not identical , stage of 
development, the internal and external variables which affect the Church's context are more 
comparable. 
Data Collection 
Data was collected from a mix of primary and secondary sources, which were 
available from Memorial University's Queen Elizabeth ll Library, the Interlibrary Loan 
Service, and numerous electronic sources. 
Primary sources of Polish data included statistical information from the Polish 
polling agency, CBOS/ 3 the Polish General Social Survey, 24 and the World Values 
Survey.25 Slovene statistical sources were more numerous and readily accessible through 
the Social Sciences Data Archive (Arhiv Druiboslovnih Podatkov), organized by the 
University of Ljubljana. Comparative data for both countries was available through a 
statistical data archive at a German university, which provided the full codebook of the 
22 Ibid., xvii. 
23 This abbreviation stands for Centrum Badania Opinii Spolecznej [Public Opinion Research 
Center] , which makes the results of its public opinion polls available electronically at http://www.cbos.pl 
24 This is a comprehensive survey conducted each year, between 1992 and 1999, which assesses 
hundreds of variables related to Polish social identi ty, religious attitudes, and re ligious practice. 
Unfortunate ly, only the 1992 to 1994 data is available for unrestricted access. The remaining data is 
compiled in a prohibitively expensive publication. 
25 Most of the World Values Survey data for Poland is accessible through the Memorial 
University library, although recent years may prove to be inaccessible. 
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International Social Survey Programme studies of religion in a number of countries around 
the world in 1991 and 1998. These sources of data provided a method of measuring 
society's openness to Church participation in politics. Information compiled by both the 
Polish government and the Roman Catholic Church provided basic statistics about religious 
affiliation and the structure of the Roman Catholic Church.26 Comparable longitudinal 
data, which was derived from these primary sources, was analyzed qualitatively because it 
lacked the detail necessary for quantitative methods. Other primary sources included the 
Constitution of the Republic of Poland ( 1997) and the Constitution of the Republic of 
Slovenia ( 1991 ), which outlined the constitutional position of the Church in each country. 
Polish and Slovenian news agencies27 also served as a source of information about recent 
political events, particularly the 2005 elections in Poland. 
One particularly challenging phase of the analysis involved the translation of 
statistical data that was necessary for an explanation of the societal context in both 
countries. Many documents were only available in their native language and required 
translation into English; a time-consuming exercise that required the acquisition of 
additional resources, such as dictionaries and grammar references of the Polish and Slovene 
26 The infonnation provided by the annual statistical publication of the Polish government is 
derived from the latest census in 200 I. Unfortunate ly, a significant proportion of the government ' s data, 
which concerns re ligion and the Church, is provided by the Roman Catholic Church, rather than a 
disinterested observer. 
27 This includes electronic news sources which are published on the internet. Since the 
re liabili ty of internet sources is unpredictable, Polish sources will be confined to reputable news agencies 
such as the Warsaw Voice and a few others which publish in the English language. In addition, the 
availability of English-language Sloven ian news sources was limited and thus, input from these sources is 
limited in the Sloven ian section of the analysis. 
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languages.28 
Unfortunately, some of the gaps in the data for each country could not be filled due 
to financial, time, and language limitations. Certain comprehensive studies, especially tho e 
related to Poland, were either unavailable or prohibitively expensive. This was the case for 
Polish General Social Survey data from 1995 onwards. However, many sources of data, 
sometimes drawn from secondary sources, have been used to fill the gaps. 
Secondary research sources, including books, scholarly articles, and conference 
papers, drawn from a wide range of disciplines in the social sciences and humanities, served 
as the principal supporting evidence for this thesis.29 The arguments and evidence 
contained in each of these sources were critically assessed to determine the current level of 
knowledge about the topic, as well as to delineate trends and gaps. In addition, significant 
theoretical connections were extracted for further analysis in this thesis. Finally, many of 
the sources were also used to support the arguments in this thesis because these works 
presented information on the topic that could not be feasibly gained in any other manner. 
2M Since I completed a B .A. with a major in Russian Language and Literature, I was able to use 
my familiarity of Slavic languages to perfom1 basic translations using these sources. 
29 A preponderance of these sources are drawn from scholarly publications. Most of the books 
are written by academics with a clearly stated institutional affiliation or a notable reputation in their area 
of study. The scholarly journals are dominated by reputable publications: Religion, State, & Society, 
Social Compass, Sociology ofReligion , Sociological Analysis, American Sociological Review, Social 
Forces, Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion , Europe-Asia Studies, Communist and Post-
Communist Studies, Slavic Review, East European Constitutional Review, and East European Politics 
and Societies. Publications uch as Religion in Eastern Europe, East European Quarterly, and Polish 
Sociological Review may have standards which are less rigorous than some of the other journals, but the 
information which they provide is valuable nonetheless. Finally, conference papers, most of which were 
available from online academic societies, are also included . 
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Organization of the Analysis 
The first section of the analysis concentrates on developments in the Polish and 
Slovene Church's historical and social context to gauge and compare the power of Roman 
Catholicism in the construction of political opportunity in each case. Next, the analysis 
moves on to consider and compare the role of political parties in creating political 
opportunities for each national Church. As an extension of the pivotal role of political 
parties in democratic politics, the next section looks at bow the structure of the electoral 
process and the electoral fortunes of various parties in each country affect the Church's 
political opportunity structure. The fourth section furthers this analysis by looking at and 
comparing government dynamics, specifically how the necessity of coalition governing has 
affected the political opportunities available to each Church. The importance of legal and 
constitutional opportunities and constraints on each national Church merits the devotion of 
the fifth section to a comparative examination of how these factors affect the political 
opportunity structure over both the short- and the long-term. Finally, the transnational 
forces which press upon the state, specifically the EU and other western institutions, and 
shape its policy choices, are compared in terms of the limits or enhancements that they 
impose on the political opportunity structure and the Church's ability to influence the 
development of the state. 
Whether the Church was able to make use of the contextual variables which fom1ed 
the structure of opportunity with which it was presented was not the focus of this analysis. 
Rather, the analysis focused on how each component of the context, over general periods 
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of time, affected the degree of political manoeuverability available to the Church, regardless 
of whether or not the Church was able to take advantage of the opportunities with which it 
was presented. This was used to explain why the Roman Catholic Church in each of 
Poland and Slovenia has experienced variable opportunities and outcomes over the post-
communist period, as well as the differences between the Church's political role in each 
context. 
Summary 
Utilizing a framework which is based upon the Roman Catholic Church' s status as 
an interest group, as well as an adaptation of the theory of political opportunity structure 
(POS), this study seeks to explain how fluctuating contextual features affected the political 
options available to the Church in post-Communist Poland and Slovenia. These options 
reflect the relative openness or closure of the sy tern to the Church's political influence and 
thereby determine what the Church was able to accomplish politically. A variety of primary 
and secondary sources were used to accomplish this task. The end result will provide a 
comparative explanation of how political opportunity structure affects the Church ' s 
political activity and suggest further lines of inquiry. 
CHAPTER4 
THE POLISH AND SLOVENE CHURCHES: 
CONFRONTING A NEW SOCIETY 
At the beginning of the 1990s, the Polish Roman Catholic Church was poised to 
play a leading role in the subsequent development of the democratic regime and an 
emancipated society. It held this position, certain that it faced a political opportunity 
structure that opened many avenues of political influence. However, Polish democracy 
unleashed a set of forces that consistently challenged the Church's right to wield political 
power, such that, as the decade progressed, the Church's political power was eroded from 
the peak it bad reached in the early 1990s. Essentially, the Church stabilized around a new 
status quo position, never facing a political opportunity structure that was as open as it had 
been during the transition, nor as closed as it had peen at various points during its history. 
The Slovene Roman Catholic Church faced a different situation in the early 1990s: 
the political and social context created a political opportunity structure that placed the 
Church into a subordinate position in the development of Slovene democracy and society. 
The general perception across east-central Europe that religious institutions, particularly 
the Roman Catholic Church, bad played some role in democratic political change accorded 
the Church some respect and a symbolic role, but little concrete political power. The 
Church maintained this low level of power, attaining few concessions from either state or 
society, until 1999, when the Church made some small gains. This trend continued and, by 
2005, the Church had reached a higher level of political power than it had enjoyed during 
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all of the preceding decade. However, these gains are modest compared to those of the 
Polish Church and the Slovene Church continues to face a political opportunity structure 
that provides fewer openings into the political arena. Thus, for both Churches, the dynamic 
interaction between hi tory, society, political parties, electoral politics, government, legal 
and constitutional structures, and transnational priorities, profoundly influenced the 
political opportunity structure and hence, the relative openness of each country's system to 
Church influence. 
The Power of Roman Catholicism 
The scale of political change and evolution over the last two decades has had far-
reaching consequences for Polish and Slovene society. The inundation of new liberal, 
democratic, and western values has reinforced, even amplified, some preexisting features, 
and weakened others. Each society's assimilation of these values bas altered the Church's 
context; much as ripples spread across a pond, society's views of the Church ripple across 
the democratic political landscape. Notable differences are apparent in each Church's 
histories that have resulted in markedly contrasting nationalistic constructions such that 
Polish national identity traditionally revolves around the Church, while Slovene national 
identity revolves around language and culture, subordinating the Church to a less 
prominent role. These historical features, combined with societies that present remarkably 
different religious tendencies, but similar hostilities toward Church interference in political 
processes and issue-oriented politics, create a different set of opportunities and constraints 
for the Church in each country. 
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History in the Construction of National Identity 
Roman Catholicism Through History up to the Communist Period 
Poland's tumultuous history, characterized by a succession of foreign invasions and 
territorial partitions, serves as a definitive element in the formation of Polish identity.' 
Since these invaders often adhered to different religious traditions, Poles defined their 
nationality such that it would separate them from these rulers according to religious 
identity.2 Since a majority of Poles practised Roman Catholicism, it was natural that this 
faith would form a nationalistic connection to Polish identity. World War II, which was 
accompanied by ethnic and territorial modifications, along with the circumstances of the 
Communist period, amplified the association between Polishness and Roman Catholicism.3 
Accordingly, "[t]he Catholic narrative of Polish history is far more than a recognition that 
Roman Catholicism was and is important in Poland: it is an ideologically-loaded conceptual 
framework that gives specific meaning to the past and helps determine what is remembered 
and what is forgotten."4 Indeed, the Catholic Church is often assigned a heroic role during 
periods of foreign domination, regardless of its status as the lone institution available to 
1Ewa Nowicka, "Roman Catholicism and the Contents ofPolishness," in New Religious 
Phenomena in Central and Eastern Europe, eds. Irena Borowik and Grzegorz Babinski (Krakow: Nomos, 
1997), 9 I -92; Irena Borowik, "Transfonnations of Catholicism and Religiosity of Catholics in Poland," in 
Religion , Churches, and the Scientific Studies of Religion: Poland and Ukraine, ed. Irena Borowik 
(Krakow: NOMOS, 2003), 42. 
2 Nowicka, 9 I . Borowik, "Transformations of Catholicism in Poland," 42. 
3 Brian Porter "The Catholic Nation: Religion, Identity, and the Narratives of Polish History," 
Slavic and East European Journa/45 , no.2 (200 I): 292; Nowicka, 92. 
4 Porter, 291. 
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Poles or its cooperation with foreign powers.5 Further, the Church promotes historical 
events which reinforce this association and downplays those which detract from it.6 For 
instance, the significant presence of Protestant, Jewish, and Orthodox religious faiths 
during Poland's history is de-emphasized in favour of Catholic prominence.7 Consequently, 
the common interpretation of the Church's presence in Poland's history promotes the idea 
that Poland is a Roman Catholic nation. Although this idea is based on the past, it has 
implications for the Church, even in the present. It bas been interwoven into Poland's 
political culture over hundreds of years and provides the Church with a justification for its 
continued presence in Polish politics. Also, this association with national identity can be 
exploited in situations that revolve around the differentiation of Polishness relative to other 
nationalities. 
The evolution of the Roman Catholic Church over its one thousand years in 
Slovenia was uneven and lacked the same dominant character of the Church' s evolution in 
Poland. During the Reformation, Protestantism assumed a seminal role in the development 
of Slovene language and culture with the transcription of the first Slovene-language Bible. 8 
5 Ibid., 294-295. 
6 Elzbieta Mach and Zdzislaw Mach, "Religious Minorities and Exclusion in Education in 
Present-Day Poland," in Church-State Relations in Central and Eastern Europe, ed. Irena Borowik 
(Krakow: Nomos, 1999), 405. 
7 Porter, 291 -293 . 
8 Mitja Velikonja, "Historical Roots of Sloven ian Christoslavic Mythology,"; Joze Pogacnik, 
"The Cultural Significance of the Protestant Refonnation in the Genesis of the South Slavic Nations," 
Slovene Studies 6, no. 1-2 ( 1984): I 03- 105, I 07- 108. 
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Protestantism also provided the Slovene people with an alternate identity and a different set 
ofbeliefs, which ran counter to those of the Church. However, the Church recreated its 
monopoly during the Counter-Reformation and subsequently assumed a prominent role in 
political life, using the idea of Catholic integrism as a justification for its dominance.9 This 
situation, which lasted until World War IT, entailed a substantial amount of political activity 
which was intended to preserve the Church's influence over the Slovene people. 10 During 
World War IT, the Church made a costly choice, which effectively dissociated the Church 
from Slovene culture and initiated a culture of distrust around the Church's motives and 
activities within society. It chose to ally with the occupying forces against the Communist-
backed Partisan forces, which were supported by a majority of the Slovene people.'' The 
decision continues to mar the Church's reputation, even in the present. As a result, the 
Church's historical development in Slovenia does not lend credence to a nationalistic 
association between Slovene identity and Roman Catholicism and the Church's historical 
position in Slovenia is generally much weaker than it is in Poland. Thus, the Church lacks a 
nationalistic base from which to justify its political involvement and cannot use this 
association to exploit situations that require a differentiation of Sloveneness from another 
nationality; Slovenes have their language and culture to differentiate themselves from 
9 Velikonja, "Historical Roots ofSiovenian Christoslavic Mythology." 
10 Velikonja, "Historical Roots of Slovenian Christoslavic Mythology"; Zdenko Roter, "The 
Church and Contemporary Slovene History," Nationalities Papers 21, no. 1-2 (1993): 7 1, 74. 
11 Velikonja; Roter, 74. 
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others. 
The Politics of Resistance and Change: Fomented 
by the Church or Leaving the Church Behind? 
The Communist period, from 1945 to 1989, merits special attention because the 
events of this time bad a direct effect on the political opportunity structure at the start of 
the democratic political transition and added to the Church's historical association with 
nationalism. During this time, the Polish Church managed to assume a position between 
state and society which enhanced its standing among the Polish people and forced the 
Communists to take the Church seriously as a powerful contender. Communist attempts to 
diminish the Church's role forced the Church to take political action and unite with Polish 
society against Communist rule. 12 For this cause, the Church uti! ized its ties to the Polish 
nation to capture the grievances of the populace in a religious-nationalistic frame 13 that 
could be also be described as a civil religion, 14 which was imbued with Catholic symbols, 
12 Sabrina P . Ramet, Nihil Obstat: Religion, Politics, and Social Change in East-Central Europe 
and Russia (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1998), 99-102 
13 Osa analyzes the Church's use of religious nationalism to fight the Communist state in terms 
of emphasizing a Catholic Poland versus forei gn Communists framing of the ituation. Maryjane Osa, 
"Creating Solidarity, "The Religious Foundations of the Polish Social Movement," East European Politics 
and Societies II , no. 2 ( 1997): 352-354. 
14 Morawska utilizes the concept of civil religion, defined as "a set of religiopolitical symbols and 
rituals ... [which] address issues of political ethos and legitimacy that are not fused with either the state 
or church." Ewa Morawska, "Civil Religion Versus State Power in Poland," in Church-State Relations: 
Tensions and Transitions, eds. Thomas Robbins and Roland Robertson (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction 
Inc., 1987), 222. 
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100 
romanticism, and nationalism. 15 Poland was elevated to martyrdom, destined to share the 
suffering of Christ, and to seek redemption from its oppression by collectively serving 
Christianity and opposing the atheistic communist state.16 This transfer of Church ideas 
and symbols to the public, political sphere allowed the Church to represent the entirety of 
Polish society, even if some members of that society did not have strong ties to Roman 
Catholicism. In this way, the events of the Communist period strengthened the nationalistic 
association between Roman Catholicism and Polish identity. The Church was also pivotal 
in the formation of networks and the development of repertoires for the opposition. 17 In 
particular, the foremost opposition organization in Poland, Solidarity, derived many of the 
symbols for its struggle from the Roman Catholic faith. 18 The culmination of the Church's 
role during this period came at the Round Table negotiations of 1989, when the Church 
served as a third party at the table, balancing between the delegates from Solidarity, 
determined to reform the regime, and the Communists, reluctant to give up their power in 
15 Morawska, "Civil Religion Versus State Power in Poland," 224-225; Osa, "Creating 
Solidarity: The Religious Foundations of the Polish Social Movement," 352-354. 
16 Morawska, "Civil Religion Versus State Power in Poland," 224-229. 
17 For a detailed discussion of the Church's importance in the formation of networks, see Osa 
(2003). For Church' s importance to repertoire (and frame) development see Osa ( 1997). Maryjane Osa, 
"Networks in Opposition: Linking Organizations Through Activists in the Polish People's Republic," in 
Social Movements and Networks: Relational Approaches to Collective Action, eds. Mario Diani and Doug 
McAdam (New York: Oxford University Press, 2003), 87-1 00; Osa, "Creating Solidarity: The Religious 
Foundations of the Polish Social Movement," 35 1-359. 
18 Jan Kubik, The Power of Symbols Against the Symbols of Power: The Ri e ofSo/idarity and 
the Fall a.( State Sociali min Poland (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1994), 145, 
189, 228, 252-254. 
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the reform process. Throughout the Communist period, the Church had successfully 
manoeuvred around the state and the opposition movement, carefully choosing issues over 
which it would agree to or oppose with either the state or the opposition. 19 However, this 
calculative behaviour did not tarnish its reputation with society. In addition, the state's 
recognition of the Church's clout prompted the authorities to occasionally court the 
Church's favour in order to maintain a modicum of control over the Polish people.20 The 
Church was able to make itself so indispensable to the legitimation of the system that its 
presence was required to validate the process of change. As a result, the Church became a 
viable and powerful ' third-way' in the new system and was unfettered by some of the 
legacies which haunted the two antagonists; it was a known, relatively virtuous 
representative held against a background of the distrusted and the unknown. As Poland' 
champion against the Communist state, the Church could also arouse powerful memories 
of resistance against an unwanted regime, a further legitimation of its usefulness in the 
political arena. It was in this powerful position that the Roman Catholic Church emerged 
from the old Communist regime into the new, democratic system. 
In Slovenia, the Church's development during the Communist period reflects its 
marginalization by the Communist authorities and the Church's retreat to nonpublic life. 
During the early portion of the Communist period, the Church was in a state of flux; its 
actions were focused on avoiding Communist persecution, restructuring from within, and 
19 Herbert, 206. 
20 Diskin, 206. 
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finding a place in Slovenes' private religious lives.21 From 1953 onwards, legal provisions 
guaranteed the Church's existence and the intensity of government persecution declined.22 
However, this did not enhance the Church's ability to move from the political margins and 
organize an effective opposition to the state. The fust indications of organizing around the 
goal of democratic reform came from alternative groups during the 1970s: punk, 
environmentalist, human rights, and gay subculture. The members of these organizations 
were involved in lifestyles or causes that were atypical in Slovene society and not aligned 
with the Church's teachings, so it is not astonishing that the Church was not involved in 
these early manifestations of opposition to the regime. During the 1980s, this modest 
beginning, "conceived as an alternative rather than an opposition,'m crystallized into a 
large-scale collaborative effort, led by the dissident journals Nova Revija and Mladlina, 
which was united around democratic reform of the system and, ultimately, against 
Yugoslav attempts to gain control over the federation. 24 The repressive activities of the 
central Yugoslav government, which appeared to threaten Slovenia's democratic reform 
process, allowed for a coupling between democratic concepts and Yugoslav separatism; it 
21 Velikonja,"Historical Roots ofSiovenian Christoslavic Mythology"; France M. Dolinar 
"Normalization of Church-State Relations in Yugoslavia, 
1945-," Slovene Studies 17, no. 1-2 ( 1995): 27-35; Roter, 7 1. 
22 Dolinar, 28-30. 
23 Tomaz Mastnak, "Civil Society in Slovenia: From Opposition to Power," Studies in 
Comparative Communism 23, no. 3/4 ( 1990): 305. 
24 Tatiana Bajuk Sencar, "The Making of History: Discourses of Democracy and Nation in 
Slovenia," Slovene Studies 22, no. I (2000): 39-4 1,47-50, 57; Erika Harri , Nationalism and 
Democratisation: Politics of Slovakia and Slovenia {Aidershot: Ashgate, 2002), 157- 158. 
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became increasingly apparent that democratic government could only be realized in 
Slovenia through sovereignty from the Yugoslav state.25 An umbrella organization, known 
as the Committee for the Defense of Human Rights (CDHR), served as the common voice 
for the political demands of civil society, 26 but the Church did not join this large-scale 
effort; rather it formed its own organization, the Commission for Justice and Peace, in 
1985, and signed a joint document with the CDHR in 1988 that called for democratic 
reform of the system.27 The Catholic organization was somewhat aloof from the media and 
other civil society organizations, but it explicitly supported action on human rights issues 
and "encouraged Catholics to participate in peaceful efforts at social change based on 
humanitarian motives."28 In addition, the Church utilized its spiritual resources to hold 
mass prayers and meditations.29 However, despite these efforts, the Church's activities 
were eclipsed by dominant civil society organizations/ 0 which played a much larger role in 
the initiation of demands for systemic reform. 
The Church was destined to play a peripheral role in the systemic transformation 
not only because of the strength and prominence of civil society organizations, but also 
25 Harris, 156-158. 
26 Mastnak, 312. 
27 Sencar, 51-52. 
2K Sencar, 5 1-52. 
29 Sencar, 55. 
30 Velikonja,"Historical Roots of Sloven ian Christoslavic Mythology." 
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because of one further development that occurred during the late 1980s. As the Yugoslav 
political structure became increasingly strained by its nationalist components, Slovenia 's 
Communists were forced to choose between Yugoslav and Slovene interests, resulting in a 
critical choice to align with Slovene reformers and initiate democratic reform.31 In effect, 
the democratic transformation became a union between civil society, the League of 
Socialist Youth (LSY), and the Slovenian League ofCommunists.32 Civil society's 
eventual political alliance with the governing Communists further confined the Church. 
The Church shared a historical antipathy with the Communists that could not be easily 
surmounted, even in the pursuit of a common cause. As a result, the alliance between civil 
society organizations and the Communists blocked the Church from assuming a leading 
role in the change. Moreover, the degree of polarization between elites was minimal, 
eliminating any opportunity to align with a particular side to attain political power. This 
meant that the Church's approval and activity were unnecessary to the legitimation of 
either the Communists or civil society, who had arrived at their own shared understanding 
of the essential priorities and tasks for the transformation. Essentially, the politics of 
systemic change left the Church behind. Since the Church failed to play a prominent role in 
the reform process, nor was it part of the established political elite, it was in a relatively 
3 1 Janko Prunk, "The Origins of an Independent Slovenia," in Making a New Nation : The 
Formation of Slovenia, eds. Danica Fink-Hafner and John Robbins (Aidershot: Dartmouth, 1997), 27-28; 
Charles Bukowski, "Slovenia's Transition to Democracy: Theory and Practice," East European Quarterly 
33, no. I ( 1999): 74-8 1; Sen car, 58; Harris 134. 
32 Harris, 134; Bukowski, 73-74; Anton Bebler, "Slovenia's Smooth Tran ition," Journal of 
Democracy 13, no. I (2002): 127-129. 
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weak position at the end of the Communist period. This contrasts sharply with the 
Church's position of political and social power in Poland at the same stage of development. 
Thus, when the political transformation officially started in both countries - that is, when 
each country's Communist Party lost its monopoly on power- each Church carried a 
different load of historical baggage from both the distant and recent past. This legacy 
provided a much lighter load for the Polish Church because it could draw upon recent, 
positive memories of the Church. In contrast, the Slovene Church carried a much heavier 
burden from recent memories of its activities: a legacy of betrayal and a marginal role in an 
era of popular change. In this way, the historical legacy acted as a negative influence on 
the Church's context in transitional Slovenia. Partly because oftlus legacy, fewer openings 
were available to the Church to gain a foothold in the political decision-making processes 
of the new polity; the Church was largely confined to a symbolic role commensurate with 
its domination of the religious sphere. 
Society 
Polish and Slovene society have experienced one of the most rapid and sweeping 
periods of change in their recent history, as the ideology underlying these polities has been 
replaced by a completely different one, carrying along with it broad changes in economics, 
politics, and society. As a religious institution, the Church is particularly vulnerable to the 
whims of a changing society because its parishioners are drawn from that society. If 
society, synonymous with the voting public in a democracy, embraces ideas and practices 
which are not consistent with continued religious beliefs or, more specifically, Catholic 
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beliefs and practices, the Church loses the power of common religious belief which bonds 
people to the Church. The Church's survival comes into question without as many 
Catholics to worship at its churches and to contribute resources to its cause. Just as 
important, as time goes on, the reasons behind the Church's political involvement become 
less relevant. The Polish Church, particularly vulnerable because of its traditionally strong 
links with society, has faced a society that has noticeably changed its position toward the 
Church over the post-Communist period, becoming less open to the Church's political 
involvement. Although the Church in Slovenia is similarly vulnerable to the consequences 
of a declining link with society, its much weaker connection with Slovene society means 
that the Slovene Church has much less to lose than the Polish Church; it is accustomed to 
facing a society that has been consistently obstructive toward its political involvement. 
The Church's Religious Dominance 
Poland: Roman Catholic Society 
Measures of religious adherence indicate that the Church remains a dominant force 
in Polish society. Public opinion surveys from different points during the 1990s and up to 
2005 demonstrate the continuation of Roman Catholicism's nearly exclusive status, with 
the proportion of Poles declaring themselves to be Roman Catholic varying between 94 
percent and 97 percent. The latest census data from the Polish government indicates that 
the proportion of Roman Catholics in Poland is actually lower, lying close to 90 percent. 33 
33 The Roman Catholic Church has a total of 34,3 12,707 adherents out of a population of 
38,230,000, which, when calculated into a raw percentage is 89.75 percent. Central Statistical Office, 
"TABL. 35 ( 15 1 ). Selected Religious Denominations in Poland: End of Year," Statistical Yearbook of the 
--------------------------------------
107 
However, the Church disputes this figure, placing it at 96 percent.34 Although there is a 
small discrepancy between each source, it does not detract from the overwhelming 
adherence to the Church in Poland; level of membership in the Church appear to have 
remained relatively steady over the last 15 years. These overwhelming declarations of 
adherence to Roman Catholicism coincide with high levels of belief in God (see figure 2), 
as well as in self-described religiousness (see figure 3). Proportions of the religious and the 
nonreligious stayed the same over the 1990s, showing only minuscule changes between 
levels of belief. In addition, regular attendance at Church services is still impressively high, 
despite a slight shift toward less frequent attendance over time.35 Conversely, other figures 
suggest a greater decline in belief and practice over the same time period.36 This 
Republic of Poland 2003 (Warsaw: Statistical Publishing Establishment, Republic of Poland, 2003), 128; 
Central Statistical Office, "TABL. l (11 7). Population Based on Census Data," Statistical Yearbook of the 
Republic of Poland 2003 (Warsaw: Statistical Publishing Establishment, Republic of Poland, 2003), l 04. 
34 Bunson, 322. 
35 More than once a week attendance at Church services dropped by nearly 20 percent between 
1991 and 1998, while attendance 2 to 3 times a month and several times a year increased by a 
corresponding percentage. Regu lar church attendance (once a month or more) sti ll sl ightly above 70 
percent in 1998, while it wa 75 percent in 199 1. This data was modified to reflect the drop of several 
choices from the 1998 questionnaire that were present in the 1991 questionnaire; many of the categories 
which were dropped were low or no response categories in the 1991 survey and readily fit into the 
categories adopted for the 1998 survey. International Social Survey Programme, "V65.R often attend 
religious services?" /SSP /991 : Religion Codebook [online], 85-87; retrieved from Zentralarchiv fiir 
Empirische Sozialforschung an der Universitat zu Koeln, Codebook ZA Study 2150; avai lable from 
http://www.za. uni-koeln.de/data/en/ issp/codebooks/s2 150cbd.pdf Internet: accessed I 0 September 2005 
(N= I 063); International Social Survey Programme, " V218.R: Religious services - how often," 1SSP 1998: 
Religion II Codebook [online], 182- 183; retrieved from German Social Science Infrastructure Studies 
(GESIS), Zentralarchiv fiir Empirische Sozialforschung an der Universitat Zll Koeln, Codebook ZA Study 
3 190, 3'd ed., 200 l ; avai lable from http ://www.za.uni-koeln.de/data/en/issp/codebooks/s3190cbd.pdf 
Internet: accessed I 0 September 2005 (N= 11 4 7). 
36 Evaluations of religious belief and practice from the early 1990s, showed a much higher level 
of belief and attendance than in 1999. Public Opinion Research Center (CBOS), "Religiousness of Pole ," 
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discrepancy between the data from the early post-Communist period and recent years 
represents a change in degree over magnitude. Poles are still believers in and practitioners 
of Roman Catholicism, just at a marginally lower level within the highest range - that is, at 
the extreme of religious belief and practice- especially when compared to other contexts.37 
Further, recent polling data shows that nearly half of Poles feel "very close" or "close" ties 
to their church. Although most of the remainder feels a "loose" connection with the 
Church, only a small number feel "no ties" to their church.38 The Church 's rela tionship 
with its parishioners at the local (parish) level shows a similar trend. As table I indicates, 
most respondents possess a discernable, steady attachment to their local parish; this has 
persisted into the present. The Church's domination ofPolish religious society, along with 
Poles' continuing attachment to the Church, provides the Church with a consistent 
opportunity to pursue political influence. This is because the connection provided by a 
common religious faith becomes a resource of shared history and values that is avai lable to 
the Church during its forays into the political. Just as the Solidarity movement tapped into 
the common heritage of Roman Catholicism in Poland by utilizing Catholic symbols to 
Polish Public Opinion (March 1999): 4 [online] ; available from 
http://www.cbos.pl/E GUSH/Bulletin/ 1999/03 _ 1999.pdf Internet: accessed 29 January 2005. 
37 Borowik, "Transfonnations of Catholicism and Religiosity of Catholics in Poland," 4 7-49. 
38 11 .6 percent of Poles have "very close ties' to church, 41 .2 percent have "close ties," and only 
2.5 percent and 7.0 percent have "no ties at all" or are "not a member of any church," respectively. This 
data was extracted from a table in Tomka 's article which contains data from a 1998 survey. Miklos 
Tomka, "Religion, Church, State and Civil Society in Ea !-Central Europe," in Church-State Relations in 
Central and Eastern Europe, ed. frena Borowik (Krakow: Zaklad Wydawniczy NOMOS, 1999), 44. 
,-----------------·------
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unite disparate elements of society/ 9 the Church has the capacity utilize the shared religious 
faith of Poles to provide a common ground from which to unite Poles around specific 
political aims. Therefore, on the most superficial level, the Church appears to exist in a 
consistently supportive societal context; however, this support becomes selective once 
political issues are exchanged for religious issues. 
39 Tarrow, Power in Movement, 121 . 
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Figure 2. Belief in God in Poland, 1991 and 1998: -3=don't believe; -2=don 't know, no 
way to find out; -1 =don't believe in God, but in a higher power; O=believe at some times, 
but not others; l =have doubts, but believe; 2=believe with no doubts about existence. 
Sources: International Social Survey Programmme (ISSP), !SSP 1991: Religion Codebook [online], 33-34; 
retrieved from German Social Science Infrastructure Studies (GESIS), Zentralarchiv fur Empirische 
Sozialforschung an der Universitiit zu Koeln, Codebook ZA Study 2150, 1995; available from 
http://www.za.uni-koeln.de/data/en/issp/codebooks/s2 I 50cbd.pdf Internet: accessed 10 September 2005; 
International Social Survey Programme (ISSP), 1SSP 1998: Religion II Codebook [online], 52; retrieved 
from Gennan Social Science Infrastructure Studies (GESIS), Zentralarchiv fiir Empirische Sozialforschung 
an der Universitiit zu Koeln, Codebook ZA Study 3190, 3'd ed., 200 l ; available from http://www.za.uni-
koeln.de/data/en/issp/codebooks/s3190cbd.pdf Internet: accessed l 0 September 2005. 
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Figure 3. Religiousness in Poland, 1991 and 1998: 3=extremely religious; 2- ery religious; 
1 =somewhat religious; O=neither rel igious nor non-religious; -1 =somewhat non-religious;-
2=very non-religious; -3=extremely non-religious. 
Sources: International Social Survey Programnm1e (TSSP), !SSP 1991: Religion Codebook [online], 75-76; 
retrieved from German Social Science lnfrastmcture Studies (GESIS), Zentralarchiv fur Empirische 
Sozialforschung an der Universitat zu Koeln, Codebook ZA Study 2150, 1995; available from 
http://www.za.uni-koeln.de/data/en!issp/codebooks/s2 I 50cbd.pdf Internet: accessed I 0 September 2005; 
International Social Survey Progranune (TSSP), !SSP 1998: Religion lf Codebook [online] , I 16; retrieved 
from German Social Science Infrastmcture Studies (GESIS), Zentralarchiv fur Empirische Sozialforschung 
an der Universitat zu Koeln, Codebook ZA Study 3190, 3'd ed., 200 I; available from http://www.za.uni-
koeln.de/data/en!issp/codebooks/s3190cbd.pdf Internet: accessed I 0 September 2005. 
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Table 1. Poles' Feelings of Membership in Their Local Church Parish (percent) 
Degree of Year 
Membership 
1994 1999 2005 
Definitely yes 38 32 45 
Rather yes 41 46 35 
Rather not 13 13 11 
Definitely not 6 5 7 
Difficult to say 2 4 2 
Source: Krzysztof Zagorski and Beata Roguska, eds., trans. K.inga Pawlowska, Public Opinion Research 
Center (CBOS), "The Poles' Ties with Their Parish," Polish Public Opinion [online] (March 2005): 2, 
figure; available from http://www.cbos.pl/ENGLISH/Bulletin/2005/03 _2005.pdf Internet: accessed 15 July 
2005; (N= 1070, 2005). 
Note: The data in this table was extracted from a graphical figure which illustrated the responses to the 
question, "Generally speaking, do you feel a member of your local Parish, do you feel ties with it?" 
Despite Poles ' continuing belief in the basic tenets of Christianity and their high 
rates of religious participation, conformity with the Church's teachings is undergoing a 
modification toward individualization. This individualization involves the restructuring of 
individual interpretations and expressions of Church dogma. Instead of following the 
Church's teachings on certain issues, many Poles rely on their own interpretation of the 
appropriate course, melding the values of contemporary society with their knowledge of 
Roman Catholic principles. On almost every issue, ranging from the political to the 
religious, a majority of Poles express the belief that their views should arise from their own 
choices, not the Church's; a phenomenon that Borowik calls a "selective acceptance of 
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dogma."40 A CBOS poll from 2001 reveals the scope of this phenomenon, finding that 
while almost two-thirds of the respondents follow the Church's teachings, a substantial 
proportion place their own interpretation on the Church's teachings, choosing to "do it my 
own way.'141 A 2005 analysis shows that this trend has stabilized, as the numbers have 
remained virtually unchanged since 2001.42 Borowik contends that thi trend is confined 
to the relatively small middle class,43 but the aforementioned results suggest otherwise; 
even though this sector of society has not shown significant growth in recent years, the 
figures suggest that a large minority of Poles have disconnected their identification with the 
Church from the need to follow all of the Church's teachings. In this way, Poles remain 
connected to the Church, but this connection only provides the basis for individual 
decision-making; Poles ' final decisions about important issues result from an internal 
40 This survey from the early 1990s, asks Poles whether "everyone should decide for themselves" 
or "everyone should be obedient to the Church" for I 0 issues: politics, birth control, child rearing, divorce, 
interruption of pregnancy, fonn of marital vows (civi l or church), extra-marital sex, religious belief and 
practice, marital infidelity, and fasting. For every issue, a majority of respondents selected "everyone 
should decide for themselves", although the magnitude decreased as the issue moved closer to the central 
tenets of the fai th, as in fasting and religious belief and practice. frena Borowik, " Institutional and Private 
Religion in Poland 1990-1 994," in New Religious Phenomena in Central and Eastern Europe, eds. Irena 
Borowik and Grzegorz Babinski (Krakow: Zaklad Wydawinczy OMOS, 1997), 250-251 . 
41 In this survey, 40 percent of respondents expressed that they use their own interpretations of 
Catholicism, rather than the Church ' s, to guide their lives. Public Opinion Research Center (CBOS), 
"Religiousness of Poles," Polish Public Opinion [online](April 200 I): 2; avai lable from 
http ://www.cbos.pl/ENGL!SH/Bulletin/200 1/04_ 200 ! .pdf Internet: accessed 29 January 2005. 
42 The results of this 2005 poll showed that compliance with the Church' s doctrine was about 58 
percent, compared to 39 percent for personalized belief. Krzysztof Zagorski and Beata Roguska, eds., 
trans. Kinga Pawlowska, Public Opinion Research Center (CBOS), "The Poles ' Ties with Their Parish," 
Polish Public Opinion [online] (March 2005): 2; available from 
http://www.cbos.pl/ENGL!SH/Bulletin/2005/03 _ 2005.pdf; Internet: accessed 15 July 2005. 
43 Borowik, "Transformations of Catholicism and the Religiosity of Catholics in Poland," 56-57. 
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melding of Catholic and contemporary values. The result is that the Church cannot simply 
dictate its views and expect a willing and obedient society to follow. The processes of 
opinion-formation are complex, incorporating the liberal notions of freedom of opinion and 
personal choice, which go against the idea that there is a single, official interpretation of 
Roman Catholicism's principles. As a result, the views of a majority of Polish society may 
not always coincide with the wishes of the Church, especially with regard to the issues of 
democratic state-building. It means that a Pole may be an adherent of the Church without 
obeying the Church's dictates or putting the Church's views first when making decisions 
about political issues; in some cases, individual opinion contradicts that prescribed by the 
Church.44 
Slovene Detachment from Religion and the Church 
Roman Catholicism is clearly the faith of the majority of Slovenes, with variable 
polling figures placing the proportion of Roman Catholics into the low 70 percent range.45 
Although the proportion of religious believers increased during the early 1990s, it quickly 
stabilized around 50 percent (see figure 4) and the religious tend to cluster around the 
44 Borowik, "Institutional and Private Religion in Poland 1990- 1994," 248-252. 
45 The Slovene Public Opinion Survey, conducted each year during the 1990s, shows a 
movement between a high of 81 percent in 1991 to a low of 69 percent in 1997; however, the proportions 
fluctuate in 70 percent to 75 percent range for the remaining years. Nikos Tos et al. , "v96. Which 
religious denomination do you belong to, if any?," Sloven ian Public Surveys 1990-1998: Cumulative 
Codebook [online] (Ljubljana: Public Opinion Research Centre, Faculty of Social Science, University of 
Ljubljana, 2004); retrieved from German Social Science Infrastmcture Studies (GESlS), Service Agency 
Eastern Europe, Zentralarchiv fur Empirische Sozialforschung an der Universitiit zu Ki:i ln, Codebook ZA 
Sn1dy 3217; available from 
http://www.gesis.org/en/data_service/eastern_europe/data/codebooklcb32 17.pdf; Internet; accessed I 0 
September 2005. 
------------------------------------------------------------------------
lowest level of "somewhat" rei igious - those with the loosest ties to their religion (see 
figure 5). A concurrent stabilization in the proportion of nonreligious suggests that 
Slovene society has reached a steady state on this measure. Compared to Poland, the 
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levels of adherence to Roman Catholicism in Slovenia are much lower, meaning that the 
Slovene Church can reach a relatively smaller portion of the population through appeals to 
common religious identity. The relatively looser ties of Slovene Roman Catholics to their 
religion, shown in figure 5, also detracts from the Church's ability to launch political 
initiatives that rely on this common identity. As far as the central tenets of Christianity and 
Catholicism are concerned, Slovenes tend to express either disbelief or uncertainty about 
the existence of God, while only a small minority express absolute faith in God's existence 
(see figure 6). Slovenes also display a continuing tendency toward infrequent or non-
attendance at religious services, as shown in table 2. Although the proportion of Slovenes 
who attend Church regularly (once a month or more) increased over the 1990s, the 
magnitude of this increase was small and a majority of Slovenes continued their habit of 
attending Church much less frequently or never. Slovenes' less than strong feelings of 
linkage to church, displayed in table 3, demonstrate that society is evenly divided among 
three different attachments to church: strong, weak, and none. Again, since these features 
suggest less attachment to and participation in the Church than in the Polish case, the 
resonance of the Church's political appeals is expected to be much less than in Poland, 
meaning that the Church's message is less able to find the common ground necessary to 
secure society's support for its political aims. 
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Figure 4. Religiou ness in Slovenia, 1991 to 2005. 
Sources: Nikos Tos et al., Slovenian Public Opinion /990-1998: Cumulative Codebook [online] (Ljubljana: Public 
Opinion Research Centre, Faculty of Socia l Science, University of Ljubljana, 2004), v94; retrieved from German 
Social Science Infrastructure Studies (GESIS), Service Agency Eastern Europe, Zentralarchiv fUr Empirische 
Sozialforschung an der Universitiit zu Kiiln, Codebook ZA Study 32 17; avai lable from 
http://www.gesis.org/en/data_service/eastem_europe/data/codebook/cb3217 .pdf Internet: accessed I 0 September 
2005; Nikos Tos et a t. , Slovensko Javno Menenje S/ovensko Javno Mnenje 1999/4: Stalisca o Pridruzevanju Evropski 
Uniji [Slovene Public Opinion Survey 199914: Allitudes on Integration in the European Union} [online] (Ljubljana: 
Public Opinion Research Centre, Faculty of Social Science, University of Ljubljana, 1999), vQ6 15; retrieved from 
Arhiv Druzboslovnih Podatkov (ADP), University of Ljubljana, 2000, Dataset SJM994; avai lable from 
http://www.adp.fdv.uni-lj.si/opisilindex Internet: acces ed 6 October 2005; Nikos Tos et al., Slovensko Javno Mnenje 
200111: Sta/isca Slovencev o Pridruievanju Evropski Uniji in Mednarodna Raziskava o Delovnih Aktivnostih[Siovene 
Public Opinion Survey 2001/ 1: Allitudes toward Integration in the European Union and International Research on 
Working Activities} [online] (Ljubljana: Public Opinion Research Centre, Faculty of Social Science, University of 
Ljubljana, 200 I), vD9;retrieved from Arhiv Druzboslovnih Podatkov (ADP), University of Ljubljana, 2002, Dataset 
SJMO II ; avai lable from http://www.adp.fdv.uni-lj .si/opisi/index Internet: accessed 10 September 2005 ; Nikos Tos et 
al., Slovensko Javno Mnenje 200311 [Slovene Public Opinion Survey 2003/ 1} [online] (Ljubljana: Public Opinion 
Research Centre, Faculty of Social Science, University of Ljubljana, 2003), v818; retrieved from Arhiv Druzboslovnih 
Podatkov (ADP), Dataset SJM031. Ljubljana: Univerza v Ljubljani, 2004; available from http://www.adp.fdv .uni-
lj.si/opisi/ index Internet: accessed I 0 September 2005; Niko Tos et al., Slovensko Javno Mnenje 200511: 
Mednarodna Raziskava Stalisca o Delu [Slovene Public Opinion Survey 2005/ 1: International Comparative Study 
Work Orientation, /SSP [online] (Ljubljana: Public Opinion Re earch Centre, Faculty of Social Science, University of 
Ljubljana, 2005), v730; retrieved from Arhiv Druzboslovnih Podatkov (ADP), University of Ljubljana, Dataset 
SJM051; avai lable from http://www.adp.fdv.uni-lj.si/opisi/index Internet: accessed 30 March 2006. 
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Figure 5. Comparison of Patterns of Religiousness in Poland and Slovenia, 1991 and 
1998: 3=extremely religious; 2=very religious; 1 =somewhat religious; O=neither religious 
nor non-religious; -1 =somewhat non-religious; -2=very non-religious; -3=extremely non-
religious. 
Sources: International Social Survey Programmme (fSSP), !SSP 1991: Religion] Codebook [online); 
retrieved from German Social Science Infrastructure Studies (GESIS), Zentralarchiv fi.ir Empirische 
Sozialforschung an der Universitiit zu Koeln, Codebook ZA Study 2 150, 1995; available from 
http://www.za.uni-koeln.de/data/en/issp/codebooks/s2150cbd.pdf Internet: accessed I 0 September 2005; 
International Social Survey Programme (!SSP), /SSP 1998: Religion 11 Codebook [online]; retrieved from 
Gennan Social Science Infrastructure Studies (GESIS), Zentralarchiv fi.ir Empirische Sozialforschung an 
der Universitiit zu Koeln, Codebook ZA Study 3190, 3'd ed., 2001 ; available from http://www.za.uni-
koeln.de/data!en/issp/codebooks/s3190cbd.pdf Internet: accessed I 0 September 2005. 
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Figure 6. Belief in God in Slovenia, 1991 and 1998: -3=Don't believe; -2=Don't know 
there's no way to find out if there is a God; - 1 =Don't believe in God, but a higher power 
of some kind; O=Believe at some times, but not others; 1 =Believe, but have doubts; 
2=Believe with no doubts. 
Sources: International Social Survey Programmme,/SSP 1991: Religion Codebook [online], 33-34; 
retrieved from German Social Science Infrastructure Studies (GESIS), Zentralarchiv fur Empirische 
Sozialforschung an der Universitiit zu Koeln, Codebook ZA Study 2 150, 1995; available from 
http://www.za.uni-koeln.de/data/en/issp/codebooks/s2 150cbd.pdf Internet: accessed I 0 September 2005; 
International Social Survey Programme, !SSP 1998: Religion II Codebook [online], 52; retrieved from 
Gennan Social Science Infrastructure Studies (GESIS), Zentralarchiv fur Empirische Sozialforschung an 
der Universitiit zu Koeln, Codebook ZA Study 3190, 3'd ed., 200 I ; available from http://www.za.uni-
koeln.de/data/enlissp/codebooks/s3 190cbd.pdf Internet: accessed I 0 September 2005. 
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Table 2. Attendance at Religious Services in Slovenia (percent) 
Frequency 1992 1994 1996 1999 2001 2003 2005 x 
;:>: once a week 12.9 15.6 14.6 8.8 12.8 16.1 13.7 14 
several times a 
month 8.4 8. 1 8.3 9 6.5 6.1 6.6 7.6 
once a month 6 6.9 8 5.2 6.8 6.6 6.4 6.6 
several times a year 26.8 36.4 35.4 40.7 39.8 32.1 37.2 36 
less frequently 16.7 5.8 9.1 9 7.7 12.9 12.1 L 1 
never 25.6 24.8 22.6 24.5 24.2 24.4 21.9 24 
N 923 944 96 1 1001 925 1073 1002 975 
Sources: Niko Tos et al. , Slovenian Public Opinion Surveys 1990-1998: Cumulative Codebook [online] 
(Ljubljana: Public Opinion Research Centre, Faculty of Social Science, University of Ljubljana, 2004), v95; 
retrieved from Gennan Social Science Infrastructure Studies (GESJS), Service Agency Eastern Europe, 
Zentralarchiv fi.ir Empirische Sozialforschung an der Universitiit zu Koln, Codebook ZA Study 32 17; 
available from http://www.gesis.org/en/data _service/eastern_ europe/data/codebooklcb3217.pdf Internet: 
accessed 10 September 2005; Nikos Tos et al. , Slovensko Javno Mnenje 1999/ 1 [Slovene Public Opinion 
Survey 200311} [online] (Ljubljana: Public Opinion Research Centre, Faculty of Social Science, University 
of Ljubljana, 1999), vD7 A; retrieved from Arhiv Druzboslovnih Podatkov (ADP) [Social Sciences Data 
Archive], University ofLjubljana,2004, Dataset SJM991; available from http://www.adp.fdv .uni-
lj .si/opisi/index Internet: accessed 21 March 2006; Nikos Tos et al. , Slovensko Javno Mnenje 200113 
[Slovene Public Opinion Survey 2001/3] [online] (Ljubljana: Public Opinion Research Centre, Faculty of 
Social Science, University of Ljubljana, 2001 ), v8 1 7; retrieved from Arhiv Druzboslovnih Podatkov (ADP) 
[Social Sciences Data Archive], University of Ljubljana, 2004, Dataset SJMO 13; available from 
http://www.adp.fdv.uni-lj .si/opisilindex Internet: accessed 2 1 March 2006; Nikos Tos et al., Slovensko 
Ja vno Mnenje 2003/1 [Slovene Public Opinion Survey 200311} [online] (Ljubljana: Public Opinion 
Research Centre, Faculty of Social Science, University of Ljubljana, 2003), v820; retrieved from Arhiv 
Druzboslovnih Podatkov (ADP) [Social Sciences Data Archive] , University ofLjubljana, 2004, Dataset 
SJM03 1; available from http://www.adp.fdv. uni-lj.si/opisi/index Internet: accessed 10 September 2005; 
Nikos Tos et al., S/ovensko Javno Mnenje 200511 [Slovene Public Opinion Survey 2005/ 1} [online] 
(Ljubljana: Public Opinion Research Centre, Faculty of Social Science, University of Ljubljana, 2005), 
v732; retrieved from Arhiv Druzboslovnih Podatkov (ADP) [Social Sciences Data Archive], University of 
Ljubljana, 2006, Dataset SJM05 1; available from http://www.adp.fdv.uni-lj .si/opisi/index Internet: 
accessed 1 0 September 2005. 
Table 3. Slovenes' Links to Church, 1998 (percent) 
very close ties 3.1 
close ties 29.4 
loose ties 26.5 
no ties at all 4.6 
not member of any church 33.3 
Source: Miklos Tomka "Religion, Church, State and 
Civil Society in East-Central Europe," in Church-State 
Relations in Central and Eastern Europe, ed. Irena 
Borowik (Krakow: Zaklad Wydnawiczy NOMOS, 1999), 
44 (N=867). 
Just as membership in the Roman Catholic religion is synonymous with neither 
religious belief nor religious practice, neither is membership synonymous with the 
120 
application of Church teachings to everyday Slovene life. Rather, society is moving toward 
greater individualization of religious principles, independent of the Church, as well as the 
Church's ideas of how Slovenes should live their lives to conform with its teachings. This 
idea is borne out by SPO polls, conducted over the 1990s, which found that the proportion 
of respondents who declared that they were "religious in accordance with the teachings of 
the Church" decreased, while the proportion who declared that they were "religious in my 
own way" simultaneously increased.46 Furthermore, among the approximately half of 
Slovenes who subscribe to some level of religious belief, only a small share of them 
incorporate the teachings of the Roman Catholic Church. The remainder rely on their own 
46 Marjan Smrke, "Religious Dynamics in Slovenia during the 1990s," in Religion and Social 
Change in Post-Communist Europe, eds. Irena Borowik and Miklos Tomka (Krakow: Zaktad 
Wydawniczy, 200 I), 200. 
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interpretation of rei igion, characterized by a "galaxy of diverse beliefs which centre 
considerably less around the Roman Catholic Church and considerably more around the 
personal convictions of the individual. "47 This trend does not bode well for the Slovene 
Church. Although a similar trend is also apparent in Poland, it is of a much smaller 
magnitude than in Slovenia. This is perhaps because Slovenes are more advanced along 
this trend than their Polish counterparts. Overall, the Church's dominance over the 
religious sphere provides the Church with a connection to a large proportion of the Slovene 
population, but this connection lacks the strength of the connection between the Church 
and Poles, mainly because Slovenes are more dissociated from religious belief, Roman 
Catholicism, religious practice, and the Roman Catholic Church. In Slovenia, the Church's 
messages and demands lack the same strong connection to a pre-existing pool of closely-
held beliefs. The salience of wider Church political appeals is therefore reduced, in turn 
minimizing the Church's opportunities to attain political influence. Therefore, the openness 
of this portion of the political opportunity structure has been relatively smaller in Slovenia 
compared to Poland over the entirety of the post-communist period. 
Evaluating the Church as a Public Institution: Confidence and Tru t 
Measures of trust and confidence indicate whether Poles believe that the Church is 
a reliable institution, based on their assessments of its past and present activity, as well a 
their expectations of the Church's future behaviour. When compared to other institutions 
in Poland, the Church consistently receives the highest ratings of confidence, with the 
47 Ibid., 20 I. 
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exception of the Polish military, which receives similarly high ratings of confidence; this 
trend is consistent across all available measures in the post-Communist period, as shown by 
table 4. This does not mean that trust in the Church is high; rather, even with moderate 
ratings of trust, the Church surpasses other public institutions because trust in those 
institutions is generally quite low.4 Also, table 5 shows that despite some ups and downs 
over the 1990s, the Church has also consistently been accorded some degree of confidence 
or trust from a majority of Poles. However, despite these indications of relative strength 
next to other public institutions, for a small, but consistent proportion of Poles, continuing 
adherence to the Church and its beliefs does not translate into confidence in the Church as 
a public institution; a small, but consistent proportion of Poles express a little or no trust in 
the Church. Additionally, this proportion of the population appears to have grown since 
the year 2000, but still constitutes a minority of Poles. Thus, even with this change, 
throughout the post-communist period, the Church has been a bulwark for Polish society. 
In a national landscape where the political players were constantly changing, the Church 
represented a consistent, unchanging presence and thus was an institution that Poles could 
feel confident about. This confidence in the Church represents a consistent, if perhaps 
declining, opportunity for the Church to become involved in public discourse as a trusted 
representative of the people, contributing positively to the Church's political opportunity 
structure. Nevertheless, Poles' trust in the Church may be conditional, especially as the 
Church advances farther into the domain of the public and the political in the democratic 
48 Irena Borowik, " Institutional and Private Religion in Poland 1990- 1994," 246. 
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state. 
Table 4. Confidence in Selected Public lnstitutions in Poland, 1992-1994 (Cumulative) 
lnstitution 
Level of Confidence Roman Catholic 
(Percentage) Government Military Church 
A Great Deal 5.9 34.15 41.73 
Only some 40.3 49.53 44.46 
Hardly any 48.08 9.4 12.07 
Source: Bogdan Cichomski and Zbigniew Sawinski, Polish General Social Survey, 1992-1994: Cumulative 
Codebook [online] (Warsaw: Institute for Social Studies, University of Warsaw, 1994); retrieved from 
Scholarly Communication Center, Rutger's University, New Brunswick, NJ; available from 
http://www.scc.rutgers.edu/pgss/PGSScb 1655.pdf Intemet: accessed 19 February 2005 
(N=4914). 
I 
I 
I 
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Table 5. Poles' Confidence/Trust in the Church, 1991 to 2004 
Confidence ISSP PGSS !SSP Trust CBOS 
Level Level 
(percentage) 1991 1992 1993 1994 1998 (percentage) 2000 2004 
Complete 10.4 ] 13 
Trust 47 56 A great deal 22.2 40.6 40.8 43.6 27.2 
Only some 40.7 45.5 43.4 44.2 40.6 Neutral 26 "~ 
Hardly any 15.1 11.7 14 10.4 12.5 Distrust 24 35 
Don't know 11 .5 2.1 1.5 1.6 6.8 Difficult to 3 9 Say 
N 1063 1647 1649 1609 1147 ~ NA 969 
Sources: International Social Survey Programme, !SSP 1991: Religion Codebook [online] , 25; retrieved 
from Zentralarchiv fi.ir Empirische Sozialforschung an der Universitiit zu Koeln, Codebook ZA Study 2150; 
available from http://www.za.uni-koeln.de/data/enlissp/codebooks/s2150cbd.pdf Internet: accessed I 0 
September 2005 (N= 1063); Bogdan Cichomi ki and Zbigniew Sawinski, Polish General Social Survey, 
1992-1994: Cumulative Codebook [online] (Warsaw: Institute for Social Studies, University of Warsaw, 
1994), v247; retrieved from Scholarly Communications Centre,Rutgers University, New Bnmswick, N.J. ; 
available from http://www.scc.rutgers.edu/pgss/PGSScb6155.pdf Internet: accessed 19 February 2005; 
International Social Survey Programme, !SSP 1998: Religion II Codebook [online], 26; retrieved from 
Gern1an Social Science Infrastructure Studies (GESIS), Zentralarchiv fi.ir Empirische Sozialforschung an 
der Universitiit zu Koeln, Codebook ZA Study 3190, 3"' ed., 200 I; available from http://www.za.uni-
koeln.de/data/enlissp/codebooks/s3190cbd.pdf Internet: accessed I 0 September 2005 (N= 1147); Public 
Opinion Research Center (CBOS), "Tru t in Public Institutions in Poland, the Czech Republic and 
Hungary," Polish Public Opinion (November 2000): 1-2 [online] ; available from 
http://www.cbos.pl/ENGLTSH/Bulletin/2000/ 11_2000.pdf lnternet: accessed 29 January 2005; Public 
Opinion Research Center (CBOS), "Trust in Public Institutions in Central and East European Countries," 
Polish Public Opinion (October 2004): 2-3 [online] ; available from 
http://www.cbos.pi/ENGLTSH/Bulletin/2004/l 0_2004.pdf Internet: accessed 29 January 2005. 
In contrast to Poles, Slovenes tend to show distrust for the institutional Church, 
further supporting the previously identified trend of Slovenes' detachment from the 
institution. As for Poles, decisions of trust act as a "primary summary indicator of 
appraisals of the past operation and performance of the Roman Catholic Church together 
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with its clergy, as well as an estimation of the present operations and hopes or fears for the 
future .'"'9 In this way, Slovenes' confidence in the church is either an indictment or a 
vindication of the church's past and present political activities, as well as an index of the 
public distrust of and declining public expectations of future Church behaviour. First, the 
Church usually receives lower levels of trust in public opinion surveys than other public 
institutions.50 The confidence that is vested in most of these institutions is not especially 
high, but these institutions still gamer more trust than the Church. Also, annual SPO 
surveys show that, despite a few small fluctuations, Slovenes consistently display the same 
pattern of general distrust of organized religion, specifically churches and clergy (see 
figures 7 and 8). This pattern is characterized by a high proportion of respondents 
expressing little or no trust in either church or church leaders. Further data, presented in 
table 6, confirms that the Church receives the same level of trust when it is specifically 
49 Smrke, "Trust in the Church and Clergy in Slovenia during the 1990s," 32 1. 
50 In the most recent SPO survey from 2005, government received the confidence of 35 percent 
of Slovenes, the police 39 percent, the justice courts 30 percent, and the church and clergy 22 percent. 
During the 1990s, SPO surveys consistently documented a similar trend. For example, in 1996 
government received the confidence of 28 percent of Slovenes, the police 40 percent, the justice courts 24 
percent, and the church and clergy 22 percent. Nikos Tos et al. Sloven ko Javno Mnenje 2005/2: 
Nacionalna in mednarodna varnost (CRP Znanje za varnost in mil~ in Mednarodna povolilna raziskava 
[Slovene Public Opinion Survey 2005/2: National and international Security (CPR Knowledge for 
Security and Peace) and the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems} [online] , V209K,V2090, V209N, 
V2098 (Ljubljana: Public Opinion Research Centre, Facul ty of Social Science, University of Ljubljana, 
2005); retrieved from Arhiv Druzboslovnih Podatkov (ADP) [Social Sciences Data Archive], University of 
Ljubljana, Dataset SJM052. Available from http://www.adp.fdv.uni-lj.si/opisi/index Internet: accessed 30 
March 2006. 
Niko Tos et al. , Slovenian Public Opinion Surveys 1990-1998: Cumulative Codebook [online] (Ljubljana: 
Public Opinion Research Centre, Faculty of Social Science, University of Ljubljana, 2004), V48, V52, 
V5 l, V40; retrieved from German Social Science Infrastructure Studies (GESIS), Service Agency Eastern 
Europe, Zentralarchiv fiir Empirische Sozialforschung an der Universitiit zu Koln, Codebook ZA Study 
32 17; ava ilable from http://www.gesis.org/enldata_service/eastern_europe/datalcodebook/cb32 17.pdf 
Internet: accessed 10 September 2005; Smrke,"Trust in the Church and Clergy in Slovenia during the 
1990s," 322. 
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identified, rather than subsumed under the general term church and clergy, and that 
according to the retrospective reflections of Slovene respondents subjective feelings of 
trust in the Church declined in the post-1990 period. This goes along with the trend of 
increasing distrust and declining trust in the Church over the 1990s that has been identified 
by at least one other researcher.51 It should be noted that this trend varied over the late 
1990s and early 2000s so that, at certain points, it looked as if the Church's standing was 
increasing. However, this has not continued into the present because patterns of trust 
subsequently returned to their previous level and form in 2003 and 2005, characterized by 
an overwhelming distrust in the Church. As a result, the Church's tenuous connection to 
Slovene society is further weakened and society's openness to Church appeals is 
considerably diminished over time as the post-Communist era proceeds. In contrast to 
Poles, Slovenes tend to distrust the Church, even when held against other institutions. 
Thus, Slovenes appear to be much less inclined to see the Church as institution that acts in 
the best interests of the Slovene people. Moreover, Slovenes place some of their 
confidence in other institutions and, although this confidence is by no means overwhelming, 
thus, unlike Poles, have alternatives to the Church. This makes the Slovene societal 
context much less amenable to Church political influence and thereby diminishes the 
Church's opportunities for political influence, affecting the political opportunity structure 
for the Church negatively. 
51 Smrke notices the same trend in his analysis of the same SPO data. Smrke, "Trust in the 
Church and Clergy in Slovenia during the 1990s," 322. 
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Figure 7. Confidence in Churches and Religious Organizations in Slovenia during the 
1990s. 
Sources: Niko Tos et al. , Slovenian Public Opinion Surveys 1990-1998: Cumulative Codebook [online] 
(Ljubljana: Public Opinion Research Centre, Faculty of Social Science, University of Ljubljana, 2004), v40 
[online] ; retrieved from Gem1an Social Science fnfrastmcture Studies (GESTS), Service Agency Eastern 
Europe, Zentralarchiv fur Empirische Sozialforschung an der Universitiit zu Koln, Codebook ZA Study 
32 17; available from http://www.gesis.org/en/data_service/eastern_europe/data/codebook/cb3217 .pdf 
Internet: accessed 10 September 2005; Niko Tos et al. , Slovensko Ja vno Mnenje 1999/1: Demokraizacija v 
Vshodno-Evropskih Dri.avah (Mednarodna Raziskava) in Nacionalna Varnost [Slovene Public Opinion 
Survey 1999/1: Democratization in Eastern-European Countries (International Research) and National 
Security] [online] (Ljubljana: Public Opinion Research Centre, Faculty of Social Science, Univers ity of 
Ljubljana, 1999), V 138C; retrieved from Arhiv Dmzboslovnih Podatkov (ADP) [Social Sciences Data 
Archive], University of Ljubljana, Dataset SJM991 , 2000; available from http://www.adp.fdv.uni-
lj .si/opisi/index Internet: accessed 10 September 2005. 
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Figure 8. Confidence in Churches and Religious Organizations in Slovenia, 2000 to 2005. 
Sources: Nikos Tos et al. , Slovensko Javno Mnenje 200011 [Slovene Public Opinion Survey 200011} 
[online] (Ljubljana: Public Opinion Research Centre, Faculty of Social Science, University of Ljubljana, 
2000), V 1_ 138 ; retrieved from Social Sciences Data Arch ive, University of Ljubljana, Dataset SJMOO l , 
200 l ; Niko Tos et al. , Slovensko Javno Mnenje 2001/1 [Slovene Public Opinion Survey 200111: Attitudes 
toward Integration in the European Union and International Research on Working Activities] [online] 
(Ljubljana: Public Opinion Research Centre, Faculty of Social Science, Universi ty of Ljubljana, 200 l ), 
Vl _ l8B; retrieved from Social Sciences Data Archive, University of Ljubljana, Dataset SJMO 11 , 2002; 
Nikos Tos et al. , Slovensko Javno Mnenje 2002/ 1 [Slovene Public Opinion Survey 2002/ 1: Allitudes toward 
integration in the European Union and NATO] [online] (Ljubljana: Public Opinion Research Centre, 
Faculty of Social Science, University of Ljubljana, 2002), V203B; retrieved from Social Sciences Data 
Archive, University of Ljubljana, Dataset SJM02l , 2002; Nikos Tos et al. , Slovensko Ja vno Mnenje 200311 
[Slovene Public Opinion Survey 2003/ 1} [online](Ljubljana: Public Opinion Research Centre, Faculty of 
Social Science, University of Ljubljana, 2003), V202B; retrieved from Social Sciences Data Archive, 
University of Ljubljana, Dataset SJM03 L, 2004; Nikos Tos et al. , Slovensko Javno Mnenje 200512 [Slovene 
Public Opinion Survey 200512: National and International Security (CPR Knowledge for Security and 
Peace) and the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems] [online] (Ljubljana: Public Opinion Research 
Centre, Faculty of Social Science, University of Ljubljana, 2005), V209B; retrieved from Social Sciences 
Data Archive, University of Ljubljana, Dataset SJM052, 2006. 
Note: The internet address of all sources is listed in the bibliography. 
Table 6. Retrospective Reflections on Slovenes' Trust in the Catholic Church and its 
Officials in 1990 and 1997 Compared 
Level ofTrust 
(percent) Then (1990) Now (1997) Change 
A great deal 11 8.7 -2.3 
Quite a lot 30.5 26.8 -3.7 
Not very much 33.8 39.1 5.3 
None at all 12.1 15.2 3.1 
Source: Tos Nikos et al. Slovensko Javno Mnen ·e 1997/2: Mednarodna lj 
Raziskavao o Veri Odnosu do Cerkve [Slovene Public Opinion Survey 
1997/2: international Research on Religion and Attitudes toward Church} 
[online] ( Ljubljana: Public Opinion Research Centre, Faculty of Social 
Science, University of Ljubljana, 1997); retrieved from Arhiv 
Druzboslovnih Podatkov (ADP) [Social Sciences Data Archive], 
Ljubljana: Univerza v Ljubljani, 2000, Dataset SJM972; available from 
http://www.adp.fdv.uni-lj.si/opisi/ index Internet: accessed I 0 September 
2005. 
Note: Data was extracted from the results of two questions in this survey, 
one of which asks respondents how much they trust the Church at that time 
( 1997) and how much they trusted the Church about 8 years before that. 
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CHAPTERS 
POLITICIZING THE CHURCH 
For the Roman Catholic Church to gain significant opportunities from its sizeable 
linkage to Polish society, Poles must perceive the Church not only as a legitimate religious 
and public institution, but also as a legitimate political actor. This means that Poles' 
openness to the Church as a political actor, indicated by approval of the Church's general 
activities, its pronouncements on issues, and its power, must be high in order to provide the 
Church with favourable political opportunities. When Polish society displays the 
predominant view that the Church's political activities are acceptable and the Church's 
religious base is secure, the Church is presented with the best social context in which to 
pursue political activity surrounding its policy goals. 
Poland: Resistance to a Political Church 
A distinct trend appears in Poles' assessments of the Church's activities, measured 
by a series of CBOS polls, conducted several times a year from 1989 to 2005. 1 As 
demonstrated in figure 9, Poles' opinions of the Church have gone through three distinct 
phases. As the political transformation began, the Church received the approval of an 
overwhelming majority of Poles; however, these positive feelings declined over the next 
few years, reaching an all-time low in 1993. Gradually, over the remainder of the 1990s, 
society shifted back towards a general position of approval, albeit with a few minor 
1The N-values for each survey are not available, but CBOS usually utilizes a randomized, 
representative sample of approximately I 000 Polish adults. 
130 
131 
fluctuations. After this point, around the year 2000, Poles' views of the Church settled into 
a stable pattern with about two-thirds of Poles generally expressing approval and one-
quarter expressing disapproval of the Church. How has this affected the Church? 
Although the Church was engaged in some of its most controversial activities during the 
early 1990s2 and society's approval of its activities was clearly declining, the Church was 
only placed in a vulnerable position vis-a-vis society for a brief time in 1993. Since then, 
the Church has enjoyed the openings in the political system created by society's generally 
positive views of its activities; however, this situation is alterable. The recent steady state 
in public opinion hovers around a much lower level than where it began in the early 1990s, 
indicating that the Church lost some of its credibility with a portion of society over the 
post-Communist period and that this portion maintains a state of lasting disapproval toward 
the Church. Nevertheless, based on this measure, Poles appear to generally approve of the 
Church's activities, unless these activities stray too far into politics. This is borne out by 
specific measurements of society's attitudes toward the Church's political activities. 
2 rt was during this time that the Church secured considerable influence over education and the 
restrictive abortion law was introduced. 
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Figure 9. Opinions of the Church's Activities in Poland, 1989 to 2005 
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Sources: Public Opinion Research Center (CBOS), "The Church in Post-Communist Poland," Polish 
Public Opinion (May 1999): 3-4 [online] ; available from 
http://www.cbos.pl/ENGLISH/Bulletin/1999/05 _ 1999.pdf Internet: accessed 29 January 2005; Michal 
Wenzel, "Opinie o Dzialalnosci Instytucji Publicznych [Opinions about the Work of Public Institutions]," 
Public Opinion Re earch Center (CBOS) Report 35 (February 2005): 6 [online] ; available from 
http://www.cbos.pl/SPISKOM.POL/2005/K_35_05.PDF Internet: accessed 13 May 2005. Michal Wenzel, 
"Opinie o Dzialalnosci Tnstytucji Publicznych [Opinions about the Work of Public In titutions]," Public 
Opinion Research Center (CBOS) Komunikat z Badari 168 (October 2005): 5 [online] ; available from 
http://www.cbos.pl/SPISKOM.POL/2005/K_ l68_05.PDF Internet: accessed 2 1 March 2006. 
Note: The data from 1989 to 1998 was extracted from a line graph titled "Change in the Opinions of the 
Activity of the Church." The data points for each poll conducted during a given year were converted into 
an average for that year. The data from 1999 to 2005 was extracted from a table titled "Zmiany Opinii o 
Kosciele [Changes in the Opinion of the Church]." For years in which multiple polls were conducted, the 
individual results from each poll are averaged to arrive at a value for the entire year. 
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Although the Church exists in a generally positive societal context, its activities are 
bounded by Poles' perceptions of the legitimacy and credibility of the Church's 
involvement in the debate surrounding specific issues and in the political process. The 
Church is confined to a specific domain which concerns social and religious issues, such as 
the social problems produced by the economy and society, rather than those issues which 
touch upon the freedoms introduced by democracy, such as the freedom of the media and 
the independence of the government from the Church (see table 7). The line between these 
realms is not precisely defined since any issue becomes political when the nation's leaders 
debate government policy. However, once the Church is specifically connected to a 
contentious political issue or the political process, Poles overwhelmingly disapprove of 
Church attempts to influence public opinion, the procedures of the democratic system, and 
political outcomes. With reference to the specific processes of voting and government 
decision-making, the data in table 8 suggest that Poles adopted the viewpoint that the 
Church's influence in these processes was inappropriate as early as 1991 and, over the 
1990s, became increasingly opposed to the Church's intervention in these central 
components of the democratic system. In general, patterns of resistance to the Church' s 
participation in politics have remained stable at very high levels (close to 80 percent) since 
1999, as shown by figure 10. Therefore, the trend of public disapproval toward the 
Church's political intervention follows a similar pattern to that concerning the Church' s 
general activities; society's greater openness to a Church political role in the early 1990s 
gave way to an overwhelming wave of negative feeling as the 1990s progressed, which 
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then stabilized at a high level in the late 1990s. This means that society has been greatly 
opposed to the Church's interference in explicitly political processes for much of the post-
communist period. Consequently, the Church's opportunities to enter the democratic 
political process have been limited by the wishes of Polish society to keep the Church out 
of these areas. This may be why Church-sponsored political parties have performed so 
poorly in Polish elections. 
Table 7. Acceptability of Church 
Pronouncements on Selected Issues, 
1998 (percent) 
unemployment 58.3 
growing social differences 58.2 
extramarital relations 53.3 
abortion 52.8 
style and content of the media 33.1 
government politics 19.8 
Source: Miklos Tomka, "Religion, Church, State 
and Civil Society," in Religion and Social Change 
in Post-Communist Europe, eds. Irena Borowik 
and Miklos Tomka (Krakow: Zaldad Wydawniczy 
NOMOS, 2001), 61. 
Note: Data extracted from Table 9, "Opinions 
about the abilities and social expectations from 
the Catholic Church in ten previously communist 
countries in East-Central Europe, spring 1998 
(percent of valid answers)." 
Table 8. Poles' Opinions About the Inappropriateness of Church Influence 
over Political Processes, 1991 and 1998 
Voting Government 
Response (percent) 
1991 1998 1991 1998 
Strongly agree 39.1 48.5 31.7 47.5 
Agree 36.9 29.6 39.7 29.5 
Neither agree nor disagree 5.9 8.3 10.2 10 
Disagree 9.2 9.1 9.8 8.5 
Strongly disagree 9 4.6 8.7 4.4 
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Sources: International Social Survey Programnune (ISSP), !SSP 1991: Religion Codebook [online]; 
retrieved from German Social Science Infrastructure Studies (GESIS), Zentralarchiv fur Empirische 
Sozialforschung an der Universitiit zu Koeln, Codebook ZA Study 2150, 1995; available from 
http://www.za.uni-koeln.de/data/enlissp/codebooks/s2 150cbd.pdf Internet: accessed I 0 September 2005; 
International Social Survey Programme (ISSP), !SSP /998: Religion 11 Codebook [online]; retrieved from 
German Social Science Infrastructure Studies (GESIS), Zentralarchiv fur Empirische Sozialforschung an 
der Universitiit zu Koeln, Codebook ZA Study 3190, 3'd ed., 2001 ; available from http://www.za.uni-
koeln.de/data/enlissp/codebooks/s3 190cbd. pdf Internet: accessed I 0 September 2005 . 
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Figure 10. The Church Should Have a Voice in Politics in Poland 
2004 
Source: Beata Roguska, "Stabilizacja Opinii o Wplywie Kosciola na :lie w K.raju [Stabilisation of the 
Opinion About the lntluence of the Church on Life in Poland]," Centrum Bandania Opinii Spolecznej 
(CBOS) Report 79 (May 2004): 5 [online] ; available from 
http://www.cbos.pl/SPISKOM.POLI2004!K_079 _04.PDF fntemet: accessed 29 January 2005. 
Note: The author of this report does not provide the sample sizes for each survey utilized in her analysis; 
however, the CBOS methodology usually consists of a sample size of approximately I 000, drawn from a 
randomized representative sample of the adult population. 
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The final component of the context which society presents to the Church involves 
assessing Poles' perceptions of the Church's political power and, based on those 
perceptions, the direction in which Poles want that power to change. PGSS statistics from 
the early 1990s, presented in table 9, suggest that Poles were unambiguous in their 
perception that the Church's power was excessive compared to their own relative ideal of 
what that power should be; however, these feelings waned somewhat by 1994. As with 
most of the previous data, condemnations of the Church peak around the year 1993, which 
has been identified as one of the more politically active for the Church. The culmination of 
this data confirms that society became increasingly negative toward displays of the 
Church's political power in the democratic system quickly after the introduction of 
competitive democracy. However, as the Church's involvement in highly charged political 
issues changed, did the societal context also change as some of the controversy subsided? 
Did Polish society become more accepting of the Church's power after 1994? As table 10 
shows, a majority of Poles consistently saw the Church as a highly influential actor, while 
only a tiny proportion see it in the opposite light. Simultaneously, a significant minority of 
Poles remains dissatisfied with the Church's power although this proportion does not 
approach the very high levels ofthe early 1990s (see table 11). Once the highly charged 
politics of the early 1990s subsided, society' s tolerance for expression of the Church's 
power rebounded from the low of the early 1990s and stabilized at a level whereby the 
Church is caught between the division of society into the minority that approves of the 
Church's power and the large majority that disapproves of the Church's power. This 
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further confines the openings which are provided to the Church to impress its views on the 
political process and hence limits the Church's political opportunity structure. 
Table 9. Poles' Opinions about Religious Organizations ' Level of Power, 1991 to 1998 
(percent) 
Level of Power 1991 1992 1993 1994 1998 
too much 60.5 63.8 64.7 54.6 59.6 
right amount 36.5 27.1 26 35.6 36.8 
too little 2.9 1.6 2.2 2.4 3.6 
N 1063 1647 1649 1609 1147 
Sources: International Social Survey Progranunme (ISSP) !SSP 1991: Religion Codebook [online] ; 
retrieved from German Social Science Infrastructure Studies (GESIS), Zentralarchiv ft.ir Empirische 
Sozialforschung an der Universitat zu Koeln, Codebook ZA Study 2150, 1995; available from 
http://www.za.uni-koeln.de/data/en!issp/codebooks/s2150cbd.pdf Intemet: accessed 10 September 2005; 
Bogdan Cichomski and Zbigniew Sawi.nski,Po/ish General Social Surveys 1992-1994: Cumulative 
Codebook (Warsaw: Institute for Social Studies, University of Warsaw, 1995), v. 345; retrieved from 
Scholarly Communications Center, Rutger's University, New Brunswick, NJ; available from 
http://www.scc.rutgers.edu/pgss/PGSScb 1655.pdf Internet: accessed 19 February 2005; International Social 
Survey Progranune (ISSP), /SSP I 998: Religion If Codebook [online]; retrieved from German Social 
Science Infras tructure Studies (GESIS), Zentralarchiv fiir Empirische Sozialforschung an der Universitat 
zu Koeln, Codebook ZA Study 3 190, 3'd ed., 200 I; available from http://www.za.uni-
koeln.de/data/en/issp/codebooks/s3 190cbd.pdf Internet: accessed I 0 
September 2005. 
Note: This data was modified from the original forn1. Responses for "far too much" and "too much" were 
additively combined to produce the category "too much." Responses for "far too little" and "too little" were 
similarly modified to produce the category "too little." 
Table I 0. Changes in the Perception of the Church's Influence 
over Polish Affairs, 1999 to 2004 (percent) 
Level of Influence 1999 2002 2004 
great 68 57 58 
neither great nor small 24 31 28 
small 6 8 10 
difficult to say 2 4 4 
Source: Beata Roguska, "Stabilizacja Opinii o Wplywie Kosciola na :lie w 
Kraju [Stabilisation of the Opinion About the Influence of the Church on Life 
in Poland]," Centrum Bandania Opinii Spolecznej (CBOS) Report 79 
(May 2004): 2. [on line] Available from http://www.cbos.pUSPTSKOM.POL/2004/ 
K_079_04.PDF Accessed: 29 January 2005. 
Note: To achieve greater simplicity, the responses "very large" and " large" 
were combined to fonn one category of response, "large." The response 
"small" was arrived at in a similar manner. Although the author does not 
provide the sample size for each survey, CBOS surveys typically utilize a 
randomized sample of approximately I 000 adults. 
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Table 11. Changes in the Desired Level of Church Influence 
over Polish Affairs, 1999 to 2004 (percent) 
Level of Change 1999 2002 2004 
more 5 13 12 
same 31 38 38 
less 61 42 45 
difficult to say 4 8 5 
Source: Beata Roguska, "Stabilizacja Opinii o Wplywie Kosciola na :lie 
w Kraju [Stabilisation of the Opinion About the Influence of the Church 
on Life in Poland]," Centrum Bandania Opinii Spolecznej (CBOS) 
Report 79 (May 2004): 3 [online] . Available from 
http://www.cbos.pl/SPISKOM.POLI2004!K_079 _04.PDF Accessed: 29 
January 2005. 
Note: To achieve greater simplicity, the responses "very large" and "large" were combined to fonn one 
category of response, "large." The response "small" was arrived at in a similar manner. Although the 
author docs not provide the sample size for each survey, CBOS surveys typically utilize a randomized 
sample of approximately I 000 adults. 
Slovenia: Rejection of a Political Church 
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Considering Polish society' s high level of resistance to a political Church, it is not 
surprising that Slovene society is also highly resistant to the Church's involvement in 
politics. To begin with, Slovenes are not as enthralled with the Church as a religious actor 
and thus the Church does not possess those critical links with society that allow it to 
assume a position of authority. Compared to Poles, Slovenes consider the Church's public 
commentary on a wider range of issues to be inappropriate (see table 12). Even issues 
which the Church considers to be essential to its moral duties, such as the protection of life 
and the preservation of marriage, are considered off-limits to the Church by a large 
majority of Slovenes. Although Poles by no means endorsed the Church's activities in 
141 
these areas, a small majority of Poles found these issue areas to be within the limits of the 
Church's domain. This, combined with a consistent, pronounced rejection of Church 
attempts to influence voting or government decision-making (see figures 11 and 12), 
suggests that Slovenes are overwhelmingly opposed to Church interference in the nation's 
political life. Moreover, Slovenes are cautious about providing churches with more power, 
indicated by the infinitesimal proportion of poll respondents in table 13 who believe that the 
Church has too little power, as well as the large minority of Slovenes who believe that 
churches already have too much power. Slovenes not only view churches, including the 
Roman Catholic Church, as illegitimate political actors, but also show the tendency to 
impose strict limits on the reach of their influence over political issues and processes. Also, 
the general unwillingness to provide religious organizations with more power speaks of a 
society that is satisfied with keeping the Slovene Church in its place in the religious realm. 
Polish society, although similarly averse to Church interference in politics (see figures 9 and 
10, respectively), provides the Church with more space to act on moral issues, as well as 
some other issues that have less impact on the political process itself, such as 
unemployment and social inequality. A direct comparison of the two countries, contained 
in figures 13 and 14, shows that both societies have typically been highly opposed to 
Church influence over voting and government, but that Slovenes tend to be more polarized 
in their disapproval. Therefore, although Poles and Slovenes have been remarkably similar 
in their outlook about the inappropriateness of the Church 's interference in the political 
process, Slovenes have outright rejected the Church as a political actor and placed 
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additional constraints on the Church's political activities, further reducing the political 
opportunities for the Church and closing this important aspect of the political opportunity 
structure. 
Table 12. The Appropriateness of Church Declarations on Specific Issues (percent 
affirmative responses) 
Issue 1997 1998 
growing social differences 52.9 52.7 
unemployment 37.8 37.5 
style and content of the media 29.1 28.6 
extramarital relations 29 27.2 
abortion 28.2 27 
government politics 20.9 21.2 
Source: Ntkos Tos et al. , Slovensko Ja vno Mnenje 1997/2: Mednarodna Raziskavao o Veri Odnosu do 
Cerkve [Slovene Public Opinion Survey 1997/2: international Research on Religion and Attitudes toward 
Church] [online] (Ljubljana: Public Opinion Research Centre, Faculty of Social Science, Univers ity of 
Ljubljana, 1997), v59, v60, v6 1, v62, v64, v65; retrieved from Arhiv Druzboslovnih Podatkov (ADP) 
[Social Sciences Data Archive], University of Ljubljana; Dataset SJM972; available from 
http://www.adp.fdv.uni-lj .si/opisi!index Internet: accessed 10 September 2005 (N= 1005); Miklos Tomka, 
"Religion, Church, State and Civil Society in East-Central Europe," in Church-State Relations in Central 
and Eastern Europe, ed. Irena Borowik (Krakow: Zaldad Wydnawiczy NOMOS, 1999), 60 (N=867). 
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Figure 11. Slovene Opinions on the Inappropriateness of Church Influence on Voting, 
1991to2003. 
Sources: Nikos Tos et a l. , Slovensko Javno Mnenje /99112, Slovensko Javno Mnenje 1992/3, Slovensko 
Javno Mnenje 1993/1, Slovensko Javno Mnenje 199511, Slovensko Javno Mnenje1 99611, Slovensko Javno 
Mnenje 1997/2, Slovensko Javno Mnenje 199811 Slovensko Javno Mnenje /999/3, Slo vensko Ja vno 
Mnenje 20001 I , Slovensko Ja vno Mnenje 200112, S/ovensko Javno Mnenje 200311 [all online] (Ljubljana: 
Public Opinion Research Centre, Faculty of Social Science, University of Ljubljana, 199 1, 1992, L 993, 
1995, 1996, 1997, 1998, 1999, 2000,2001 , 2003), V4108, V2_ 128, V6_048, V3_25, Q4148, Q236g, 
R57A, Vl32, V5_098, V2_368, V5338; retrieved from Social Sciences Data Archive (ADP), University 
of Ljubljana; Datasets SJM91 2, SJM923, SJM931 , SJM951 , SJM961 , SJM972, SJM981, SJM993, 
SJMOO I, SJMO 12, SJM031 ; available from http://www.adp.fdv.uni-lj .si/opisi/ index Tnternet: accessed I 0 
September 2005. See bibliographic entries for additional infom1ation on each survey. 
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Figure 12. Slovene Opinions on the Inappropriateness of Church Influence on Government 
Decisions, 1991 to 1999. 
Sources: Nikos Tos et al. , Slovensko Ja vno Mnenje 1991/2: Slovenska Druiba na Prehodu v Demokracijo 
in Mednoarodna Raziskava o Vernosit in Cerkvi [Slovene Public Opinion Survey 199112: Slovenian 
Democratic Transition and International Relig ion and Church Survey} [online] (Ljubljana: Public Opinion 
Research Centre, Faculty of Social Science, University of Ljubljana, 199 1 ), V41 OD; Social Sciences Data 
Archive, University of Ljubljana, Dataset SJM912, 1999; available from http://www.adp. fdv.uni-
lj.si/opisi/index Internet: accessed I 0 September 2005; Nikos Tos et al., Slovensko Javno Mnenje /99811: 
Mednarova Raziskava o Neenakosti in Religiji [Slo vene Public Opinion Survey 1998/ 1: !SSP 1998 
Religion and !SSP 1999 Inequality] [online] (Ljubljana: Public Opinion Re earch Centre, Faculty of Social 
Science, University of Ljubljana, 1998), R57B; retrieved from Social Sciences Data Archive, University of 
Ljubljana, Dataset SJM98 1, 2000; avai lable from http://www.adp.fdv.uni-lj.si/opisi/index Internet: 
accessed 10 September 2005; N ikos Tos et al. , Slovensko Javno Mnenje 199913: Evropska Raziskava 
Vrednot [Slovene Public Opinion Survey 199913: European Values Survey} [online] (Ljubljana: Public 
Opinion Research Centre Faculty of Social Science, University of Ljubljana, 1999), V 130; retrieved from 
Social Sciences Data Archive, University of Ljubljana, Dataset SJM993, 2000; available from 
http://www.adp.fdv.uni-lj.si/opisi/index Internet: accessed I 0 September 2005. 
Table 13. Evaluations ofthe Power of Churches and Religious 
Organizations in Slovenia, 1991 and 1998 (percent) 
Level of Power 1991 1998 
far too much power 4.1 10.4 
too much power 22.4 37.1 
about the right amount of 
power 64.6 41.8 
too little power 7.9 8.2 
far too little power 0.9 2.5 
Sources: International Social Survey Programmme (TSSP), /SSP 1991: 
Religion Codebook [online]; retrieved from German Social Science 
Infrastrucn1re Studies (GESIS), Zentralarchiv flir Empirische 
Sozialforschung an der Universitat zu Koeln, Codebook ZA Sn•dy 2150, 
1995; available from http://www.za.uni-koeln.de/data/en/issp/codebooks 
/s2150cbd.pdf Internet: accessed 10 September 2005; International 
Social Survey Progranm1e (ISSP), /SSP 1998: Religion II Codebook 
[online] ; retrieved from German Social Science Infrastructure Studies 
(GESTS), Zentralarchiv fur Empirische Sozialforschung an der 
Universitat zu Koeln, Codebook ZA Study 3190, 3'd ed., 200 I; available 
from http://www.za.uni-koeln.de/data/en/issp/codebooks/s3 190cbd.pdf 
Internet: accessed I 0 September 2005. 
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Figure 13. Opposition to Religious Leaders' Influence on the Voting Process in Poland and 
Slovenia, 1991 and 1998. 
Sources: International Social Survey Programmme (TSSP), ISSP 1991 : Religion Codebook [online]; 
retrieved from Gennan Social Science Infrastructure Studies (GESTS), Zentralarchiv fiir Empirische 
Sozialforschung an der Universitiit zu Koeln, Codebook ZA Study 2150, 1995; available from 
http://www.za.uni-koeln.de/data/en!issp/codebooks/s2150cbd.pdf Internet: accessed I 0 September 2005; 
International Social Survey Programme (!SSP), ISSP 1998: Religion n Codebook [online]; retrieved from 
German Social Science Infrastructure Studies (GESIS), Zentralarchiv fur Empirische Sozialforschung an 
der Universitiit zu Koeln, Codebook ZA Study 3190, 3'd ed., 200 l ; available from http://www.za.uni-
koeln.de/data/en/issp/codebooks/s3190cbd.pdf Internet: accessed I 0 September 2005. 
147 
50 
~40 
0 
-~ 30 ----T-~----=------c------------
ca 
.... 5i 20 ---:------------"1.--"'----'-.---------
~ ~ -- · ·· ··· · ·· · · . ', ··· ·· 8. 1 0 -+---------~.~.--=-=.~.____.. ~:........-.--- -------,,..., 
Disagree Agree 
Strongly agree Neither Strongly disagree 
_ __,. __ 
........ .. .... 
- ·->E-·-
Poland-1991 
Poland-1998 
Slovenia-1991 
Slovenia-1998 
Figure 14. Opposition to Religious Leaders' Influence on Government Decisions in Poland 
and Slovenia, 1991 and 1998. 
Sources: International Social Survey Programnune (ISSP), /SSP 1991: Religion Codebook [online] ; 
retrieved from Gern1an Social Science Infrastructure Studies (GESIS), Zentralarchiv fiir Empirische 
Sozialforschung an der Universitat zu Koeln, Codebook ZA Study 2150, 1995; available from 
http://www.za.uni-koeln.de/data/en/issp/codebooks/s2 150cbd.pdf Internet: accessed I 0 September 2005; 
International Social Survey Programme (ISSP), !SSP 1998: Religion !I Codebook [online] ; retrieved from 
German Social Science Infrastructure Studies (GESIS), Zentralarchiv fiir Empirische Sozialforschung an 
der Universitat zu Koeln, Codebook ZA Study 3190, 3'd ed., 200 I; available from http://www.za.uni-
koeln.de/data/en/issp/codebooks/s3 190cbd.pdf Internet: accessed I 0 September 2005. 
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Change of Context? Slovene Society and the Recent Church-State Agreement 
The agreement between the Slovene government and the Vatican, known as the 
Vatican Accord, merits attention because its passage seems to indicate that the 
unfavourable social context of the 1990s has changed to provide greater opportunity for 
the Church as a political actor. Polling data from 200 I, shortly after the agreement was 
first signed, reveals several features of Slovene society's relationship with the Church in 
post-Communist Slovenia. First, 45 percent of respondents were unaware of the details of 
this agreement.3 Second, a majority of respondents believed that the negotiation of this 
agreement was beneficial to Slovenia; however, the margin of this endorsement was quite 
small at 54.9 percent.4 A similarly small majority declared that it was not necessary for this 
agreement to be subjected to a referendum.5 These features show that a slim majority of 
Slovenes likely approve ofthe negotiation of the agreement, hardly strong evidence to 
support a turnabout in society's consistently negative orientation toward the Church's 
political involvement. The ambiguous legal framework governing church-state relations 
throughout the 1990s necessitated a political-legal resolution which would lend some 
3 Zenel Batagelj , Sporazum z RKC [Agreement with Roman Catholic Church} [online] 
(Ljubljana: CAT I-Trzenjske, Medijske, Druzbene Raziskave in Svetovanje, d.o.o., 200 I), VAT I ; retrieved 
from Arhiv Druzboslovnih Podatkov (ADP) [Social Sciences Data Archive], Dataset SPORRkO I. 
Ljubljana: Univerza v Lujbljani, 2003; available from http://www.adp.fdv.uni-lj .si/opisi/index Internet; 
accessed II September 2005. (N=370) 
4 Batagelj, Sporazum z RKC [Agreement with Roman Catholic Church} [online], VAT2. 
5 When asked whether the agreement should be judged by the people in a referendum, most 
respondents (54.1 percent) answered no. Batagelj, Sporazum z RKC [Agreement with Roman Catholic 
Church} [online], VA T3. 
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stability to the relationship between church and state. Although this agreement empowers 
the Church by acknowledging that the Church's situation merits formal legal recognition, 
the other ide of this agreement ensures that the Church's behaviour is governed by law. 
Given the negative orientation which has characterized society up to the time of this 
agreement and beyond, it is more likely that Slovenes have pragmatically accepted the 
necessity of a formal arrangement between Church and state which ensures some level of 
regulation over the Church's behaviour. Slovenes' underwhelming approval for this 
agreement indicates a cautious acceptance of this method of settling relations between 
Church and state; respondents in the same survey rejected the idea that this type of 
agreement should be utilized further in the settlement of specific disputes with the Church.6 
This is consistent with the societal context that the Church continues to face; Slovenes are 
restrictive in the privileges which they are willing to grant the Church, but not totally 
inflexible. It is unlikely that Slovenes are willing to let the Church overstep from within 
specific legal bounds, particularly on overtly political topics. Therefore, the Vatican Accord 
does not necessarily indicate a new openness to the Church's political influence because all 
other measures indicate that Slovenes still want the Church confined rather than freed. 
Summary: Linking History, Society, and Politics 
The importance of the Roman Catholic Church through much of Polish history, the 
nationalistic associations between Polish identity and Roman Catholicism, and the Church' s 
6 Batagelj , Sporazum z RKC [Agreement with Roman Catholic Church] [online], VAT4. 
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significant role in politics during the communist period, all served to prime Polish society to 
receive and respond to the Church's appeals. Also, Polish society has retained a strong 
connection to Roman Catholicism and the institutional Church, despite a noticeable trend 
of increasingly individualized religion. This connection is manifested in Poles' participation 
in Church ritual and activities, Poles' trust in the Church over virtually all other public 
institutions, and the leeway Poles have granted the Church to participate in issue-oriented 
politics. However, Poles' seek to limit the extent ofthe Church's political activities, 
manifesting strong resistance to the Church's involvement in both electoral politics and 
government decision-making processes. Consequently, the political opportunity structure 
that the Church has faced throughout the entirety of the post-communist period has 
allowed for significant political activity, but only within the limits prescribed by society. 
When the Church attempted to move beyond those limits, as it did in the early 1990s with 
its extensive interference in election campaigns and several government decisions, society 
becomes less open to the Church ' s political influence. This was especially evident in the 
drop in approval ofthe Church to an all-time low that occurred around 1993. Since that 
time, most measures indicate that the Church managed to recoup much of its lost standing 
with society and that Church and society have reached a state of equilibrium in their 
relationship, such that society is open to the Church' s political participation within the 
previously defined limits prescribed by society. 
Slovenes, on the other hand, have presented the Church with a stable and 
constrained political opportunity structure throughout much of the post-communist period 
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that gave the Church little space to participate in Slovene politics or to expand its power in 
the democratic state. The Church started out in the democratic system in a weak position, 
lacking the strong nationalistic ties to Slovene culture and society, as well as the esteem 
associated with communist-era political activity, that its Polish counterpart enjoyed in its 
relationship with Slovene society. Additionally, Slovenes possess weaker ties to religion, 
Roman Catholicism, and the Roman Catholic Church. This is evident in their relative 
nonreligiousness, low religious participation rates, individualization of religious principles, 
and general lack of trust in the Church as a public institution. Further, Slovenes proscribe 
Church political activity on most major political issues, as well as in electoral politics and 
government decision-making processes. In this way, this skeptical, distanced society has 
placed stringent limits on the Church, negatively affecting the Church' s political 
opportunity structure. Therefore, although both societies rejected Church involvement in 
decisions that should be made under the auspices of the democratic system, Polish society 
helped to create a political opportunity structure that has been much more open to the 
Church. 
CHAPTER6 
POLITICAL PARTIES: FRIENDS OR FOES? 
The process of post-communist democratization in Poland and Slovenia opened the 
political arena to a variety of legitimate actors. Among these actors, political parties bear 
the bulk of the responsibility for translating and representing society's political demands. 
Because of this role, political parties, as well as their patterns of development and strength, 
necessarily affect the Church's pursuit of political power. Political parties compete with 
the Church for influence, but also serve as important access points in the political system, 
either through direct collaboration or promotion of corresponding principles. Poland and 
Slovenia's party systems shared several developmental similarities, especially during the 
early days of democratic development, but different dynamics have shaped the development 
of each system such that it provides a remarkably different set of opportunities and 
constraints for the Church. 
Crowded Landscape: Parties as Competitors 
The Instability of Party Development in Poland 
In Poland, the emergence and development of a multitude of parties, spanning the 
ideological spectrum and representing a variety of interests and issues, impinges on the 
Church's long-standing role as arbiter between state and society. The Church' s 
representative dominance has been challenged by a broad range of parties, espousing 
various ideological orientations: post-communist, peasant, social democratic, labour, 
Christian, populist-national, bourgeois conservative, free-market liberal, and socialist. In 
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addition, special interest parties such as pensioner and cultural mjnority parties have al o 
emerged at various times. In 2002, an overtly anti-Church party was even formed, 1 
providing citizens with an option dedicated to eliminating the Church's political role. The 
existence of these parties provides Poles with so many choices that the Church is not 
necessary for interest articulation; instead, Poles can choose a specific political party to 
perform that function. However, in practice, these party alternatives often fail to match the 
Church, lacking the features necessary to become consistent, successful political 
competitors and to capture the confidence of Polish society. 
Political parties ' abilities to compete with the Church for the public's loyalty have 
been diminished by the persistent instability of the party system throughout much of the 
post-Communist period. One facet of this instability is apparent in the staggering 
proliferation in the number of political parties: a multitude of political parties were formed 
around prominent personalities, narrow goals, or in the name of political convenience, 
without a corresponding recognition of the resources, organization, and skill that are 
required to maintain a successful political party. As a resul t, Polish politics failed to 
develop a core of strong, consistent party contenders for most of the 1990s. Although 
1 The Racja Anticlerical Party, led by a Fonner Catholic priest, declared it opposition to the 
Church's influence over Polish politics, advocating repeal of the Concordat and a number of Church 
privi leges. It was officially registered in 2002, with estimates of the number of members varying between 
6,000, from registration documents, and 12,000, from leader's claims. The party's radical stance 
eventually alienated the SLD (Democratic Left Alliance), which had originally been a supporter during 
the initial formation of the party. Jerzy Slawom.ir Mac, "Church & State: A Wild Party," The Warsaw 
Voice (29 September 2002) [online]; available from http://www. warsawvoice.pl/archiwum.phtml/2139 
Internet: accessed 30 July 2005. 
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party development was initially slow/ it later gained momentum during the interim 
between 1989 and 1991.3 Consequently, in 1991 , at the starting point of this analysis, the 
party system presented Polish voters with an astounding number of choices as over a 
hundred parties competed for seats in the Sejm.4 This situation improved as the number of 
political parties shifted downwards over time,5 suggesting a trend of consolidation in the 
party system. Moreover, the union of several post-Solidarity parties to form Solidarity 
Electoral Action (A WS) during the mid-90s was thought to indicate a new unity on the 
right of the political spectrum. This presumption of growing stability in 1997 was based on 
the idea that the party system had developed a stable core of parties, dominated by two 
main blocs of the right and the left, respectively, Solidarity Electoral Action (A WS) and the 
Democratic Left Alliance (SLD), and augmented by the significant presence of smaller 
parties, notably the Freedom Union (UW) and the Polish Peasant Party (PSL).6 However, 
2 This is attributed to the quick timing of the 1989 partially-competitive elections and the 
strength of Solidarity. Kitschelt et al. , 99. 
3 Tomek Grabowski, "The Party that Never Was: The Rise and Fall of the Solidarity Citizens' 
Conm1ittees in Poland," East European Politics and Societies 10, no. 2 (1996): 237. 
4 A total of one hundred and eleven parties and groupings competed in the parliamentary 
e lections to fill the four hundred and sixty seats in the lower house, the Sejm. 
5 For instance, the number of contenders over successive elections changed dramatically between 
199land 1993 from a high of Ill to 35. In addition, this trend continued in 1997, when 21 groups 
contested the elections, and in 2001, when just 14 groups contested the 200 I elections. This infom1ation 
was extracted from table 4.8 , which compares the number of contenders on election lists over successive 
e lections in post-Conummist countries. Frances Millard, Elections, Parties, and Representation in Post-
Communist Europe (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004), 90. 
6 Aleks Szczerbiak, "Party Structure and Organizational Development in Post-Communist 
Poland," Journal of Communist Studies and Transition Politics 17, no. 2 (200 I): 95; 126; A leks 
Szczerbiak, "Old and New Divisions in Polish Politics: Polish Parties ' Electoral Strategies and Bases of 
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this conclusion appears to have been premature because the A WS, composed of dozens of 
different groups, fragmented over the years 2000 and 2001, producing new parties who, 
instead of being bound by their political orientation, were compelled to form a common 
grouping for the upcoming 2001 elections. 7 As expected, this coalition did not hold 
together after the election, contributing to further fragmentation during the 2001-2005 
period. At the same time, the SLD, thought to be one of the few stable parties on the 
Polish political scene, destabilized as the party was gripped by scandal and suffered the 
departure of several prominent personalities, producing several new political parties and 
weakening the remaining core of the SLD.8 Thus, at the end of2005, the main parties in 
Poland, consisting of Law and Justice (PiS), Civic Platform (PO), Self-Defence (SO), the 
SLD, the League of Polish Families (LPR), and the PSL, have all contended and been 
successful in more than one election, lending credence to the idea that perhaps the Polish 
system is developing a stable core of parties; however, "the Polish political scene remains 
extremely fluid and unstable."9 The continuing instability ofPolish party politics has 
Support," Europe-Asia Studies 55, no. 5 (2003): 729. 
7 A leks Szczerbiak, "Poland's Unexpected Political Earthquake: The September 200 I 
Parliamentary Election," Journal of Communist Studies and Transition Politics I 8, no. 3 (2002): 63-64; 
Frances Millard, "Elections in Poland 200 I : Electoral Manipulation and Party Upheaval," Communist and 
Post-Communist Studies 36 (2003): 75-76. 
x Aleks Szczerbiak, '"Social Poland' Defeats 'Liberal Poland'? The September-October 2005 
Polish Parliamentary and Pre idential Elections," Journal of Communist Studies and Transition Politics 
23, no. 2 (2007): 206-208. 
9 Szczerbiak, '"Social Poland' Defeats 'Liberal Poland '? The September-October 2005 Polish 
Parliamentary and Presidential Elections," 223-224. 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
prevented the fonnation of strong links between constituencies of voters and particular 
political parties, limiting the ability of the party system to consistently represent the 
multitude of interests in society. 
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The sharp contrast between the Church and most of its party competitors is 
immediately obvious; while most parties struggled to carve out a niche in the new 
democratic system, the Church remained much as it had for the last century. The lack of 
unity within political parties and the failure of broader alliances between smaller parties, 
weakened most parties as competitors to the Church. The bewildering array of choices 
split the political system to such a degree that the Church continued to appear as one of the 
few stable, viable, and reliable choices in the new system. In effect, the weakness of the 
majority of Poland's political parties increased the openings available to the Church to 
claim that it represented a broader spectrum of Polish society. The Church still faced few 
rivals that could match it with the same degree of organization, resources, and potential 
constituency size. A degree of consolidation within the party system has narrowed party 
options to a manageable level and increased the plausibility of a few parties effectively 
assuming their articulative and representative functions. It remains to be seen if these 
parties can successfully navigate the challenges of Polish politics and build successful party 
structures to become viable, stable, and reliable representatives of the Polish people. Until 
the party system becomes fully consolidated, the Church will continue to look like the more 
reliable representative and will consequently receive openings into the political system that 
positively affect its political opportunity structure. 
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The Stability of Party Development in Slovenia 
As in Poland, the Slovene political landscape filled up with a diverse assortment of 
parties, ready to represent various concerns in society. Among the great number of parties 
which have developed in post-Communist Slovenia, several distinct ideological strands, 
spanning the spectrum of political belief, are apparent: socialism, religion, nationalism, 
liberalism, populism, and environmentalism.10 Additionally, parties have formed as 
advocates for specific groups in society, such as farmers and retired persons.' ' In general, 
the party system in Slovenia appears to have been much more stable than the system in 
Poland over the last 15 years as the Slovene system has gone through "a process of gradual 
system-development from a nucleus of durable parties." 12 As a result, Slovenia's party 
system is considered to be among the most developed and stable in the post-Communist 
region 13 such that, as early as 1993, one observer concluded that "Slovenia's political 
parties are now more or less comparable to those in continental European countries with a 
traditional multi-party dcmocracy."14 Therefore, in the mix of political parties in Slovenia, 
10 Danica Fink-Hafner, "Development of a Party System," in Making a New Nation: The 
Formation of Slovenia, Danica Fink-Hafner and John R. Robbins, eds. (Aldershot: Dartmouth, 1997), 
145-148. 
I I fbid. , 148. 
12 Millard, Elections, Parties, and Representation in Post-Communist Europe, 143. 
13 fbid. , 149. 
14 Bibic makes two caveats to this observation; "their profiles are not as sharply defined as those 
in countries with a long liberal democratic tradition and their relationships are far more fluid. " Adolf 
Bibic, "The Emergence of Pluralism in Slovenia," Communist and Post-Communist Studies 26, no. 4 
( 1993): 384. 
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it bas generally been easier for voters to find a dependable party that already possesses an 
established record in the country, the democratic system, and the country's Parliament. 
The Church's presence and stability do not present a remarkable contrast to the state of 
democratic institutions, so there has been little space for it to tep in as Slovenes' 
representative. Thus, both the variety and effectiveness of Slovenia's political parties have 
presented a particular challenge for the Church in its quest to gain a share of political 
power. These political parties occupy the official representative space such that the Church 
is not needed to assume the representative function for Slovene citizens; these citizens are 
likely to find a political party that fits their particular interests. Moreover, the nature of the 
democratic system vests power in parties through the election of their members to the 
governing bodies of the state. This established presence in the decision-making apparatus 
of the state gives parties an edge over the Church in influencing the course of the polity. 
This advantage is enhanced by the parties' consensus around Slovenia's broad policy goals, 
the development of a number of stable and reliable political parties, a significant slowdown 
in the entry of new parties, 15 a general trend of consolidation over fragmentation, and the 
adaptability of the former nomenk/atura16 to the democratic political system. 
Despite the complications of political transformation and the pace of party 
formation, the Slovene party system has maintained a paradoxical state of stability, which 
15 Jn 1992, the number of party contenders was 26, in 1996, 22, and in 2000, 16. Extracted from 
table 4.8 in Millard, Elections, Parties, and Representation in Post-Communist Europe, 90. 
16 The term nomenklatura refers to the elite of the former Communist government. 
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means that the Church has been dealing with a relatively consistent set of party competitors 
that have existed since the early 1990s, regularly make it into Parliament, and remain 
pohtically active. This has left a reduced space for other interests to take up a significant 
role linking Slovenes to the democratic state. This consistency and stability represents a 
sharp contrast to the situation in Poland, where political parties were largely mutable and 
inconstant. Like Poland, Slovenia was besieged by an explosion of new parties when 
political competition was legalized; however, these parties were united, at least initially, 
around the common goal of Slovene independence. 17 Consequently, the degree of 
fragmentation among Slovenia's parties was initially modest because political expediency 
required party competitors to cooperate to ensure that Slovenia's separation from 
Yugoslavia proceeded as smoothly as possible. This consensus has lasted for much of the 
post-Communist period because the dominance of the centre limits polarization between 
left and righe 8 and a "large degree of overlap [existed] between parties on core values, 
such as the establishment and consolidation of democracy, the development of a market 
economy ... and on major issues such as potential membership in the EU or NAT0."19 
17 Alenka Krasovec, "Party and State in Democratic Slovenia," in Party Development and 
Democratic Change in Post-Communist Europe: The First Decade, ed. Paul G. Lewis (London: Frank 
Cass, 200 I), 94. 
IH Drago Zajc, "Slovenia," in The Handbook of Political Change in Eastern Europe, eds. Sten 
Berglund, Thomas Hellen, and Frank H. Aarbrot (Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar, 1998), 280. 
19 James Gow and Cathie Cam1ichael, Slovenia and the Slovenes: A Small State and the New 
Europe (B loomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 2000), 156-157. Kuzmanic expresses a 
similar idea as well, stating that there is a "more or less unifonn consensus on almost all key political 
questions." Tonci Kuzmanic, "Slovenia: From Yugoslavia to the Middle of Nowhere?" in 
Democratization in Central and Eastern Europe, eds. Mary Kaldor and Ivan Yejvoda (London: Pinter, 
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This made it difficult for the Church to align with a political party or group that shares its 
particular values because almost all of the parties are striving toward the same goals. They 
did not need the Church as an ally; this would mean sharing resources and tempering the 
liberalization of Sloverua. Further, what Millard calls "party tourism," the defection of 
individuals from one party to another, which leads to party breakdown and new party 
formation, has been rare in Slovenia, especially in comparison to other post-Communist 
countries.20 Even the fragmentation of DEMOS, which may have been fomented by 
conflict over the Church/' before the 1992 elections failed to disturb the system because 
"DEMOS had been constructed of identifiable proto-parties and collapsed into its 
constituent elements. "22 This meant that when DEMOS disappeared, most of its spinoffs 
were already recognized parties or groupings. Thus, the Slovene political party scene 
possessed a host of features which allowed parties to fill the political space created by 
democratization. In contrast, Polish parties existed in a state of relative upheaval 
throughout most of the post-communist period, leaving more space for the Church to take 
advantage of other openings in the political opportunity structure. Until recently, the 
general state of agreement on Slovenia's moderate course opened up few opportunities for 
1999), 124. 
20 Millard, Elections, Parties, and Representation in Post-Communist Europe, 133. 
21 According to Millard, the split of DEMOS occurred over economic and religious issues, 
namely the Christian Democrats undue attention toward the Church over other, more important issues. 
Millard, Elections, Parties, and Representation in Post-Communist Europe, 53. 
22 Millard, Elections, Parties, and Representation in Post-Communist Europe, 53. 
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the Church. However, since the year 2000, both the notable growth of the right/ 3 and the 
increasing accentuation of issues such as national identity, religion, and ethnicity to create 
distinct party identities24 have moved the Slovene system slightly from its moderate course. 
This may have opened opportunities for the Church to engage in collaboration with more 
potential political party allies that are defined by religious, traditionalist themes. 
Political Parties as Collaborators 
Besides acting as competitors in their bid to represent society, political parties can 
also serve as a valuable resource for the Church, especially when they connect voters to 
the Church's interests. Conversely, the Church is also a valuable resource for a party 
seeking legitimation of its ideology or policies. The degree to which the objectives and 
policy of a political party and the Church coincide determines their compatibility as 
convenient partners or hostile enemies. Additionally, the ability of compatible and 
incompatible allies to establish an effective party organization, stable presence in politics, 
and strong links with the electorate affects the Church' s opportunities to have an influence 
on politics and public policy. 
The Weakness of Compatible Allies: The Fragmented, Ineffective Polish Right 
The prevailing cleavage structure in Polish politics for much of the post-communist 
period has largely dictated which part of the political spectrum and which parties are 
23 In one of the most recent works on Slovenia, Cox notes that the " more conservative elements 
in the Slovene polity would seem to be on a upswing at the moment, with the center-right undergoing 
something of a deflation ." This is a reaction to the NSi ' s e lection to two out of seven seats to the 
European Parliament in 2004. Cox, 122- 123. 
24 Harris, 169. 
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compatible with the Church. This cleavage structure, described as "a historical-cultural 
one, framed by a combination of attitudes toward the communist past and moral and 
cultural values, particularly the role of the Catholic Church in public life, and closely linked 
to levels of religiosity,"25 has continued to define where both parties and voters place 
themselves on the political spectrum.26 Thus, a number of parties on Poland's right, which 
tend to have I inks to the opposition movement of the 1980s, show the greatest ideological 
compatibility with the Church and support Church-oriented policies; that is, the Polish right 
typically lends more credence to religious demands.27 However, most parties on the right 
have failed to become coherent political parties because they are "divided to and beyond 
the point of being self-defeating. "28 As a result, most parties of the right have failed to 
become part of the political system's select, stable core of political parties, representing 
ineffective political choices for Polish voters and unreliable allies for the Church. Thus, 
although great potential has been realized by the Church's association with the right, the 
openings spawned by an association with these allies are tempered by the right's failure to 
spawn consistent, durable parties. 
25 Szczerbiak, '"Social Poland' Defeats 'Liberal Poland '? The September-October 2005 Polish 
Parliamentary and Presidential Elections," 219. 
26 Kitschelt et al. , 232, 252-254, 276-277; Radosl aw Markowski, "Party System 
Institutionalization in New Democracies: Poland -A Trend-Setter with No Followers," in Party 
Development and Democratic Change in Post-Communist Europe: The First Decade, Paul G. Lewis, ed . 
(London; Portland: Frank Cass, 200 1), 68; Szczerbiak, "'Social Poland ' Defeats 'Liberal Poland'? The 
September-October 2005 Polish Parliamentary and Presidential Elections," 219. 
27 Kitschelt et al. , 233. 
28 Marjorie Castle and Ray Taras, Democracy in Poland, 2'"1 ed. (Boulder: Westview Press, 
2002), 133. 
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Initially, during the heady days of the Polish transition and the interim government 
of 1989, Solidarity appeared to be the dominant force shaping Poland's political future, but 
this dominance dissipated as prominent personalities and constituent groupings within the 
alliance fought amongst themselves for dominance.29 This formation, which contained a 
number of pro-Church groups and leaders, was also the Church's closest supporter. After 
Solidarity's fragmentation, several key post-Solidarity political groupings emerged to 
support the preservation of Catholic identity and morality in Poland, notably the various 
parties subsumed under the Church-sponsored banner of Catholic Electoral Action 
(WAK).30 The ZChN, which was affiliated with WAK, became a component of two 
coalition governments in the 1991-1993 legislature. During this time, when the Church' s 
rightist allies held a position power within the governing coalition, the Church experienced 
some of its greatest gains. This included the signing of the Concordat and the passage of a 
highly restrictive abortion law. However, the opportunities of this time were not to last; 
during the period from 1993 to 1997, the right became highly fragmented, beset by conflict, 
party breakdown, and leadership struggles.31 Reacting to the threat posed by the SLD, 
several parties of the right managed to come together to form A WS for the 1997 elections, 
29 Grabowski, 24 1-247; Marian Grzybowski, "Poland," in The Handbook of Political Change in 
Eastern Europe, eds. Sten Berglund, Tomas Hellen, and Frank H. Aarebrot (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 
1998), 160-1 6 1. 
30 During the 1991 elections, Church officials openly endorsed specific candidates and parties in 
their parishes including Catholic Electoral Action. Mirella Eberts and Peter Torok, "The Catholic 
Church and Post-Communist Elections in Hungary and Poland Compared," in Religion and Social 
Change in Post-Communist Europe, eds. Irena Borowik and Miklos Tomka (Krakow: Zaklad 
Wydawniczy NOMOS, 2001), 136- 137 . 
31 Castle and Taras, 133- 134. 
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but "the basis on which they came together was a negative one, there was little 
programmatic coherence, and the constituent entities were unwilling to sink their own 
putative identities into a single political party."32 As a result, this grand coalition of rightist 
parties succumbed to the same fate as Solidarity, breaking down and, ultimately, breaking 
up into two main successors Solidarity Electoral Action - Right (A WSP) and Law and 
Justice (PiS) who competed in the 2001 elections. Although PiS persisted to fight another 
election in 2005, A WSP, forged from several different groupings who refused to submerge 
their individuality into a common entity, 33 suffered the same fate as its predecessors. Thus, 
during this period, stretching from 1989 to 2001, the Polish right, although attaining 
electoral success in the 1991 and 1997, failed to produce much in the way of cohesive, 
stable parties. Even those brief periods of success provided the Church with numerous 
openings into politics and the governing coalition, but the lack of a consistent, identifiable 
party ally kept the Church no doubt diminished certain openings that would have enhanced 
the political opportunities available at particular times. 
The situation of the right, and thus of the Church in its search for a party ally 
appears to have taken a turn for the better since 200 l. When the SLD, the bedrock party 
of the left and the entire political system, experienced its own course of scandal and 
fragmentation in 2003, a significant opportunity opened for the right to ascend to 
prominence, but only if it could coalesce to form some coherent parties in time for the next 
32 Millard, Elections, Parties, and Representation in Post-Communist Europe, 266. 
33 Millard, "Elections in Poland 200 I: Electoral Manipulation and Party Upheaval," 76. 
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election in 2005. Several viable parties, which had all been contenders in the 2001 
elections, were able to take advantage of voter disillusionment with the tarnished SLD: PO, 
PiS, and LPR. Among these parties, PiS and LPR shared the most values with Church 
officials. The LPR, the latest incarnation of the Christian-national sector, is the Church's 
most natural ally because of its Christian-Catholic orientation.34 However, the party's 
interests do not completely coincide with those of the Church as the LPR is not supportive 
of Poland's integration with the EU/ 5 a policy with which the Church became closely 
associated during the late 1990s. PiS also bad the potential to create an atmosphere that 
was conducive to the realization of the Church's goals. This is because "PiS represents a 
much more traditional viewpoint, retains a Christian Democratic spirit and clearly distances 
itself from liberal fundamentalism in the economy by supporting some kinds of state 
assistance for less affluent citizens."36 In addition, PiS's tendency toward virulent anti-
communism37 suggests a commonality with the Church which is unmistakable; the Church 
has maintained its position as a vocal opponent of the communist successor parties and the 
legacies of communism throughout the post-Communist period. The ascendancy of these 
34 The LPR oppo es same-sex relationships and endorses Catholic morality in public life. 
Marcin Mierzejewski, "Swinging Right," The War aw Voice (4 November 2004) [online]; available from 
http://www.warsawvoice.pllindex.phtml?pg=druk&a=6984; Internet: accessed 2 1 August 2005. 
35 Tbid. 
36 Tbid. 
37 PiS 's distrust of the fonner communis ts is evident in their radical motion to criminalize the 
SLD in late 2004. Tn addition, according to Mierzejewski, "PiS politicians have never concealed their 
hostility for the post-communist left, which they see as a corrupt, criminal, and even secret police-like 
organization." Marcin Mierzejewski, " Polar Divide," The Warsaw Voice (24 November 2004) [online]; 
available from http://www.warsawvoice.pl/vicw/7092; Internet: accessed I 0 October 2005. 
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two parties has once again created more opportunities for the Church to attain influence in 
the party arena and enhanced the Church's political opporturuty structure. However, it is 
questionable whether these parties can contain the forces which have ripped apart previous 
incarnations of the right. The very recent period of PiS pre-eminence under the leadership 
of the controversial Kaczynski twins, Lech as President and Jaroslav as Prime Minister, 
witnessed the introduction of measures that were so beneficial to the Church as to prompt 
suggestions that a violation of the of the principles of the Church-State relationship took 
place.38 
Consistent, Dependable Allies: The Slovene Right 
One advantage of the Slovene party system's stability has been the availability of 
several small, well-established, consistent parties as potential political allies for the Church. 
As in Poland, these parties generally lie toward the right side of the political spectrum and 
have shown problems forming larger political groupings to challenge the immensely 
successful Liberal Democracy of Slovenia (LDS) in the nation's elections.39 The most 
notable pro-Church parties in Slovenia have been the Slovene Christian Democrats (SKD), 
the Slovene People's Party (SLS) and, more recently, the Social Democratic Party of 
Slovenia (SDS) and the New Slovenia-People's Christian Party (NSi). The SKD, the 
largest constituent of the DEMOS coalition during the early 1990s, was a party of the 
JM Wojciech Sadurski, "The Constitutional Order," in Democracy in Poland 2005 - 2007, eds. 
Lena Kolarska-Bobinsa, Jacek Kucharczyk, and Jaros law Zbieranek (Warsaw: Institute of Public Affairs, 
2008), 2 1. 
39 Attempts to form ' Coalition Slovenia' in 2000 were successful for the election, but quickly fell 
apart in the wake of defections, breakdowns, and mergers. Millard, Elections. Parties, and 
Representation in Post-Communist Europe, 148- 149. 
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centre-right that managed to contest and attain success in each post-communist election in 
Slovenia. Because of its identity as a Christian party, the SKD, "support traditional values 
and defend the position of the Catholic Church in society, as well as urging the 
reintroduction of religious education in schools."40 The SLS, similar to the SKD in 
outlook, also resides at the centre-right of the political spectrum.41 Both the SKD and the 
SLS "embrace in many ways the legacy of the old clericals";42 however, an attempted union 
between the two parties to form a larger unit, SLS + SKD, during the late 1990s, was 
largely a failure because of the party' s participation in the brief, yet unpopular, rightist 
coalition government of 2000 and the defection of a crucial leader, Lojze Peterle, to the 
NSi .43 The Social Democratic Party of Slovenia (SDS), originally left of center when it 
was known as SDSS, had, by 2000, turned to the right, adopting populist appeals in party 
rhetoric.44 By 2004, the party changed its name yet again, becoming the Slovene 
Democratic Party (SDS). Regardless of its name, this political party has successfully 
competed in each of Slovenia' s four post-Communist elections, winning seats each time, 
and in the last election in 2004, winning the most seats of any party (see appendix B for full 
results). This party, noted for its propensity toward an increased role for the Roman 
40 Zajc, "Slovenia," 28 1. 
41 Cox, 119. 
42 rbid. 
43 Ibid.; Behler, 133- 134. 
44 fbid.; Millard, Elections, Parties, and Representation in Post-Communist Europe, 148. 
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Catholic Church,45 is one of the Church's best chances to enhance its political opportunity 
structure and expand its political influence. The NSi, a recent entrant into the party arena 
(2000), has rapidly become a formidable political force, winning seats in the two elections 
in which it participated, and becoming part of the new governing coalition of the right in 
2004. This Church-supported party,46 along with the other Church-oriented parties of the 
right serve as important allies for the Church in its quest to influence Slovene politics. The 
relatively stable, consistent presence of these parties, especially as compared to the 
instability Poland's right, gives these parties a favourable profile with Slovenia's electorate. 
This means that the parties successfully present themselves as a plausible alternative to the 
LDS because they seem more likely to be able to provide stable, effective government. 
Moreover, as constituents of governing coalitions, they possess the potential to change 
government policy and provide openings for the Church. Thus, the Slovene Church, 
steeped in a political system that has consistently provided more stable, appealing allies on 
the right, has enjoyed more potential openings in this component of the political 
opportunity structure than in Poland; however, voters' choices ultimately determined how 
effective these openings would be for the Church's goals. 
Political Parties as Opponents 
Serious Challenger: The Former Communists Reincarnate Themselves in the SLD 
45 Rizman refers to this proclivity in his discussion of the possibilities emerging from an SDS-Ied 
coalition, pecifically pondering whether leader Jansa will be able tore ist the urge " to increase the 
influence of the Catholic Church in vita l social spheres (education, in particular) ... " Rizman, 75. 
46 The fom1ation of this party received " the strong and visible support of the most influential 
dignitaries in the Catholic Church." Rizman, 73. Also, in the 2000 election this party was openly 
supported by the Church. Ivekovic, 530. 
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Although the fragmentation of many parties has limited their effectiveness in the 
political system, the Communist succe sor party, the SdRP, and its party alliance, the SLD, 
which became the SLD party in 1999, demonstrated a formidable ability to compete 
successfully in Polish politics. From 1993 to 2001, the effects of the SLD's success were 
readily apparent, as the SLD made gains in popular vote at each election,47 even as the 
Church actively discouraged voters from supporting these ex-Communists. The SLD made 
a tremendous breakthrough in 1993, launching the party into a dominant role in the 
political system, capturing the allegiance of Poles holding anti-clerical and pro-Church 
views alike, and becoming the only party which could be described as a party of"broad 
appeal," able to span the Communist/anti-Communist divide: "SLD politicians had gotten 
so much public respect that even if the public still thought communism was bad, the SLD 
seemed not only far from that past but al o comparatively more sane and rational than 
those who were not ' tainted' by communist pasts."48 Despite their past, the former 
Communists of the SdRP demonstrated a remarkable ability to adapt to the realities of 
democracy and to use the system to their advantage. This task which required a 
remarkable level of political insight, skill, and persistence; these qualities were lacking in 
most other party competitors. Although the SdRP started from a shaky ideological 
foundation, the party's break with the past was clear in its adoption of the new symbols of 
47 The SLD's percentage of the popular vote increased as follows: 1991 , 12 percent; 1993, 20.4 
percent; I 997, 2 7. I percent; 200 I , 41.0 percent. 
4
M Jane Leftwich Curry, "Poland 's Ex-Communists: From Pariahs to Establishment Players," in 
The Leji Transformed in Post-Communist Societies: The Cases of East-Central Europe, Russia, and 
Ukraine, eds. Jane Leftwich Curry and Joan Barth Urban (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2003), 32. 
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social democracy and its reformist stance.49 Simultaneously, the party retained resources, 
supporters, and organizational skills from the old organization that allowed members to 
build a strong party.50 Moreover, the party's estrangement from other parties and fellow 
parliamentarians isolated its members, effectively instilling a party unity that is rare in other 
Polish parties.51 In addition, the SdRP's effective control over the SLD also enhanced the 
party's cohesion.52 Therefore, the SLD was able to rival the Church in terms of 
organizational capacity and resources: maintaining a considerable reach across Polish 
territory, a core of dedicated supporters, and a relatively sturdy resource base. Most of all, 
as the party held onto its traditional support base, it also gained new supporters by 
becoming a party of 'broad appeal', avoiding overtly 'Communist' policies, recruiting low-
profile candidates for important posts, and gaining the support of the disillusioned 
electorate.53 In effect, the ex-Communists of the SdRP and the SLD became 
representatives of the democratic system, shedding their history ·of past resistance to 
democratic change as easily as a second skin, while the Church remained mired in a past in 
which its power was defmed by its opposition to an unpopular government that no longer 
existed. 
49 Anna M. Grymala-Busse, Redeeming the Communist Past: The Regeneration of Communist 
Parties in East Central Europe (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 105-107; 161. 
5° Curry, 26; Castle and Raymond Taras, Consolidating Democracy in Poland (Boulder: 
Westview Press, 1995), 125- 127. 
51 Curry, 26, 35-36; Gryzmala-Busse, 250-25 1. 
52 Curry, 50. 
53 Curry, 30-31 . 
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The SLD retained at least one ideological feature from the Communist period which 
has, at times, represented a constraint on the Church' s activities; the party' s unmistakably 
secular stance54 questions the legitimacy of the Church' s political power and it also 
competes with the Church's moral stance on policy issues. During the 1990s, relative to 
other parties, the SLD showed the most pronounced opposition to the Church 's political 
power.55 For the 1993 election, the SLD' s opposition to the Church' s power was 
presented as an objection to the Church ' s religious dominance, the anti-abortion law, and 
the circumstances surrounding the negotiation of the Concordat because these items 
infringed on the rights of other religions and women and interfered with the jurisdiction of 
the Polish state. 56 Even though ideology pulled the SLD toward a position of opposition 
to the Church as a political power, the party's pragmatism provided openings for the 
Church because the SLD needed to maintain its broad appeal and its reputation as a 
reasonable actor to ensure future electoral success. This lent a great deal of flexibility to 
party's dealings with the Church; leaders were careful to choose the issues over which they 
would engage in conflict with the Church's moral absolutism. Abortion was one issue over 
which the SLD uncompromisingly opposed the Church' s position, particularly the Church-
54 The party is a finn advocate of the separation between Church and state. Curry, 30. 
55 Poland 's parties presented a large spread on this particular issue with the ZChN sanctioning 
the Church 's influence the most, many parties lying in between the two extreme views, such as KPN, PSL, 
and UD, and the SLD showing the most disregard for the Church's influence. Kitschelt et al. , 3 I 9. 
56 Curry, 40. Also, certain elements within the SLD continued to object to the Church ' s power as 
late as 2003, advocating a strict separation between Church and state. Witold Zygulski , "Trouble at the 
Top," The Warsaw Voice (3 April 2003) [online]; available from 
http://www.warsawvoice.pllindex.phtml?pg=dmk&a= 1879 Jntemet: accessed II March 2005. 
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influenced, restrictive anti-abortion law of 1993.57 However, SLD leaders' reputations for 
logic and pragmatism were not entirely unearned; the SLD treaded lightly around the issue 
of the Church, simply because most Poles and therefore voters were still officially Roman 
Catholic. Thus, on occasion, the SLD attempted to appease the Church and its followers 
by cooperating with the Church. For instance, during its first term in government, it 
reached out to religious believers by allowing the Christian Social Union (UChS) into the 
SLD alliance; whether this move was motivated by strategic considerations, namely 
appealing to devout Catholic voters to broaden the party's support, or genuine policy 
changes, is debatable.58 SLD leaders also made moves toward including the Church in 
political discussions during the meetings of the joint Government-Episcopal committee 
around the same time.59 Since both the SLD and the Church supported Poland's 
integration with the European Union, cooperation was necessary during the final stages of 
accession, when the SLD was the main governing party. Thus, even though the SLD's 
policy position advocated separation between Church and state and the SLD acted as a 
constraint on Church encroachment into the political arena, the tempering of this policy 
reduced the SLD' s opposition to the Church's influence when its pragmatism overrode 
ideology and provided openings in the political opportunity structure. 
57 Refer to article on opposition to abortion here. 
5
M Potocki presents his skepticism of this move, focusing on the uspicions of political opponents 
and Church representatives. Andrzej Potocki, UW Spokesman "SLD-Church Rapprochement: That New-
Found Religion," The Warsaw Voice ( 14 April 1996) [onl ine] ; available from 
http://www.warsawvoice.pllarchiwum.html/89/ Internet: accessed 4 February 2005. 
59 rbid. 
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Despite the SLD's success for most of the post-Communist period, its measure as a 
competitor to the Church has undergone significant modification in recent years. 
Corruption, internal squabbling, and electoral defeat, have combined to compromise the 
image of professionalism and stability which contributed to the SLD's success. Its term in 
office from 2001 to 2005 was rocked by political scandals and allegations of corruption, 
many of which arose from the legacies of Communist period. The SLD was also damaged 
by the breakaway formation of a new political party, Polish Social Democracy (SDPL), in 
2004, just as the party faced its lowest rankings in public opinion polls.60 Since the 2005 
elections, when the SLD garnered the lowest percentage of popular votes in its history,6 1 
the SLD has held the status of opposition party, holding fewer seats than at any time since 
the early 1990s. The weakness of the SLD bas released some of the constraints which this 
powerful political party imposed on the Church; the SLD has less influence over the 
development of the polity. Since the SLD's downfall is concurrent with the rise of several 
parties of the right, notably Church-friendly PiS and the Catholic LPR, the Church's 
opportunity to influence policy has likely increased, while constraints on its political activity 
have likely decreased. However, whether this drop in the SLD's fortunes signals a 
permanent decline for the party is questionable as it seems that a significant portion of its 
constituency neglected to vote in the last election, the party retains the strong 
60 
" Regrouping the Left Camp," The Warsaw Voice (26 May 2004) [online]; ava ilable from 
http://www.warsawvoice.pllindex.phtml?pg=druk&a=539 Internet: accessed 21 August 2005. 
6 1 The SLD only received the support of just over II percent of those who voted in the 2005 
elections to the Sejm. 
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organizational capacity that made it a successful party during the previous 15 years, and the 
Polish party scene continues to be unstable.62 If the SLD manages to rebound from this 
low period, it may once again represent a threat to the Church's power. 
Continuity in Power: Slovenia's Liberal Democrats 
The Liberal Democratic Party of Slovenia (LDS), arguably Slovenia's most 
successful party competitor, as well as one of the Church's greatest detractors, originated 
from the Communist nomenklatura, much as the Church's leading party competitor in 
Poland. Like the former Communists in many east-central European countries, including 
Poland, many of the Slovene Communists were able to transform themselves into 
democratic parties relatively quickly, but the former Communists in Slovenia had an extra 
edge; they became partners in the change, rather than persisting as opponents.63 As a 
result, they were incorporated into the new system from the beginning and were able to 
take advantage of the resources which they inherited from the previous party apparatus in 
their transformation into a democratic, competitive political party.64 Among the two main 
descendants of the former Communist apparatus, the ZLSD and the LOS, the LOS, which 
originated from the League of Socialist Youth (LSY), has undoubtedly been the more 
successful of the two. The Slovene LOS is equated with the Polish SLD as the one of the 
62 Szczerbiak, '"Social Poland ' Defeats ' Liberal Poland'?," 222-224. 
63 Alenka Krasovec, "Party and State in Democratic Slovenia," in Party Development and 
Democratic Change in Post-Communist Europe: The First Decade, ed. Paul G. Lewis (London: Frank 
Cass, 200 l ), 94; Harris, 169. 
64 Krasovec, 94; Cox, 118. 
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two major Communist-successor parties that "established themselves as pivotal players."65 
The constant leadership of Janez Dmovsek from 1992-2002, the LDS 's superior 
organization, and the LDS 's pursuit of a centrist policy, firmly established the LDS as 
Slovenia' s main party.66 The LOS's platform encompasses the broad values of "preserving 
social justice and social harmony in Slovenia while also .. . securing the new sovereign 
state, promoting the growth of both democracy and market-based economic restructuring, 
and pursuing integration into Euro-Atlantic institutions such as the EU and NAT0."67 
Significantly, the LDS has also been firmly secularist in its stance, seeking a strict 
separation between church and state. Thus, from 1992 to 2004, when the LDS formed the 
primary party in government coalitions on a nearly continuous basis, the Church faced a 
constrained political opportunity structure that provided few openings to further the 
Church's agenda. This is not to suggest that the Church was unable to achieve any 
concessions during that time, but the few openings that were offered were small and 
resulted in insignificant gains for the Church. For instance, the tug of war over religious 
education, which has been strung out over most of the post-communist period, has only 
resulted in the concession to provide an optional course, 'Religions and Ethics', to 
secondary school students.68 Because of the constitutional separation between church and 
65 Millard, Parties, Elections, and Representation in Post-Communist Europe, Ill . 
66 Cox, 11 7 - I 18. 
67 Cox, 11 8. 
6M Matjaz Klemenc ic, "Conclusion: Slovenia between Liberalism and Clericalism," in 
Democratic Transition in Slovenia: Value Transformation, Education, and Media, eds. Sabrina P. Ramel 
and Danica Fink-Hafner (College Station: Texas A & M Unversity Press, 2006), 272. 
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state, this course cannot be used as a vehicle to introduce explicitly Roman Catholic 
education into the schools, without constitutional modifications, a seemingly unlikely 
prospect. 69 
A decline in the fortunes of the LDS after leader Drnovsek's departure for the 
Presidency in 2002 has become a political boon for actors on both the right and the left of 
the political spectrum. First, after the departure ofDrnovsek as leader in 2002, the party 
moved from its centre-left position further to the left, making the party less palatable to 
Slovene voters. At the same time, the center was taken over by the ZLSD and the SDS.70 
This effectively trapped the LDS in its new, less popular leftist orientation. Also, after its 
many years in power, Slovenes became increasingly dissatisfied with indications of 
corruption in the LDS. For the LDS, these changes resulted in electoral defeat to the 
forces of the right in 2004. Since then, the LDS has shown great difficulty adapting itself 
to the requirements of its opposition role. 71 In this situation ofLDS decline and centre-
right ascendancy, the Church stands to benefit from a more open political opportunity 
structure than it has faced since Slovene independence and the brief period of rightist 
11
q KJemenCic, "Conclusion: Slovenia between Liberalism and Clerica lism," 272-273. 
7° Fink-Hafner pondered the possible negative consequences of lo ing Dmovsek after the 2002 
elections, including fears about an LOS monopoly over the two highest offices in the country, those of 
President and Prime Minister. Danica-Fink Hafner, "Slovenia," European Journal of Political Research 
42 (2003): I 083-1084. 
7 1 Leadership changes to reposition the party only happened a full year after the time of the 
electoral defeat. Danica Fink-Hafner, " Slovenia," European Journal ofPolitical Research 45 (2006): 
J 263. Also, the President, and former leader of the LOS, Drnovsek, engaged in confl ict with parliament 
as he plunged into the role of opposition; a role which the LOS was fai ling to fulfill. Danica Fink-Hafner, 
"Slovenia," European Journal of Political Research 46 (2007): 1111. 
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coalition government in 2000. Finally, Church-friendly politicians are dominant in party 
politics, setting up a situation that could be filled with opportunities to increase the 
Church's role in Slovene political and social life. However, the ability of these parties to 
function effectively as electoral contenders and parliamentary representatives remains to be 
seen. 
Summary 
The relative instability of Polish party politics as compared to Slovene party politics has 
played a role in shaping the political opportunity structure in each country. The instability 
of Polish parties has acted as both an advantage and a disadvantage for the Church, 
facilitating the image of the Church as a comparatively stable, reliable representative of the 
Polish people but, simultaneously, limiting the effectiveness of potential political party allies 
and access to political openings created by affiliation with political parties. Conversely, for 
the Slovene Church, the stability of the party scene provided little means to differentiate 
between political parties and the Church as representatives of Slovenes but, simultaneously 
expanded the number of stable, effective political party allies available to the Church. 
Thus, the Slovene Church was confined to work through political party allies to gain access 
to parliament, whereas the Polish Church, independently powerful as a representative and 
lacking stable party allies, could sometimes forgo the necessity of working through its party 
allies to gain access to government. However, in both cases, the rejuvenation of former 
Communist nomenklatura to form the most stable and effective parties in the political party 
arena has, at times, limited both Church's abilities to gain openings in party and 
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government politics. For the Slovene Church, the consistency of the LDS acted as a 
formidable constraint on its political activities until recently. The Polish Church bas not 
been similarly limited because of the alternation in the fortunes of the SOL, but has al o 
seen recent changes in party politics which may create new openings for the Church. Thus, 
because of the multitude of political party elements contributing to the political opportunity 
structure, no single element was able to exclusively constrain or expand the Church' s 
political opportunities at any point in time. Further, these opportunities based on political 
parties, are modified by the electoral process and government dynamics in each country. 
CHAPTER 7 
ELECTORAL POLITICS: CHANGING THE FORTUNES OF POLITICAL PARTIES 
As the forum for political choice in a democracy, elections determine the winners 
and losers among political parties. In this way, citizens' choices at the ballot box, in 
interaction with the structure of the electoral system, translate into seats and power in the 
legislature and thereby into the chance to influence the direction of government policy. 
Thus, the fate of the Church's allies, as well as its opponents, in the electoral arena 
necessarily affect the Church's political opportunity structure by determining which parties 
gained the potential to influence policy. Furthermore, elections also provided the Church 
with a forum for its own ambitions, either as a party supporter or as a third-party influence. 
Since the Round Table of 1989 and the first partially-free elections ofthe same 
year, Poles have had multiple opportunities to vote in competitive democratic elections. 1 
The results of elections to the Sejm, from 1991 to 2005, are provided in Appendix A. 
Polish elections displayed two consistent, interrelated trends: minority winners and 
alternating party turnover. In every election to the Sejm, the party or electoral coalition 
winning the highest number of seats failed to attain a majority, meaning that the winning 
party was required to put together a coalition with one or more other parties to form a 
government. Also, a trend of alternation was apparent in the switch between rightist 
1 Elections to the Sejm, the lower chamber of the Parliament, and the Senate, the upper chamber 
in Parliament, were held simultaneously in 1991 , 1993, 1997, 2001, and 2005. Poles also elected their 
President in 1990, 1995, 2000, and 2005. Other opportunities to vote at the local level, also took place in 
1990, 1994, 1998, and 2002. 
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parties and the SLD as winners of successive electoral contests. 
Slovenes have also had multiple opportunities to vote in fully democratic elections 
since the processes of democratization and independence gained full momentum during 
1990 and 1991.2 The full results of the elections to the DrZ.avni Zbor (National Assembly) 
are provided in Appendix B. It should be noted that the first post-communist elections of 
1990 have been minimized in this analysis because Slovenia was not yet an independent 
state. As in Poland, these electoral contests produced winning parties with only a minority 
of seats in National Assembly. However, the identity of the winning party was consistent 
over all of the elections between 1992 and 2000. This sharply contrasts with the pattern of 
alternation that became the norm in the Polish system. Consequently, the Slovene system 
possessed an element of continuity between elections that is similar to that of western 
European systems; the winner of the previous election, which was also the current 
governjng party, usually tended to have the upper hand in subsequent elections.3 
A Work in Progress: The Effects of Ongoing Electoral Reform 
The list proportional electoral system, which was chosen to allocate seats among 
electoral contenders to both Poland's Sejm and Slovenia 's National Assembly, introduces 
2 Elections for the National Assembly (Drzavni Zbor) were held in 1992, 1996, 2000, and 2004. 
Also, elections for the Presidency were held in 1992, 1997, and 2002. The founding elections of the 
intenn ediate between the old system and the new were held in 1990 for both the National Assembly and 
the Presidency. 
3 This refers to Millard ' s conclus ions about the effects of incumbency, wh ich were mentioned 
Chapter 4. Essentially, Millard contrasts the typical situation of e lectoral turnover in eastern Europe with 
the edge that is conferred by incumbency in western Europe. Millard, Elections, Parties, and 
Representation in Post-Communist Europe, 276. 
182 
another element of volatility into the political opportunity structure. This is because the 
formula used in each election affects how voters' preferences are translated into seats in the 
legislature and, depending on the threshold of popular votes that is required to gain a seat, 
changes the number and composition of parties in the legislature. Thus, a lower threshold 
means that seats are divided among a greater number of parties in the legislature. 
Conversely, a higher threshold disproportionately benefits parties with a larger support 
base over those with a smaller support base, allowing fewer parties into the legislature. In 
this way, as the proportional formula and thresholds are modified to find the proper balance 
between effective representation and chaos, political parties find themselves in a different 
situation as popular appeal translates into seats. For the Church, the fate of its party allies 
and opponents in the proportional system determjnes the operung that the Church receives 
to influence the legislature. 
The proportional system in Poland has undergone frequent modification during the 
post-communist era, both to reduce fragmentation of seats among numerous small parties 
and to manipulate the winners and losers in the electoral process. The proportional 
formula for Poland' s first elections in 19914 introduced a high degree of proportionality 
into the electoral contest, giving all parties a chance to gain seats in the legislature.5 
4 No threshold existed for parties or alliances in s ingle-member districts, but a 5 percent 
threshold was in place for the national list. Millard, Elections, Parties, and Representation in Post-
Communist Europe, 86. 
5 Taras, 191 ; Castle and Taras, 97; Richard Rose and Neil Munro, Elections and Parties in New 
European Democracies (Washington, D.C.: CQ Press, 2003), 228. 
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However, this resulted in a fragmented legislature; with seats divided between twenty-nine 
different parties, finding the common ground to build effective and stable coalitions was 
nearly impossible. To preclude the degree of fragmentation which had beset the legislature 
after the 1991 elections, the formula for the 1993 elections6 raised the threshold for parties 
and coalitions to enter the legislature, altered districts, and changed the seat allocation 
formula. 7 This alteration accounts for some of the contrast between 1993 legislature and 
the one which preceded it: the number of parties and groupings in the Sejm dropped from 
an unwieldy twenty-nine to a mere six. This blocked several parties from the Sejm, 
including rightist parties WAK 'Fatherland' and Solidarity, which each fell just below the 
minimum threshold.8 The same formula prevailed in the 1997 elections,9 producing a Sejm 
composed of only five parties.1° Further modifications to the electoral law in 2001 once 
again changed the formula for awarding seats to parties in the Sejm, allowing for greater 
proportionality. " As a result, the number of parties in the Sejm increased to six, 12 including 
6 The threshold for s ingle-member districts was set at 5 percent for parties and 8 percent for 
alliances, while the threshold for groupings on the national list was set at 8 percent. Millard, Elections, 
Parties, and Representation in Post-Communist Europe, 86. Rose and Munro, 228-229; Taras, 195. 
7 Grzybowski , 170. 
8 Taras, 195. 
9 Millard, Elections, Parties, and Representation in Post-Communist Europe, 86. 
10 This excludes the seats set aside for representation of the German Minority. 
11 The main thrust of the law a ltered the threshold for parties on the national list, the formula 
used to distribute seats, and the size of districts. Rose and Munro, 229; Millard, "Elections in Poland 
200 1: electora l manipulation and party upheaval, ' 70-71. 
12 Excluding the seats reserved for the Gem1an minority. 
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three new political formations. Thus, it seemed that some of the progress of the 1990s had 
been undone. This formula also prevailed for the 2005 election, the more recent electoral 
contest considered in this study, producing a Sejm which was once again divided between 
the same six parties who had gained seats in the previous election. Electoral reform, 
specifically altering the proportionality of the system, has changed the political context for 
Polish parties and their fortunes over the duration of the post-communist period. As the 
system was modified to minimize the number of parties entering the legislature, political 
parties with smaller bases of support were shut out of the legislature and thus, the main 
milieu of policymaking. Since the political right was often highly fragmented, the Church's 
main party allies, with the exception of 1997, experienced great difficulty attaining the 
share of seats necessary to gain power in the legislature. Thus, for the Church, continuing 
reform of the electoral system and its effects on the Church's fragmented party allies, often 
altered the political opportunity structure so that it did not favour the Church. 
The rules of proportional representation evolved differently in Slovenia, with the 
threshold for a seat set at 3 percent for the first two post-independence elections in 1992 
and 1996 and raised to 4 percent in 2000.13 Also, seats are distributed in the legislature 
using an altogether different formula in Slovenia. 14 Although a large number of electoral 
formations ran in the 1992 elections, there were fewer winners than in Poland 's first post-
13 Millard, Elections, Parties, and Representation in Post-Communist Europe, 89. 
14 Millard provides a full account of how candidates are elected on an individual and party basis 
in his discussion of post-Communist pol itics. Millard, Elections, Parties, and Representation in Po /-
Communist Europe, 93-94. 
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communist election; only eight parties made it into the legislature compared to twenty-nine 
in Poland. Thus, the degree of fragmentation produced by party politics and the electoral 
system was less than that in Poland. Also, though far from calm, government coalitions 
were generally more stable in Slovenia. Correspondingly, a desire to change the system in 
order to reduce fragmentation and to increase the effectiveness of government was not 
widely shared in Slovenia. Despite the apparent effectiveness of the proportional system in 
the 1992 elections, its appropriateness was questioned by political elites. In 1996, the 
Social Democrats (SDS), with the support of a citizen petition, demanded a referendum on 
the issue of reforming the electoral system to exchange a new two-round majoritarian 
system for the existing proportional system. 15 This initiative, which was not favoured by 
other parties, ultimately failed, but during the intervening time, it provoked controversy, 
confusion, and changes to the proportional system, such that the constitutional article 
governing the elections was changed. 16 This formula prevailed for the 2004 national 
election, the more recent electoral contest considered in this study. Nevertheless, the 
proportional representation system has continued to admit a similar number of parties and 
groupings to the legislature. 17 Moreover, the identity of these parties has remained fairly 
15 Andrej Auersperger Matic, "Electoral Reform as a Constitutional Dilemma," East European 
Constitutional Review 9, no. 3 (2000): 77-78. 
16 Finally, in 2000, the crisis was resolved by a change in Art. 80 of the constitution such that the 
"National Assembly is elected under a system of proportional representation with a 4 percent threshold, 
and with the further addition that voters ought to have the decisive role in choosing among individual 
candidates presented by party lists." Matic, 80. 
17 Seven in 1996, eight in 2000, and eight in 2004. 
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consistent, with few new party formations exceeding the threshold to enter parliament. For 
the Church, this stability meant that its allies predictably made it into the legislature such 
that they had the opportunity to push Church policies. Reform of the Polish proportional 
system narrowed the number of party contenders attaining success, but party and electoral 
politics failed to generate the same stability in party identities. Thus, generally, 
proportional representation has provided a greater measure of stability to the political 
opportunity structure in Slovenia than in Poland. 
Election Trends: Winners and Losers in the Electoral Arena 
Following from the effects of proportionaUty, shifts within party politics, and 
changes in society's political preferences, electoral politics reveal trends in party politics 
and society that affect the Church's political opportunity structure. With each successive 
election in post-communist Poland and Slovenia, the Church has been challenged by the 
conformation of winners and losers and the trends that underlie these results. 
Poland: A Trend of Continuous Change 
In 1991, the sheer popularity of the Solidarity movement, the adaptation required 
by the former Communists, and open electoral rules ensured that the remnants of Solidarity 
would dominate this electoral contest. Further, the Polish electorate, new to democratic 
politics, did not possess links with the developing political parties.18 As a result, this 
election produced a highly fragmented Sejm, dominated by former Solidarity groupings, 
IH Jack Bielasiak, "Poland," in Eastern Europe: Politic , Culture, and Society since 1939, ed. 
Sabrina P. Ramet (Bloomington, IN : Indiana University Press, 1998), 148. 
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but also containing a large number of small parties. The 1993 election results reflected the 
rapid adaptation of the former Communists to the new political reality, as well as their 
ability to utilize resources, both inherited and otherwise, to project a new image that was 
entirely compatible with the democratic system. Thus, the Polish electorate, seeking 
reliable political representatives, turned to the former communists, marking another new 
phase in Polish politics- the acceptance of the former communists as full participants in the 
democratic system. 19 The elections of 1997 heralded another political swing, fitting into a 
growing trend of alternation between right and left at successive elections. It also appeared 
that, because electoral victory materialized for a declining number and diversity of parties 
and groups, the system was becoming more stable.20 The union of several post-Solidarity 
parties to form Solidarity Electoral Action (A WS) and its subsequent victory in the 1997 
elections, supported this nearly unanimous observation of growing stability. 21 Additionally, 
the two major blocs, the A WS and the SLD, who represented the traditional bipolar 
19 Bielasiak, 153 ; Millard, Elections, Parties, and Representation in Post-Communist Europe, 
88. 
20 Szczerbiak, "Poland's Unexpected Political Earthquake: The September 200 I Parliamentary 
Election," 42. 
21 This stability was characterized by the dominance of two main blocs, Solidarity E lectoral 
Action (A WS) and Democratic Left Alliance (SLD), and the sign ificant presence of the Freedom Union 
(UW) and the Polish Peasant Party (PSL). A leks Szczerbiak, 95; 126. A leks Szczerbiak, "Old and New 
Divisions in Polish Politics: Polish Parties' Electoral Strategies and Bases of Support," 729. However, 
Millard does not see things the same way describing the main developments leading up to the 1997 
elections as a " renewed polarization of the Polish political scene . .. " Frances Millard, Polish Politics and 
Society (London: Routledge, 1999), 78. 
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division that was carried from the Communist period into post-communist politics,22 
seemed to indicate a growing trend of consolidation on both the right and the left of the 
political spectrum. 
The 2001 elections to the Sejm constituted another political alteration. The 
outgoing governing coalition, a mix of post-Solidarity groups (A WSP and UW), was 
virtually wiped out, while the post-communist SLD, along with a coalition of various 
smaller parties, achieved electoral victory, but not with a majority.23 Furthermore, the rest 
of the party landscape altered drastically as four new or previously marginal parties gained 
seats in the Sejm.24 Previous predictions of increasing party system stability were swept 
away by the realization that instability seems to be the rule, rather than the exception, in 
Polish politics. The former A WS government, which had tried to forestall the almost 
22 Szczerbiak, "Old and New Divisions in Polish Politics: Polish Parties' Electoral Strategies and 
Bases of Support," 729; Castle and Taras, 115; Kitschelt et al., 23 1. This division is described by 
Szczerbiak as "attitudes towards the communist past and different approaches to moral and cultmal issues 
such as religion and the role of the Church (or, more broadly, 'Christian values ' ) in public life ... " Aleks 
Szczerbiak, "The Impact of the 1998 Local Elections on the Emerging Polish Party System," Journal of 
Communist Studies and Transition Politics 15, no. 3 ( 1999): 97. 
23 Szczerbiak, "Old and New Divisions in Polish Politics: Polish Parties's Electoral Strategies 
and Bases of Support," 729-730; Szczerbiak, "Poland's Unexpected Political Earthquake: The September 
200 l Parliamentary Election," 50-5 1; Frances Millard, "Elections in Poland 200 I: Electoral Manipulation 
and Party Upheaval," 71-73. 
24 Aside from the SLD, smaller parties managed to cross the popular vote thresholds required for 
representation in the Sejm: Civic Platfonn (PO), Law and Justice Party (PiS), League of Polish Families 
(LPR), Samoobrona (SO), and Polish Peasant Party (PSL). At least three of these parties had been formed 
in the inunediate period before the election, and SO had been a marginal actor through most of the 1990s. 
Szczerbiak, "Old and New Divisions in Polish Politics: Polish Parties ' s Electoral Strategies and Bases of 
Support," 730-73 1; Szczerbiak, "Poland' s Unexpected Political Earthquake: The September 200 I 
Parliamentary Election," 50-5 1; Frances Millard, "Elections in Poland 200 I: Electoral Manipulation and 
Party Upheaval," 72-76. 
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certain victory of the SLD by tampering with the rules of the electoral process prior to the · 
election/ 5 learned the high political cost of electioneering; their attempt to prevent the SLD 
from winning the majority of seats not only failed, but their party met with ignominious 
defeat in the process, demonstrating once again that the Polish right was unable to unite as 
a stable and effective political unit. Moreover, this election was a high point for the SLD, 
proof that it had managed to craft itself into an efficient democratic parti 6 and that it had 
"won over voters who previously might previously have been considered out of bounds for 
a formation that was based on the successor to the communist party and whose electorate 
had previously been defined primarily in terms of their attitudes toward the past and moral-
cultural issues.'m This seemed to indicate that the previously dominant Communist/anti-
Communist and religious-secular divisions were giving way to socioeconomic divisions 
instead.28 
Recent electoral results indicate yet another sharp tum for the Polish political 
system. In 2005, elections carried the conservative right forces Law and Justice (PiS) and 
25 Millard recounts the fairly blatant attempts of the outgoing Solidarity (A WS) administration to 
tamper with the e lectoral rules so as to minimize the predicted electoral victory of the SLD. Millard, 
"Elections in Poland 200 I : Electoral Manipulation and Party Upheaval," 69-7 1. 
26 Millard, "Elections in Poland 200 I: Electoral Manipulation and Party Upheaval," 85; 
Szczerbiak, "Old and New Divisions in Polish Po litics: Polish Parties' Electoral Strategies and Bases of 
Support," 73 1; 735. 
27 Szczerbiak, "Old and New Divisions in Polish Politics: Polish Parties' Electoral Strateg ies and 
Bases of Support," 735. 
2x Millard, "Elections in Poland 200 I : Electoral Manipulation and Party Upheaval," 7 1; 
Szczerbiak, "Poland 's Unexpected Political Earthquake: The September 2001 Parliamentary Election," 
7 1. 
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Civic Platform (PO) to the forefront of Polish politics and removed the communist-
successor party, the SLD, from power. Self-Defense (SO), which had attained a dramatic 
result in the 2001 election, but was largely dismissed as a permanent or relevant political 
force, came in at third place in terms of popular vote and seats, indicating that despite its 
radical politics, it is a viable presence in Polish politics. Significantly, the only continuous, 
dominant presence in Polish politics, the seemingly unshakable post-Communist 
Democratic Left Alliance (SLD), which had been relatively successful in every election 
since 1993, had an abysmal result, especially when considered next to the party's 216 seats 
in the Sejm in 2001. Finally, the League of Polish Families (LPR), which is known for its 
conservative stance on moral issues,29 attained a fifth place showing in the Sejm.30 
Presidential elections, held on 9 October 2005, also marked a victory for the right as PO's 
Donald Tusk and PiS 's Alexander Kaczynski faced each other in the second round, held on 
2~ According to Mierzejewski , LPR "politicians pose as the only defenders of traditional values 
and social order . .. " Mierzejewski, "Swinging Right." 
30 Paristowa Komisija Wyborcza. Wybory do Sejmu Rzeczypospolitej Polski e) Zarz~dzone na 
Dzien: Wyniki Wybor6w 25 Wm?snia 2005 [Elections to the Sejm of the Republic ofPoland: Election 
Results 25 September 2005] [online] (Warsawa: Rezeczypospolitej Polskiej, 2005); available from 
http://www.wybory2005.pkw.gov.pi/SJM/PL/WYN/Miindex.htm Internet: accessed 29 September 2005. 
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October 23.31 Kacyri.ski emerged victorious,32 cementing PiS as Poland's ruling party for 
the foreseeable future. These dramatic results, especially the competition between the 
elections main rivals, PO and PiS, seem to indicate a shift from the traditional communist-
opposition divide, which defined Polish politics in previous post-communist elections, to a 
social-liberal divide.33 However, low voter turnouts and the past adaptability of the SLD/ 4 
as well as the general volatility that bas characterized Polish politics for much of the post-
communist period, lend uncertainty as to the longevity of this change and the long-term 
effects on the Church's political opportunity structure.35 
31 Tusk garnered 36.33 percent of the vote, while Kaczyr\ski garnered 33.10 percent of the vote. 
Since neither obtained a majority of the vote, a second round was mandated to decide between these 
candidates. National Electoral Conunission, Presidential Election of the Republic ofPo/and Ordered on 
the Day of9 October 2005: Voting Results (Warsaw: Government of the Republic of Poland, 
2005)[online]; available from http://www.prezydent2005.pkw.gov.plfPZT/EN/WYN/W/index.htm; 
Internet; accessed 10 October 2005; Poland-Elections 2005-Press Center, "Tusk with 36.33 pet, Leek 
Kacynski with 33. 10 pet enter election runoff, PKW," Polish Press Agency (10 October 2002) [online]; 
available from http://www.elections.pap.pl/cgi-bin/news.pl?did=76 1 &lang=en&subid=27 &id=2; Internet; 
accessed I 0 October 2005. 
32 Kacyriski garnered 54.04 percent of the vote in the runoff against his opponent Tusk. National 
Electoral Co111111iss ion, Pre idential Election of the Republic of Poland Repeat Ballot at the Day of 23 
October 2005: Voting Results (Warsaw: Government of the Republic of Poland, 2005) [onl ine]; avai lable 
from http://www.prezydent2005.pkw.gov.pi/PZTIEN/WYN/W/index.htm Internet: accessed 24 November 
2005. 
33 Szczerbiak, '"Social Poland ' Defeats 'Liberal Poland '? The September-October 2005 
Parliamentary and Presidentia l Elections," 2 11 ; 224; Krzysztof Jasiewicz and Agnieszka Jasiewicz-
Betkiewicz, "Poland," European Journal of Political Research 45 (2006): 1245- 1246. 
34 Szczerbiak, "'Social Poland' Defeats ' Liberal Poland '? The September-October 2005 
Pari iamentary and Presidential Elections," 225-226. 
35 Within two years (2007) Poles were once again back at the polls, reducing the PiS to second in 
the share of legislative eats and taking away their governing power, removing the LPR and SO from the 
legislature, and vaulting the PO to governing power. In addition, the SLD, now subsumed under a new 
electoral coalition, Left and Democrats (LiD), continued as a reduced presence in the legislature. 
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Despite a significant amount of instability, threads of consistency are woven 
through Poland's post-communist elections. First, a continual cycling between parties of 
the left and right became a dominant feature between elections. The implications of this 
trend are obvious for the Church; as its allies on the right and opponents on the left 
alternated in their dominance of the electoral process, the Church's political opportunity 
structure became less favourable. Thus, after the 1991, 1997, and 2005 elections, the 
Church faced a favourable political opportunity structure. These openings in the political 
structure decline after the SLD victories in the 1993 and 2001 elections. Also, by 
implication, the Church could not depend on its allies to exist from election to election 
lending a degree of uncertainty to its relations with party allies. Finally, the consistent 
presence of both PiS and the LPR in both of the more recent elections promised the Church 
an opening into the legislature and, as of 2005, into the governing coalition, greatly 
enhancing the Church's political opportunity structure. Overall, the electoral process 
provided significant, but variable opportunities for the Church throughout the post-
communist period. 
Slovenia: A Trend of Consistency 
In Slovenia's first post-communist elections of 1992, the fragmentation of the party 
scene and the large number of parties and groupings contesting the elections was reflected 
in the election results but, as previously noted, the level of fragmentation did not approach 
that of the Polish scene after its first elections in 1991. Also, this election instituted a trend 
of Liberal Democratic (LOS) dominance in Slovene politics that would not be broken until 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------
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the 2004 elections, reflecting both adaptative abilities of the former communists and the 
consistency of their political participation throughout the transition.36 The 1996 elections 
continued the trend of LDS dominance and brought back many of the same party players 
who were present in the previous parliament.37 Thus, it appeared that, whereas 
incumbency was a liability in Poland, it became an asset in Slovenia, at least for a majority 
of its political parties. A brief flirtation with a rightist coalition government, initiated by the 
newly united Slovene People's Party and the Christian Democrats (SLS + SKD) bringing 
the LDS government down, resulted in an electoral backlash against these parties in the 
subsequent year 2000 elections.38 This brought the LDS back to power with the largest 
share of the popular vote and seats that it had attained in any post-communist election. It 
also allowed two new parties to gain representation in the legislature: the Party of Young 
People of Slovenia (SMS) and the New Slovenia-Christian People's Party (NSi). The 
identities of the remaining political parties were continuous with the last election. 
The 2004 elections, however, brought about a significant alteration in Slovene 
politics. The LDS, mired in scandals and corruption, suffering from a leadership change, 
36 
"As in most of the other fom1er communist countries of eastern Europe, fom1er members of 
the nomenklatura played a prominent role in Slovenia in the 1990s. fn places like Poland, Hungary, and 
the Czech Republic, these people returned to political li fe, whereas in Slovenia they had never left it." 
Cox, 123 . 
37 The Green Party disappeared, while a new party Democratic Party of Retired Persons of 
Slovenia (DeSUS) gained seats in the National Assembly. 
JM Danica Fink-Hafner and Sabrina P . Ramet, "Slovenia since 1988: Building Democracy and 
Liberalism," in Democratic Transition in Slovenia: Value Transformation, Education, and Media, eds. 
Sabrina P. Ramet and Danica Fink-Hafncr (College Station: Texas A&M University Press, 2006), 36- 38. 
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and displaced from the political centre, failed to dominate the elections, dropping to second 
place with 23 seats- its lowest showing since 1992. Also, the rejuvenated, right-leaning 
Slovene Democratic Party (SDS) attained dominance in the elections. Even though the 
results of the more recent elections represented a significant change, much stayed the same. 
All of the parties which attained seats had been elected in the previous election and most of 
them had attained seats in every post-independence election. Thus, the political party 
players remained the same. Moreover, despite its failure in these elections, the LDS still 
attained more seats than it had in 1992 when it was able to form a coalition government. 
The LDS is far from political oblivion, suggesting that if it can adapt, it can once again 
become dominant in Slovene politics. 
The overall consistency of the electoral process and the election results contrasts 
markedly with the Polish situation, which has been subject to a greater degree of instability. 
The stability of Slovene party and electoral politics has provided a certain amount of 
security for the Church when it aligns with party allies. The Church's main party allies, 
namely the Christian Democrats, maintaining a constant party presence in each election, 
made it into the legislature each time. Thus, the Church could remain fairly confident that, 
barring disaster, it would still have a party ally in the legislature after the next election. 
This provided the Church with consistent openings into legislative politics and, sometimes, 
coalition politics if one of its party allies made it into the governing coalition. This was a 
positive benefit to the political opportunity structure. At the same time, the consistent 
dominance of the LDS diminished these openings because of its secularist orientation, but 
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did not eradicate them entirely. The election results of 2004 may widen these openings as 
it brought the centre-right to political prominence, thereby enhancing the Church's political 
opportunity structure. 
Elections as a Venue for the Church to b~fluence Democratic Choice 
Although elections are focused on political parties, they also present an opportunity 
for third parties, such as the Church, to use their own resources to try to influence society's 
party preferences and hence their voting choices. The evidence indicates that the Church in 
Poland has extensively participated in the electoral process to further its political agenda; 
however, the Church in Slovenia shows little evidence ofthe same degree of electoral 
involvement. The political opportunity structure in Poland, becoming less favourable to 
Church interference over the course of post-communist elections, gradually restricted the 
openings available to the Church to interfere in electoral politics and, hence, the Church's 
political involvement declined. However, in Slovenia, the political opportunity structure 
was never favourable enough for the Church to engage in outright interference in elections. 
In Poland, the Church's opportunity was highest in the partially-free elections of 
1989 because both Solidarity and the public supported the Church's involvement. As a 
result, the Church was able to become intensively involved in the campaign: 
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Parishes throughout the country were turned into campaign headquarters 
for Solidarity, and priests took part in selecting the opposition candidates. 
Those attending church services were instructed whom to vote for and why. 
As a result, clergymen became de facto campaign spokespersons for 
individual candidates.39 
However, once democratic changes were instituted, this context would change such that 
fewer opportunities existed for the Church to engage in this kind of influence over the 
electoral process. Thus, by the time of the first fully democratic elections in 1991 , the 
Church was facing a polity that was less open to its influence. Although the Church 
assumed an official stance ofnon-interference,40 it attempted many of the same tactics 
which it had used in the 1989 contest: issuing directives about preferred candidates and 
parties, as well as using Church services as a venue for influencing parishioners on how to 
vote.41 The reception to the Church's activities was much Jess enthusiastic than on 
previous occasions as Poles fai led to support the party that the Church was comfortable 
with, Catholic Electoral Action (WAK), and showed greater support for the parties that the 
Church maligned during the campaign, such as the UD and the SLD.42 By 1993, things had 
changed such that the Church was restricted to reminding Poles' about considering 
39 Mirella Eberts and Peter Torok, "The Catholic Church and Post-Communist Elections in 
Hungary and Poland Compared," in Religion and Social Change in Post-Communist Europe, eds. Irena 
Borowik and Miklos Tomka (Krakow: Zaklad Wydawniczy NOMOS, 200 I), 134. 
40 As Chan notes, "in every election, the Episcopate announced that it would not back any 
particular parties or candidates." Kenneth Ka-Lok Chan, "The Religious Base of Politics in Post-
Communist Poland," in Religion and Mass Electoral Behaviour in Europe, eds. David Broughton and 
Hans-Martien ten Nape! (London: Routledge, 2000). 
41 Eberts and Torok, 136-137. 
42 Eberts and Torok, 137. 
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Christian values when making their electoral choices,43 although the slant of these 
comments left "no doubt that the Catholic Church hierarchy was warning people against 
the SLD."44 This toning down of the Church 's electoral activities is concurrent with the 
previously described declines in society's openness to the Church's influence over the 
voting process. In 1995, the Church once again waded carefully into the Presidential 
election campaign to prevent Aleksander K wa5niewski, a former member of the 
Communist nomenklatura, from winning over Lech Waltysa, the former leader of 
Solidarity. Most of the Church's activism was unofficial, emerging from individual 
members of the clergy, who encouraged their parishioners to vote for the correct 
candidate.45 Again, the context was not open to this kind of political interference and, 
despite the Church's efforts, Kwasniewski won. The Church's cautious engagement in the 
election process in 1997, restricted its role to once again encouraging voters to consider 
Catholic values and the nation's past in their decisions.46 This approach fit with the 
constraints which the system had placed on its influence in the electoral process. 
In the 2001 elections, the threat of an SLD victory forced the Church to abandon 
some of its previous care and use the pulpits of local Churches to attempt to influence 
43 Eberts and Torok, 137-138; Anna Sabbat-Swidlicka, "The Polish Elections: The Church, the 
Right, and the Left," RFE/RL Research Report 2, no. 40 ( 1993): 26-27. 
44 Sabbat-Swidlicka, "The Polish Elections," 29. 
45 Eberts and Torok, 140- 141. 
46 Eberts and Torok, 142-143. 
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voters.47 As the large SLD victory indicates, these attempts to deter voters were largely 
unsuccessful. By 2005, the Church appeared to have learned that its interference often 
created undesirable results. Although the Church was clearly compatible with conservative 
and Christian parties, it did not overtly support any parties or candidates, keeping itself out 
of the electoral fray.48 Also, "moral and cultural issues such as church-state relations and 
abortion were almost entirely absent from this campaign, even though they had played such 
an emotive and significant role in Polish elections during the 1990s."49 Thus, the absence of 
some of the Church's critical concerns constrained the Church 's ability to engage in the 
election debate and may have signaled a shift of Polish politics away from the secular-
religious debate. Almost immediately after the introduction of the first fully competitive 
elections in 1991 , it became clear that the Church's opening to have influence over the 
electoral process was rapidly diminishing. Neither the majority of the public nor other 
political actors needed or wanted the Church to tell Poles how to vote; democracy 
demanded that Poles make their own choices and that parties make a stand on their own. 
Consequently, Church intervention in the election process has come to be viewed as 
inappropriate, beyond the Church's domain or, at worst, undemocratic. Overall, this aspect 
47 A letter, drawn up by the Episcopate and read in churches, asked Catholics to consider anti-
abortion stances and the communist heritage of the candidate parties in their voting decisions. 
Szczerbiak, "Poland 's Unexpected Political Earthquake: The September 200 I Parliamentary Election," 
53-54. 
4~ Szczerbiak, "'Social Poland' Defeats 'Liberal Poland' ? The September-October Polish 
Parliamentary and Presidential Elections," 2 13. 
49 Szczerbiak, "'Social Poland' Defeats 'Liberal Poland '? The September-October Polish 
Parliamentary and Presidential Elections," 213. 
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of political opportunity structure bas become increasingly closed to the Church. 
In Slovenia, the political opportunity structure never provided the same degree of 
openings for Church interference in elections. From the time of the first election in 1992 
the Church was barred from the electoral process by the views of Slovene society and the 
development of stable, proven political party alternatives. First, the Slovene public rejected 
the Church's interference in the political process, considering it the domain of legitimate 
political actors. Also, the political party scene, although initially somewhat chaotic, 
contained a number of familiar elite personalities and parties that had been active during 
Slovenia 's transition to democracy and independence. This sharply contrasts with the 
Polish case, where political party politics remained unconsolidated for most of the 1990s 
and the SLD remained the most familiar and unforgettable progenitors in the communist 
transition, allowing the Church find more openings in the political opportunity structure to 
participate in electoral politics. 
CHAPTER 8 
GOVERNMENT DYNAMICS: THE ART OF COALITION GOVERNMENT 
The vagaries of both the Polish and Slovene political party systems and electoral 
processes consistently produce winning parties lacking a majority of seats in the legislature. 
This makes pacts between parliamentary parties necessary to form a government and to 
gain the majority required for the passage of legislation. The formation of a coalition 
government requires compromise with other political parties, some of whom may be 
ideologically incompatible. Thus, usually, coalition agreements provide for policy 
concessions to the minor coalition partners and the division of executive posts between the 
participating parties. The function of a coalition is tied into its ability to function as 
cohesive unit. Thus, even a minor coalition partner can broker a deal with the other 
coalition partners which makes general cooperation contingent on the coalition's 
endorsement of a deeply-held policy; in effect, exchanging support for the continuing 
survival of the coalition government for a particular policy goal. However, wide 
disagreements about policy and personality conflicts between actors can lead to the 
disintegration of a coalition. Thus, coalition partners must tread lightly around each other 
in the pursuit of their distinct policy aims. These features of coalition government-building 
in both countries variably affected the Church's political opportunity structure, depending 
on the orientation and relative power of each of the parties involved in the governing 
coalition. 
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The Instability of Coalition Governments in Poland 
Over the last 15 years, Poland has been governed by a series of coalition 
governments, consisting of various parties and led by a variety of Prime Ministers. The 
composition of these coalitions is presented in table 14. These coalitions are often 
characteristically unstable, vulnerable to the slightest perturbation in the relationship among 
coalitions partners or divisions within the constituent parties. The instability of coalition 
government in Poland is related to the availability of compatible party allies which is 
limited by the origins of each party during the Communist era, the complexity of issue 
orientations held by each party, and each party' s propensity to cooperate with another 
party. 1 The communist/anti-communist division is so pervasive that it continues to define 
relations between parties, making coalitions between the communist and opposition 
successor parties highly unlikely, irrespective of other factors. 2 Even when Communist-
and Solidarity-successor ·parties show ideological compatibility on some dimensions,3 they 
remain divided by their history and are unable to cooperate to achieve a common goal.4 In 
1 Kitschelt et al. , 348-349. 
2 Kitschelt et al. , 355;34; George Sanford, Democratic Government in Poland: Con titutional 
Politics since 1989 (Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire: Palgrave Macmi llan, 2002), 198; Castle and 
Taras, 11 5. 
3 rn Kitschelt et al. 's study, the SLD and Solidarity were relatively close to each other on policy 
dimensions such as the welfare state and market economics. Kitschelt et al., 245. 
4 Taras 's complex representation of the party system in the early 1990s also shows this historical 
divide, among others, but it is no longer a dimens ion considered in Castle and Taras's representation of 
parties in 200 I, although close inspection reveals that a sim.ilar axes can be drawn in this diagram as well . 
Taras, 182; Castle and Taras, I 14. 
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addition, the ambitions of party elites also preclude cooperation with the competition. 5 
Even when parties subscribe to similar policy programs, close competition for the same 
policy space proscribes an alliance, thereby narrowing coalition possibilities.6 Because of 
these conditions, the task of building and maintaining a stable coalition has preoccupied 
every post-communist government in Poland. This limits the ability of any individual 
coalition partner to attain a pervasive influence over government policy; however, it also 
provides smaller parties with the opportunity to use their cooperation under the auspices of 
the coalition to influence specific policies. Thus, the Church as an ally of specific political 
parties, is subject to the limitations and opportunities of this coalition-dominated system. 
5 Kitschelt et al., 364. 
6 Kitschelt et al., 364. 
---~·--------------------------------------
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Table 14. Government Coalitions in Poland, 1993 to 2006 
Parliamentary Term Coalitions Coalition Configurations Number of Identity and Term of 
Prime Ministers Prime Ministers 
PC, ZChN, PL, PSL (91-92); Jan Olszewski, 91-92; 
1991 - 1993 3 PSL(June/July 92); 3 Waldemar Pawlak, 
UD, KLD, ZChN, PSL (92-93) 92; Hanna Suchocka 
92-93 
Waldemar Pawlak, 
1993- 1997 1 SLD,PSL 3 93-95; J6zef Olesky, 
95-96; Wlodzimierz 
Cimoszewicz, 96-97 
1997-2001 I AWS, UW I Jerzy Buzek, 97-2001 
Leszek Miller, 2001-
2001 -2005 2 SLD-UP, PSL (2001-2003); 2 2004; SLD-UP (2003-2005) Marek Belka, 2004-
2005 
Kazimierz 
2005- 1 PiS, SO, LPR 2 Marcinkiewicz, 2005-2006; Jaroslaw 
Kaczyr\ski 2006-
Sources: Herbert Kitschelt, Zdenka Mansfeldova, Radoslaw Markowski, and Gabor T6ka, Post-Communist 
Party Systems: Competition, Representation, and Inter-Party Cooperation (New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 1999), 11 -13; Raymond Taras, "Voters, Parties, and Leaders," in Transition to 
Democracy in Poland, 2"" ed., ed. Richard F. Staar (New York: St. Martin ' s Press, J 998), 69; Marjorie 
Castle and Ray Taras, Democracy in Poland, 2"" ed. (Boulder: Westview Press, 2002), 202; Krzysztof 
Jasiewicz and Agnieszka Jasiewicz-Betk:iewicz, "Poland," European Journal of Political Research 46 
(2007): 1064-1065. 
The period between 1991 and 1993 ranks as one of the most tumultuous in post-
communist Polish politics, defined by the formation of three different coalitions and the 
selection of three different Prime Ministers. The highly fractured Sejm produced by the 
1991 elections, along with the ambitions of the President, fanner Solidarity leader Lech 
Walysa, made the construction of a stable government almost inconceivable.7 The 
legislature was divided between so many parties and groupings that the stability and 
7 Grzybowski, 168- 169; Kitschelt et al. , 376. 
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function of government were compromised.8 In addition, the SLD and UD, which held the 
greatest number of seats, respectively, were precluded from forming a government because 
other parties considered partnership with them unpalatable or unacceptable.9 Moreover, 
controversy over Church-oriented policies, such as religious education, anti-abortion laws, 
and media restrictions, emerging from the Christian National Union (ZChN) and several 
other parties, split the Sejm along several party different party lines and further threatened 
the stability of the coalition govemment. 10 Despite this upheaval, the Church benefitted 
from its allies in the ZCbN, as well as the other parties in the coalition, achieving gains in 
religious education, a severely restrictive abortion law, and the negotiation of the 
Concordat. Thus, this period, although problematic for Polish political development, 
proved to be beneficial for the Church, providing a political oppo.rtunity structure that gave 
the Church openings into the heart of the democratic state. The political opportunities 
created by the legislature would seldom be this favourable again. 
The SLD's rise to power in the 1993 elections and its formation of a coalition 
government with the PSL, drastically altered the political opportunity structure for the 
Church. First, the SLD successfully overcame the challenge of finding a coalition partner 
that was not put off by its communist heritage. Also, despite the sometimes strained 
relations between the coalition partners, the interference of President Lech Walysa, and 
8 Castle and Taras, 97-98. 
9 The SLD's connection to the former PZPR divided it from other parties and the UD's disputes 
with the other post-Solidarity parties divided it from potential allies in the Sejm. Millard, Polish Politics 
and Society, 20. 
10 Bielasiak, 149- 150. 
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three changes in leadership, the coalition managed to survive for the duration of the four-
year term; however, the Church' s role became a major issue of contention within the 
coalition. 11 Thus, the careful balancing act required of the secularist SLD to maintain this 
coalition with the traditionalist PSL created some openings in the political opportunity 
structure such that the Church could still play a role in political discourse, such as that 
which it played in negotiations over the constitution, 12 but these openings failed to rival 
those of the 1991-1993 period. It was during this time that the SLD managed to replace 
the restrictive anti-abortion law with a less restrictive alternative, a signal of the less 
favourable political opportunity structure during this period of SLD-Ied coalition 
government. 
A return to government by post-Solidarity elements once again favoured the 
Church. The allocation of seats in the post-1997 Sejm favoured the A WS, but this 
electoral coalition was still left with the task of finding a coalition partner. Cohesiveness 
was a problem for the A WS from the time of its formation; however, the drive to defeat the 
SLD in the elections kept the constituent parties together. 13 Unfortunately, "gaining 
power did not cement unity from such disparate groupings." 14 Conflict was rife between the 
constituent parties and leading personalities, as well as within ministries, such that this 
11 Grzybowksi, 153-154. 
12 Although the Church did not get mo t of what it wanted from the Constitution, it sti ll 
managed to polarize the debate and leave its imprint on the document, which passed in the Sejm in 1997. 
Millard, Polish Politics and Society, 13 1-139. 
13 Bielasiak, 154- 155. 
14 Millard, Elections, Parties, and Representation in Post-Communist Europe, 266. 
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coalition government experienced great difficulty passing legislation and carrying out its 
normal functions. 15 Thus, a political change that appeared to be positive for the Church's 
political opportunity structure turned out to be less than satisfactory because of the 
dynamics of constructing and maintaining a coalition government from such a disparate and 
conflictual group of parties and personalities. The Church's only notable gain during this 
period was the passage of the Concordat in 1998, very early in the term of this government. 
From 2001 to 2005, the SLD once again governed Poland, but maintaining 
cohesion within the SLD-UP, as well as between the SLD and its coalition partner, PSL, 
was extremely difficult as political scandals linked to corruption and de-communization 
rocked the party and questioned the legitimacy of many of its leaders. By 2003, the PSL 
was no longer part of the coalition and the SLD's hold on government was dependent on 
loose affiliations with small parties and independent deputies. Under the strains of 
unpopular policies and declining public approval , a breakaway party, Social Democracy of 
Poland (SDPL) formed in 2004, taking a large number of deputies with it and requiring the 
formation of a government under a new prime minister. 16 By the time elections took place 
in 2005, this coalition government had almost completely self-destructed. Because of the 
lack of cohesiveness in this largely secular political formation, the Church's political 
opportunity structure was not negatively affected. In many ways, it was positively affected 
by the disarray of its main opponents because these opponents were severely limited in 
15 Millard, Polish Politics and Society, 27-30. 
16 Szczerbiak, '"Social Poland ' Defeats 'Liberal Poland '? The September-October 2005 Polish 
Parliamentary and Presidential Elections," 207-208. 
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what they could accomplish by their own difficulties. For instance, although the SLD tried 
to reintroduce the abortion issue onto the political agenda, 17 its efforts failed because of the 
disunity in its coalition government. It also opened the door for a change in government 
that could prove beneficial to the Church. 
After the 2005 elections, it was widely expected that PiS and PO, previously 
described as "natural allies,"18 would be forced to reconcile a number of policy differences 
to govern as a coalition. 19 However, this possibility quickly evaporated once PiS's 
candidate for President, Lech Kazcyriski, emerged the victor in the second round of 
elections, and the process of forming the next Parliament began.20 PiS, the largest party in 
the Sejm, signed a "Stabilization Pact" with SO and the LPR, which provided certain 
concessions to these parties in exchange for their support in the legislature;21 however, this 
17 The SLD's attempts initiate debate on 1993's anti-abortion law in late 2004, but it failed . 
Mierzejewski, "Swinging Right." 
18 This adage was applied after poll results, which put both parties in the lead for the next year's 
elections, demanded a critical evaluation of the possibility that the combination of their results would 
result in a viable government. Radoslaw Markowski, Polish Academy of Science and Warsaw School of 
Social Psychology, "Calling a Coalition," The Warsaw Voice (13 October 2004) [online] ; available from 
http ://www.warsawvoice.pl/view/6738 Internet: accessed 10 October 2005. 
19 Jasiewicz and Jasiwicz-Betkiewicz, 1243. 
20 A controversy quickly developed over the choice of Speaker and Deputy Speakers in the Sejm, 
which failed to include a member from PO, but included the controversial leader of Self-Defense, Andrej 
Lepper, who had already been removed from the Deputy Speaker position during the previous tenn for 
unparliamentary behaviour. After this, the Self-Defense leader declared his openness to negotiating a 
coalition agreement with PiS, and effectively raised suspicions that PiS had another coalition agreement 
in the works besides the expected agreement with PO. Witold Zygulski, "Tug o' War," The Warsaw Voice 
(2 November 2005) [online]; available from http ://www.warsawvoice.pl/view/9780 Internet: accessed 2 
November 2005. 
21 Witold Zygulski, "Pact Up and Ready to Go?" The Warsaw Voice (15 March 2006) [online]; 
available from http ://www.warsawvoice.pl/view/l 0840 Internet: accessed 15 March 2006. 
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agreement failed to provide any long-term stabilization in Parliament. Barely three months 
into the new Sejm, conflict erupted between PiS and its partners over PiS ' s unwillingness 
to go far enough in policy concessions and their partners "confrontational and disloyal 
attitude"; this crisis threatened to bring down the government and force new elections.22 
Although this did not happen and the coalition remained intact, leadership changed and a 
new prime minister was selected in mid-2006. The coalition's troubles did not end there as 
disagreements and scandals continued throughout the rest of the year, constantly 
challenging the stability and longevity of this government. 
Despite the instability of the current coalition government, this political alteration is 
a potential boon for the realization of many of the Church' s goals. The right, in the form of 
a coalition involving two right wing parties, PiS and LPR, are in control of the Sejm, the 
Senate, and the Presidency for the first time since Solidarity's failure in 1993. Thus, the 
degree of policy unity between each level of government may be unprecedented, at least 
compared to other periods in the post-Communist era. Also, the influence of the presence 
of the Catholic League of Polish Families (LPR), with its pro-Church policies, has 
promised to help advance deeply held Church priorities. Also, PiS, as a conservative party 
with a Christian Democratic bent, seems likely to support these types of policies. 
Consequently, the Church appears to be facing a more open political opportunjty structure 
than it has since the 1991-1993 period. 
22 Zygulsk:i, " Pact Up and Ready to Go?"; Witold Zygulski , "Spring Elections Unrealistic," The 
Warsaw Voice (29 March 2006) [online]; available from http://www.warsawvoice.pl/view/1 0970 Internet: 
accessed I 0 April 2006. 
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
210 
Perfecting the Art of Coalition Government in Slovenia 
Contention and controversy have not been absent from Slovene politics over the 
last 14 years, but trends of stability and consolidation run through the dynamics of most of 
Slovenia's post-communist coalition governments (see table 15 for a breakdown of these 
governments), representing a marked contrast to the Polish situation. Despite this reliance 
on relatively heterogeneous, multiparty coalitions, Slovene politics has not been 
characterized as volatile; rather, parties ' recognition and acceptance of the realities of 
coalition governing maintained a relative equilibrium within coalitions.23 This is related to 
experimentation with different sizes and conformations of coalitions during the early period 
of Slovene independence,24 forcing actors to learn bow to function in this type of political 
system. In addition, the formation and function of coalition governments have been 
regularized.25 This stability may have had certain costs/6 but it has allowed Slovenia to 
progress and mature as a democratic state. Several factors secured this stability and 
presented a complex set of opportunities and constraints for the Church: the management 
of coalition government and continuity in the governing party for much of the post-
23 Fink-Hafner, "Development of a Party System," 150-151. 
24 Zajc notes that everything from large coalitions of many parties to smaller coalitions of few 
parties was tried in the early period of government. Drago Zajc, "The Changing Political System," in 
Making a New Nation: The Formation ofS/ovenia, eds. Danica Fink-Hafner and John R. Robbins 
(Aidershot: Dartmouth, 1997), 167-168. 
25 According to Cox, the coalition partners receive a share of the fifteen cabinet posts and are 
essential to the passage of government legislation. Cox, 120. 
26 One concern, expressed by Gow and Carmichael, is that "Slovenia had a political system that 
offered underlying stabi lity and progress, but at the price of superficial fragility and latent problems of 
stagnation." Gow and Cannichael, 167. 
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communist period. 
Table 15. Government Coalitions in Slovenia, 1990 to 2006 
Pari iamentary Coalitions Coalition Configurations Prime Ministers Identity Prime 
Term Ministers 
1990-1992 [DEMOS Coalition] 
(pre- I SKD, SDSS, SKZ, SDZ, I Lojze Peterle LS SOP, ZSMS-LS, independence) 
ZLSO, ZS 
SOSS, SSS, LDS, OS, 
1992- 1996 2 ZLSD, SOZ (92); LDS, I Janez Drnovsek 
ZLSD, SKD, SDS (92-96) 
LDS, ZLSD, SKD, SDS Janez Drnovsek 
1996-2000 3 (96); LOS, SLS, OeSUS 2 ( 1996-2000); (97-2000); NSi, SLS + Andrej Bajuk 
SKD, SOS (2000) (2000) 
LOS, ZLSD, SLS + SKD J anez Ornovsek 
2000-2004 2 (2000 - 2002); LDS, 2 (2000-2002); 
ZLSD, SLS (2002-2004) Anton Rop (2002-2004) 
2004 - 1 SDS, NSi, SLS, DeSUS I Janez Jansa 
Sources: Govenunent of the Republic of Slovenia, "Government: Fonner Governments," [online] ; available 
from http://www.gov.si/vrs/ index.php?lng=eng&vie=cnt&grl =prdVld&gr2=prjVld Internet: accessed 15 
March 2006; Government of the Republic of Slovenia, "Govenu11ent: Coalition," [online] ; available from 
http://www.gov.si/vrs/index.php?lng=eng&vie=cnt&gr l =prdVld&gr2=clt Internet: accessed 15 March 
2006. 
For most of the twelve years between 1992 and 2004, the LDS was a consistently 
dominant member of every governing coalition, except for the rightist coalition which 
unsuccessfully governed for several months in 2000. The key to party' s success was its 
ability to form coalitions with unexpected, seemingly incompatible parties on both sides of 
the political spectrum. This ability has been conditioned by the configuration of Slovenia's 
party system: 
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There is a manifest ideological confrontation between left-wing and right-
wing parties in Slovenia, but so far it has been curtailed by the existence of a 
strong political centre. Indeed, electoral data testify to a relatively even 
strength of the three main party ' families ' : left, centre, and right. Given this 
pattern, Slovene political parties have been prepared to choose from a wide 
variety of coalition partners.27 
The LDS, straddling a position at the centre-left of the political spectrum, was in the 
perfect position to take advantage of this feature of Slovene party politics. This does not 
mean that these coalitions maintained perfect cohesion throughout their term, but the skills 
of the coalition partners prevented problems within coalitions from degenerating to the 
point that another election would have to take place. 
After the 1992 elections, the LDS formed a broad coalition with a party of the 
right, the Christian Democrats and a party of the left, the United List of Social Democrats 
(ZLSD), which would have been a recipe for dissension and instability in many formerly 
Communist countries, including Poland; however, this coalition government survived for 
three years. This coalition's survival and success were dependent on containing dissension 
within the ranks of the coalition and keeping conflict from spilling into the legislature, 
where opposition parties would be able to exploit the weaknesses of the coalition to score 
political points.28 The main factor which finally shook this coalition government was the 
defection of the Christian Democrats (SKD) to form a party group known as ' the Spring 
Parties', which was committed to joining forces to attain the largest share of seats in the 
27 Zajc, "Slovenia," 280. 
2M Ibid., 285. 
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legislature in the upcoming elections.29 Interestingly, the main point of departure for the 
SKD was dissatisfaction with the LDS's continuing secular stance and its inability to attain 
concessions on religion.30 Despite this attempt to unseat the LDS, the party accomplished 
another feat of coalition-building again after the 1996 elections, bringing together a 
coalition with the centre-right SLS and the small, issue-oriented Democratic Party of 
Retired Persons ( DeSUS). During 1997, under pressure from the Church and other 
parties, Prime Minister Drnovsek agreed to include the Church in the denationalization 
process and thus allow for the return of Church properties; however, the agreement was 
stalled by the upper house of parliament, the National Assembly.31 This concession to the 
Church revealed an opening in the political opportunity structure at this point in time; this 
was a notably a rare event during Drnovsek's tenure as leader of the LDS. 
A brief break in LDS coalition government occurred in the year 2000 after a 
coalition of rightist parties, composed of the Social Democratic Party (SDS) and the 
merged Slovene People's Party-Slovene Christian Democrats (SLS + SKD), formed a 
majority and deposed the SLD-led coalition. Having "pushed forcefully for the impo ition 
of the (Catholic) catechism in state-run schools and for the restitution of eccle iastical 
property,"32 this coalition clearly provided openings for the Church. As a result, the 
29 Harris, 164. 
30 One of the major points of contention concerned government ' s refusal to revert back to the 
Church, property that had been confiscated by the communists. Gow and Carmichael, 159. 
31 Ibid., 172. 
32 Ivekovic, 530. 
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Church made gains in religious education and in the return of nationalized property. 
However, unfortunately for the Church, the tenure of this government would not last long, 
failing to impress Slovenes with either its dissension, policy, or leaders. The LDS, returned 
to power in the 2000 election, once again managed to form a coalition government with the 
leftist ZLSD and the rightist SLS+SKD. This coalition lasted until 2002 when Drnovsek, 
leader of the LDS and Prime Minister since 1992, left the parliamentary caucus to 
successfully run for President. The new leader of the LDS, Rop, constructed another 
coalition with the ZLSD and the SLS that managed to hold together until just before the 
election of 2004. However, Rop failed to impress voters as he took the party further to the 
left of the political spectrum, destroying the advantage that the LDS had enjoyed from its 
position at the centre-left. 
Government from the 2004 elections onward marks a distinct alteration in Slovene 
politics with the ascendancy of the centre-right and the right to form the government. The 
electoral victory of the Slovene Democratic Party (SDS) led to its coalition with New 
Slovenia-Christian Democrats (NSi), the Slovene People's Party (SLS), and DeSUS. 
Although thjs coalition has been challenged by controversy and dissension, it managed to 
survive. The ideological bent of this coalition favoueds the Church and thus created 
openings in the political opportunity structure for the Church. This was evident in this 
government's passage of a new Law on Religious Freedom in late 2006, which met with 
resistance from the National Council because it appeared to violate the constitutional 
principle of separation between church and state and it appeared to favour the Roman 
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Catholic Church above other religions. 33 
The regularization of coalition government in Slovenia has acted as both a positive 
and a negative for the Church. LDS 's successful dominance over coalition governments 
during the first 12 years of Slovene independence, combined with leader Dmovsek' s ability 
to manage these diverse coalitions, acted as a constraint on the Church' s political 
opportunity structure. However, this negative effect was tempered by the inclusion of pro-
Church parties in many of these coalition governments. For instance, the LDS has been 
forced to ally with parties that have strong ties to nationalism and thus, favour the 
continued presence of the Church as an element of Slovene identity and culture. The 
Slovene People's Party (SLS) is one such political partner.34 Also, most of the post-
independence coalitions, including the current coalition government, have included the 
Christian Democrats as a minor party. The Christian Democrats actively pushed the 
governing coalition to adopt measures that were beneficial to the Church, opening the door 
for increased Church influence over government policy. The recent ascent of a rightist 
coalition promises to provide more openings for the Church and to enhance its political 
opportunity structure. Thus, like the Polish Church, the Slovene Church has faced a 
political opportunity structure created in a context of coalition government, with its 
political fortunes dependent on the priorities of the dominant coalition party, the stabil ity of 
each coalition, and the priorities of minor coalition partners. However, the Polish Church 
33 Fink-Hafner, "Slovenia," (2007): Ill 0. 
34 Flere, " Slovenia: At a Distance from a Perfect Religious Market," 154. 
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enjoyed many more openings to influence policy because the alternating nature of coalitions 
between right and left allowed the Church to make significant gains during periods of 
rightist coalition government. In contrast, the stable dominance of a single political party, 
the LOS, over Sloverua's coalition governments for much of the post-independence period 
combined with the broad nature of these coalitions, limited openings for the Slovene 
Church such that it experienced a much reduced political opportunity structure. The only 
redeeming element for the Slovene Church was the presence of Church-oriented parties in 
these coalitions who sometimes successfully managed to wring openings for the Church out 
of their coalition partners. 
CHAPTER 9 
LEGAL AND CONSTITUTIONAL DIMENSIONS: 
EXCHANGING DNINE LAW FOR HUMAN LAW 
For the newly democratic Polish and Slovene states, the replacement of the 
constitutional and legal structure of the old communist system with a more appropriate 
constitutional and legal structure, which reflected the new democratic political reality, was 
a national priority. The content and character of the changes to the constitutional and legal 
structure of the state would have far-reaching implications, laying the groundwork for the 
structure of state institutions, as well as political interactions in the democratic system. 
This area of change became an important venue for the Church to push its agenda to 
cement Roman Catholic values at the very heart of the nation. However, each national 
Church differed in the degree to which the state constitutions served their values and 
created a favourable political opportunity structure for the Church. Also, the legal 
regulation of religious communities has differentially affected each national Church in its 
quest to maintain its religious dominance in the country. 
The Polish Church: Security in the Polish Constitution 
The process of constructing a post-Communist Constitution which discarded the 
strictures of the Communist regime and inaugurated the principles of the democratic system 
occupied the Polish society and government for most of the first post-Communist decade. 
Until 1992, political institutions were governed by a combination of the Constitution of the 
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Communist Polish People's Republic and the Round Table settlement. 1 The 'Little 
Constitution, ' 2 passed in 1992, displaced the Communist Constitution, but a number of 
Communist-era laws remained in force, regulating political relations in Poland until1997, 
when the final Constitution was passed by parliament and plebiscite.3 This marked the end 
of a contentious period in Polish politics, characterized by conflict between competing 
interests, difficult negotiations, and political compromise. The main conflicts revolved 
around arrangements of institutional power4 and competing visions of contemporary 
Poland.5 The Church's present and future political context were globally affected by the 
Constitution's main functions: specifying the basic structure of the Polish state and its 
political system, shaping the course of relations between the Church and the state, and 
placing limits on certain policy developments. It was also imperative for the Church that 
the Catholic-Christian aspect of Polish culture receive formal recognition, along with the 
1 Jacek Kurczewski, "Parliament and the Political Class in the Constitutional Reconstn1ction of 
Poland: Two Constitutions in One," International Sociology 18, no. I (2003): 163- 165. 
2 This assemblage of democratic and communist rules was put in place out of necessity, to 
provide a legal basis for the Polish state until a new Constitution, reflective of Poland 's new political 
reality, could be drawn up. 
3 Sanford, 88; Ewa Letowska, "A Constitution of Possibilities," East European Constitutional 
Review 6, no. 2/3 (1997) [online] ; available from http://www.law.nyu.edu/eecr/vo16num2/feature/ 
possibi lities.html Internet: accessed 29 January 2005; Kurczewski, 166-171. 
4 Sanford, 87-91 ; Kurczewski, 167-171. 
5 Pawel Spiewak, "The Battle for a Constitution," East European Constitutional Review 6, no. 2-
3 ( 1997) [online] ; available from http://www.law.nyu.edu/eecr/vol6num2/dcature/battle.html Internet: 
accessed 29 January 2005. 
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Church's moral and spiritual authority.6 Nevertheless, the Church's lofty goals/ formed 
around these priorities, were subject to the vagaries of the context that existed over the 
course of the negotiations. Therefore, the successive development of each version of 
constitutional law, the course of the constitutional debate, and the ultimate form of the 
Constitution, acted and continue to act as powerful components of the Church's context in 
post-Communist Poland. 
Separating Church and State 
As the new Constitution developed over 1990s, interim arrangements played a 
strong role in the Church's context. As an ad hoc, temporary arrangement, the "Little 
Constitution" was a combination of old and new; democratic institutions and freedoms 
were patched onto the old Comrnunjst-era Constitution to ensure that the system could 
operate while a new, comprehensive Constitution was prepared. These interim rules 
provided a relatively open context to the Church because even though many Communist-
era rules were retained, they were not always enforced, and the new, unrefined nature of 
the new system lent a certain fluidity to the application of its rules. In this situation, the 
6 Michal Pietrzak, "Church and State in Poland," in Law and Religion in Post-Communist 
Europe, eds. Silvio Ferrari, W. Cole Durham, Jr., assoc. ed. Elizabeth A. Sewell (Leuven: Peeters, 2003), 
219; Kurczewski, 170-171 ; Anna Sabbat-Swidlicka, "Church and State in Poland," RFEIRL Research 
Report 2, no. 14 (1993): 48; Millard, Polish Politics and Society, 137-139. 
7 A sample of the Church's main demands: "a clear reference to God in the Preamble"; 
"prominent reference to the role of the church in Polish history"; Constitution not declared to be "the 
highest law in the land"; "ban abortion from the point of conception"; "declare marriage open only to 
relationships between a man and woman"; and abstain from using "any constitutional language requiring 
a 'separation' of church and state in democratic Poland." Timothy A. Byrnes, "The Challenge of 
Pluralism: The Catholic Church in Democratic Poland," 30-31. 
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Church had a wide opening into the political arena because the precise nature of Church 
and state relations was part of the debate and thus plagued with some uncertainty. Once 
the 1997 Constitution defined the relationship between Church and state as separate, 
meaning that "internal law of religious denominations has no effect on the state order, aside 
from a few exceptions, and, at the same time, state law has no effect on strictly religious 
questions and does not govern the structure of the churches and denominational 
organizations," this situation changed lightly. Certainly, the constitutional separation 
between Church and state is not absolute, especially because the Church is granted input 
into some policy areas; rather, it is pliable.9 However, this does not allow the Church to 
step beyond certain limits in the policy-making process. 
Setting the Church Apart from Others: The Concordat 
The most significant aspect of the Constitution distinguishes the Roman Catholic 
Church's relations with the state from those of other religions in the country and enhances 
the Church's possibilities for interacting with the political system. Whereas other religious 
organizations' legal status is defined in a general clause which affirms "respect for their 
autonomy and the mutual independence of each in its own sphere . . . ,"10 the Church's status 
8 Pietrzak, 223 . 
9 Pietrzak, 223. 
10 Rep ubi ic of Poland, The Constitution of the Republic ojPoland of 2"'1 April 1997[ online] 
(Warsaw: Sejm of the Republic of Poland, 1997), Article 25, clause 3; As published in Dziennik Ustaw 
no. 48, item 483; available from http://www.sejm.gov.pl!english/konstytucja/kon l .htm Internet: accessed 
23 January 2005. 
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is separated into a pecific clause. This clause declares that "[t]he relations between the 
Republic of Poland and the Roman Catholic Church shall be determined by international 
treaty concluded with the Holy See, and by statute." 11 This mean that the Roman Catholic 
Church i accorded the status ofboth an international institution and an internal religious 
organization; a dual persona which hapes the opportunities afforded to the Church for 
action in the political realm. 
As an international institution, the Church can negotiate agreements with the Polish 
government that have the status of an international treaty between the Vatican (Holy See) 
and the Polish state. The negotiation of a Concordat became a political imperative after 
temporary arrangements were reached with the Church in 1989;12 ultimately, this course 
was intended to provide guidelines in Church-state relations. Once the agreement was 
signed with the Holy See, under dubious circumstances,13 it was difficult for subsequent 
governments to address specific areas of concern about the Concordat's implications for 
11 Con titution of the Republic of Poland, Article 25, clause 4. 
12 Millard, 135. 
13 The Concordat was signed by the Suchocka government after Parliament had been dismissed 
in preparation for e lections; some left-wing politicians point out that this contravenes the role of the 
democratically elected legis lature. Piotr Zaremba, "By Invitation: No More Excuses," The Warsaw Voice 
(6 July 1997) [online]; available from http://www.warsawvoice.pl/ archiwum.phtml/ 12557 Internet: 
accessed 2 1 August 2005; Kuba Spiewa~ "Strangling on the Concordat," The Warsaw Voice (2 June 
1996) [online]; avai lable from http://www.warsawvoice.pVarchiwum.phtml/137 Internet: accessed 30 July 
2005; Adam Szostkiewicz, "By Invitation: Concordat for the Constitution?" The Warsaw Voice (20 Apri l 
1997) [online] ; avai lable from http ://www.warsawvoice.pVarhiwum.phtml/ 12524 Internet: accessed 30 
July 2005. 
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the power of the Church relative to the state and other religious groups. 14 After 1998, 
when the Concordat was passed by Parliament, it became inextricably linked to the legal 
foundation of the Polish state, the Constitution, and also carried the obligations of an 
international treaty. Since "regulations contained in international treaties have direct force 
of law unless their effectiveness is made subject to enactment of an appropriate law,"15 the 
state is obliged to abide by the Concordat's provisions without breaking faith with the 
other signatory, the Holy See. Also, the Concordat's linkage to the Constitution obliges 
the state to abide by the agreement in its domestic policy as well. This means that the 
Church maintains some ability to influence Polish society and politics over the long-term, 
regardless of the nuances of the remainder of the political context at a particular time. As 
such, the Church has a relatively durable, long-term opening into the political system; a 
consistent opportunity to have some influence, at least on specific issues. Although the 
level of this opportunity and the influence associated with it is not entirely stable or 
independent from the remainder of the system, it represents an ever-present, potential way 
to seek engagement in political decision-making processes. Therefore, the linkage of the 
Concordat to the Constitution and the state's international obligations has provided the 
Church with a relatively durable opening into the political system once the agreement was 
passed. However, in exchange for this stable opening into the political system the 
14 Millard provides a general description of the conflict surrounding the passage of the 
Concordat, while Zaremba mentions specific concerns of the left-wing politicians prior to Concordat's 
passage. Millard, Polish Politics and Society, 135- I 37; Zaremba, op. cit. 
15 Pietrzak, 221 . 
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Concordat also acts as a limitation on the Church because "a concordat acknowledges that 
temporal rulers have the power to deny the Catholic Church its demands."16 In effect, the 
Church has made itself subject to earthly laws and placed itself under the domain of the 
state. 
The Concordat provides the Church with assured input into a number of sensitive 
· areas, including religious education and marriage. 17 Accordingly, future development of 
these issues has to include the Church because of the Church's legal status in these areas. 
This guarantees that the Church maintains the continuing ability to engage in political 
debate on these issues; it has the opportunity to become involved. For instance, the 
opportunity provided by the Constitution has proven to be somewhat durable in relation to 
the issue of abortion. The Church places particular emphasis on its conception of human 
life and absolute opposition to abortion. 18 Although the Constitution fails to prohibit 
abortion, it pledges to protect human life, 19 leaving an opening for refinements to the 
definition of "human life. A future interpretation of this term which temporally defines 
life ' s beginning at conception could be used to block abortion at any stage of pregnancy, 
16 Warner, 159. 
17 Millard, Polish Politics and Society, 136; Castle and Taras, 143- 144. 
18 Millard, 133; Andrzej Kulczycki, "Abortion Policy in Postcornmunist Europe: The Conflict in 
Poland," Population and Development Review 21, no. 3 ( 1995): 472, 485-486; Patrick J. Flood, "Abortion 
and the Right to Life in Post-Communjst Eastern Europe and Russia," East European Quarterly 36, no. 2 
(2002): 197. 
19 Article 38 states that the "Republic of Poland shall ensure the legal protection of the life of 
every human being." Constitution of the Republic ofPo/and, Article 38. 
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under any circumstances. Such an opening presents a continuing opportunity for the 
Church to have influence over this i sue. 
The Constitution also introduces an indirect opening for the Church's continuing 
influence in this policy area. The saga of abortion regulation involves a momentous 
alteration from freedom20 to restriction, contrary to the opening of freedoms in other areas 
with democratic change. Efforts to institute a complete ban were evident as early as 1989, 
but did not succeed until 1993, when a moderately restrictive anti-abortion bill became 
law.21 Subsequent attempts to replace this law to allow for greater freedom of access to 
the procedure have failed. The only liberalized bill to successfully pass the hurdles of 
Parl iamentary approval was challenged and declared unconstitutional by the Constitutional 
Tribunal in 1997.22 One of the reasons that this law was struck down was a basic 
incompatibility with the Constitutional declaration concerning the sanctity of human life; 
the Tribunal chose to define human life as beginning at fertilization, rather than at birth.23 
20 This refers to the legalization of abortion during the Communist period ( 1956). Flood, 195; 
Iwona A. Czerwiriska, "Abortion in Poland: Underground but Undeniable," The Warsaw Voice (15 July 
2001 ) [online]; available from http://www.warsawvoice.pllarchiwum.phtml/ 1693 lntemet: accessed 2 1 
August 2005 . 
21 The 1993 law prohibits abortion in all cases except those in which " the life or health of the 
mother is threatened, in the event of serious damage to the fetus or when pregnancy is the resu It of a 
crime." It al o provides for punishment of the physician who perfonllS the procedure under prohibited 
circumstances. Czerwinska. 
22 A less prohibitive law was passed by Parliament in 1996, which took account of the state of 
affairs in a woman's life. Malgorzata Bl}kowska, "Abortion Law: End of an Acrimonious Debate," The 
Warsaw Voice (3 November 1996) [online]; available from http://www.warsawvoice.pl/ 
archiwum.phtm/270 Internet: accessed 30 July 2005; Flood, 199-200; Czerwinska .. 
23 Czerwinska. 
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Another attempt to replace this law with a more liberal one in 2004 also met with social 
and political resistance. 24 Therefore, because of the opening in the Constitution on the 
definition of human life, it is difficult to remove restrictions on abortion which are contrary 
to the Church ' s wishes. Surmounting the barrier of Church-inspired resistance to abortion 
is particularly difficult for challengers because as the law remains in place society becomes 
accustomed to the norms provided by its provisions and is persuaded by the messages of 
morality that the Church has used to defme the debate.25 This suggests that because of the 
moral dimensions of the abortion question, it is particularly difficult to gain the momentum 
to enact any sort of change to the current status quo situation (the 1993 law). This means 
that the Church has a relatively durable opportunity to influence abortion policy in Poland. 
The Durability of Constitutional Arrangements 
Considering the controversy and disagreement which surrounded the passage of the 
1997 Constitution and the enormity of the political mediation required to produce each 
24 Marta Rawicz, "Controversy: The Abortion Question," The Warsaw Voice ( 13 October 2004) 
[online]; available from http://www.warsawvoice.pllarchiwum.phtm/6726 Internet: accessed 2 1 August 
2005. 
25 A CBOS survey report notes that on the legal question of abortion, Poles are not 
overwhelmingly in favor of absolute restriction nor absolute freedom and generally favor a plebisc ite on 
the is ue. However, when a similar question is asked which emphasizes the moral dimension of the issue, 
only a minority of Poles favor a referendum on the issue. Also, Jelen and Wilcox suggest that public 
opinion has moved toward the Church' s position since the introduction of the 1993 law. Public Opinion 
Research Center (CBOS), "Attitudes Towards abortion after the Verdict of the Constitutional Tribunal," 
Polish Public Opinion (August 1997): 3-4 [online]; available from 
http://www.cbos.pl/ENGLISH/Bulletin/ 1997/08_ 1997.pdf Internet: accessed 2 I August 2005; 
Ted Jelen and Clyde Wilcox, "Continuity and Change in Attitudes Toward Abortion: Poland and the 
United States," 2004 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, 18- 19 [online]; Held 
in Chicago, 2-5 September 2004; available from http://www.apsanet.org Internet: accessed 5 February 
2005. 
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article/ 6 the incentive to tamper with these arrangements is relatively low. Perhaps this is 
why no political actor has made a serious attempt to do so since the Constitution was 
passed.27 However, this does not mean that the Constitution cannot or will not be 
modified because mechanisms exist to amend the document. Two mechanisms exist to 
amend the Constitution. Judicial interpretation refines some of the articles as they are 
applied in practice.28 However, the largest blockage to changes in the Constitutional text is 
the process required to modify the Constitution. Article 235 outlines the formula for 
amendment and specifies which legislative branches may initiate the process, sets time 
limits on each phase, and describes the degree of consensus required to pass an 
amendment.29 The initial recommendation must emerge from the President, the Senate, or 
one-fifth of the Sejm's members.30 Legislative approval requires two-thirds of the votes 
with at least half of the members in the Sejm, while Senate approval requires an absolute 
majority with at least half of the members present.31 In addition, modifications to specific 
sections of the Constitution which lay out the structure of the state, deal with personal 
freedoms and rights, and outline the procedure for changes must also be approved through 
26 Letowska.; Spiewak, "The Battle for a Constitution"; Sanford, 90-9 1. 
27 Kurczewski, 178. 
2K Kurczewski , 177-178. 
29 Constitution of the Republic of Poland, Article 235 . 
3° Constitution of the Republic of Poland, Article 235, clause I. 
31 Constitution of the Republic of Poland, Article 235, clause 4. 
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a majority vote in a referendum.32 The article which sets out parameters for relations 
between rei igious organizations and the state is subject to both of the preceding 
amendment procedures. The implication is that any modification to these regulations 
would require a consensus between Parliament and society about the necessity for change, 
as well as the form of the required change. Even though the longevity of the current 
Constitution is not assured,33 it is a document of hard-fought accommodation, which did 
not win approval easily. In the often fractious Polish political system, this degree of 
consensus is difficult, but not impossible to achieve.34 Thus, the possibility of altering the 
Church's position remains open, but the movement for such a change would have to 
acquire a great deal of momentum before this political Pandora 's box would be re-
opened.35 In the post- 19971egal context, the Church has been empowered by the 
Constitution, insofar as it is considered to be an important religious actor which deserves to 
have guaranteed input into some expressly political issues such as education, marriage, and 
property restitution. This provides the Church with a relatively constant opening into that 
32 Includes Chapter I -The Republic, Chapter IT - The Freedoms, Rights and Obligations of 
Persons and Citizens, and Chapter XH- Amending the Constitution. Constitution of the Republic of 
Poland, Article 235, clause 6. 
33 Spiewak. 
34 [t should be noted that although the l997 Constitution passed through the Sejm with a large 
majority of approval, society' s endorsement was far from strong, with only a minority of c itizens turning 
out to vote, accepting the Constitution with a small margin of approval. Sanford, 90-91. 
35 The PiS and the other right-wing populist parties which gained the upper hand in government 
fo llowing the 2005 national elections promised the inauguration of a new "4'h Republic" in Poland. The 
parties were unable to deliver on this promise of major constitutional change. 
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prevails over time. 
Laws and Regulations 
Aside from the special privileges accorded to the Church by the Concordat, the 
Church is also subject to many of the same regulations as other religious organizations. 
Since the Church has its own special agreement with the state, these laws and regulations 
serve the purpose of regulating other religious actors and ensuring that all religions adhere 
to a common set of principles, consistent with the nature ofPolish society. For instance, 
legislation provides for religious ' orgaruzations right to exist and perform certain activities, 
dependent on registration with the state.36 However, these laws now privilege Christian 
religions over others, altering the availability of registration and hence legal status to non-
Christian groups.37 This favours traditional Christian religions, especially the dominant 
Roman Catholic Church, by limiting the rights of new religious competitors. Combined 
with the Church's special agreement with the state, this trend provides the Church with a 
competitive advantage over other religions; it has a greater opportunity to influence 
government policy. 
Slovenia: Subjugating the Church to the Democratic Polity 
The legal position of the Church in Sloverua evolved slowly over the post-
Communist period, marked only by significant achievements after the late 1990s. This 
pattern of late development, after the Constitution was ratified in 1991 , meant that the 
36 Pietrzak, 224-225. 
37 This change was made in 1998. Pietrzak, 225. 
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Slovene Church was in a different position from the Polish Church during the 1990s; the 
Slovene Church was reliant on official regulations and unofficial favoritism to create 
openings into the political system. However, the situation of the Slovene Church altered to 
become similar, but not equivalent to that of the Polish Church; from 1999 onwards, the 
Church gained special recognition of its status, through various means, but not with the 
scope provided to the Polish Church. 
The Constitution: Closing Out the Church 
Constitutional structures are not favourable to the Slovene Church because of the 
pattern of development of the Slovene Constitution. A significant amount of constitutional 
development took place over the course of the late 1980s, allowing for the retention of 
many features of the old Constitution to be brought into the new Constitution.38 Also, 
Slovene elites were compelled to craft a complete Constitution over a relatively short 
period of time to facilitate the extrication of Slovenia from the Yugoslav federal structure. 39 
This extrication entailed simultaneous processes of eradicating the undesirable vestiges of 
Communism, as well as building the foundation of a new, independent state that had not 
previously existed.40 Thus, in contrast to Poland, Slovenia 's constitutional process was one 
JM Miro Cerar, "Slovenia: From Elite Consensus to Democratic Con olidation," in Democratic 
Consolidation in Eastern Europe, vo I. 1, institutional Engineering, ed. Jan Zielonka, Oxford Studies in 
Democratization, ed. Laurence Whitehead (New York: Oxford University Press, 2001 ), 379-38 1. 
39 Cerar, 378, 387-388. 
4
° Constitutional construction was important to Slovenia because it demonstrated that Slovenia 
was a legitimate independent state, founded on democratic principles and thereby facilitated the process of 
international recognition. Cerar, 388. 
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of national definition rather than national redefinition. Slovenes also faced time pressures 
that demanded a speedy constitutional drafting process, while time pressures were not so 
outstanding for Poles.41 As a result, Slovenia's Constitution outlines the basic structure of 
the state, but leaves several areas open to legislative additions at a later date.42 This early 
pattern of development was negative for the Church because it curtailed debate and 
necessitated compromise, limiting the extent to which the Church could become involved in 
crafting the Constitution. Also, since the Church was in a weak power position at this 
time, political contenders had more control over the process. Even though the Constitution 
was filled with gaps, these did not exist on many issues which are integral to the Church. 
In this way, the Church's opportunities to act on these issues are reduced, at least as long 
as this Constitution remains in force. 
The Slovene Constitution firmly draws the line between the realms of state and 
41 The main reason for this is that the legitimacy of Slovenia's claim to be an independent state 
was not immediately accepted by the international community. Although Poland ex isted under the 
shadow of Soviet Communism for decades, it had still existed as a legitimate, independent state. 
42 One notable feature that is outlined in the Constitution is the electoral system. Cerar, 38 1, 387-
39 1. 
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church.43 This means that in Slovenia religious communities44 are private institutions, 
subordinate to Slovene law. This article is subject to modification in Constitutional Court 
rulings and government legislation, but this has not been apparent since the document's 
ratification.45 The Constitution also limits the Church's opportunitie to influence policy on 
the abortion issue. This is accomplished through the inclusion of a clause titled Freedom of 
Choice in Childbearing,46 which effectively makes abortion a constitutionally-protected 
right.47 Moreover, another clause concerning Slovenia's respect for human life explicitly 
proscribes capital punishment,48 restricting potential application of the clause to abortion. 
43 Article 7 of the Slovenian Constitution states that "The state and religious communities shall 
be separate." Republ ic of Slovenia, Constitutional Court, Constitution of the Republic of Slovenia of 23"1 
December 1991 [online], sec. I, art. 7; available from http://www.us-rs.si/en/index.php?sv _path=6, 17 
&itlang= _LI Internet; accessed 29 August 2005; Lovro Sturm, "Church-State Relations and the Legal 
Status of Religious Communities in Slovenia," Brigham-Young University Law Review, no. 2 (2004) 
[online]; available from http://www.findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_ qa3 736/is _20040 1/ai_ n9352357 .html; 
Internet; accessed 26 March 2005; Lovro Stunn, "Church and State in Slovenia," in Law and Religion in 
Post-Communist Europe , eds. Silvio Ferrari, W. Cole Durham, Jr. , assoc. ed. Elizabeth A Sewell 
(Leuven: Peeters, 2003), 335-337. 
44 In Slovene legal parlance, churches and religious denominations are referred to as religious 
communities. 
45 Sturm, "Church-State Relations and the Legal Status of Religious Communities in Slovenia"; 
Sturm, "Church and State in Slovenia," 335-337. 
46 This article states the following: "Everyone sha ll be free to decide whether to bear chi ldren. 
The state shall guarantee the opportunities for exercising this freedom and shal l create such condition as 
will enable parents to decide to bear children." Republic of Slovenia, Constitutional Court, Constitution 
of the Republic of Slovenia, sec. rr, art. 55. 
47 Even though the inclusion of this clause provoked considerable controversy among the parties 
involved in drafting and approving the Constitution, the Constitution made it through with this clause 
intact. Cerar, 393. 
48 Republic of Slovenia, Consti tutional Court, Constitution of the Republic of Slovenia, sec. rr, 
art. 17. 
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In effect, the first article ensures that the government's laws and activities conform with 
Slovenes' right to choose whether or not to have children. It follows that the state must 
provide a means to access this freedom, demonstrated by the wording "guarantee the 
opportunities" and "shall create such conditions." The second article ensures that abortion 
rights do not conflict with Slovenia's respect for life by limiting protection of human life to 
the area of capital punishment. Therefore, it is difficult for the Church to mount a 
challenge to abortion because the definition of"hurnan life" is restricted to after birth. This 
bas effectively restricted the Church's opportunities to act on this issue because new legal 
measures against abortion would be required to pass the overview process of the 
Constitutional Court;49 the fum legal foundation of the right to abortion is such that little 
room is allowed for substantial restrictions. Another option, that of Constitutional 
amendment, is highly complex, requiring consensus between politicians, society, and the 
Church, as well as passage through the legislature with a two-third majority vote and public 
approval through majority support in a referendum. 5° Thus, in order for this route to work, 
both Parliament and society must agree with the Church's stance on the i sue, as well as 
the Church's legitimacy in prescribing moral policy. As is shown in previous sections of 
49 This institution is set up to provide an overview of numerous state activities and their 
consistency with the Constitution. Republic of Slovenia, Constitutional Court, Constitution of the 
Republic of Slovenia, sec. VIII. , art. 160. ln practice, this Court is part of the evolution of the Slovene 
Constitution because it rules on matters that are not always written into the Constitutional text; it also 
bases its rulings on the underlying elements of the Constitution and sometimes rules on overtly political 
issues. Cerar, 398-400. 
50 Republic of Slovenia, Constitutional Court, Constitution of the Republic ofS!ovenia, sec. TX, 
art. 168 - I 71. 
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this analysis, the Church's social and political context has not been conducive to the 
Church's political activity. Also, the difficulty in taking away a Constitutionally-guaranteed 
freedom and replacing with a guaranteed restriction cannot be overestimated. 
The constitutions of each state present a different set of opportunities and 
constraints for the Church. The Churches in Poland and Slovenia are similarly limited by 
the separation of Church and state, which compels them to pursue their political agendas as 
an organized interest, in competition with other interests in the democratic system. 
However, this is where the similarity ends. The Slovene Constitution does not recognize 
the Church as a special interest in either the religious or political spheres, whereas in the 
Polish Constitution, the Church is granted a separate agreement to define relations between 
the Church and the state. Constitutional guarantees of abortion rights in Slovenia, arrived 
at early in the post-Communist period, constrained the Church from further action on this 
matter. The absence of this protection from the Polish Constitution, as well as the lengthy 
process of arriving at the Constitution's final form, benefitted the Church such that it 
gained a relatively wide window of opportunity to act on the issue of abortion. This 
opportunity allowed the Church to influence the system to produce a law that restricted 
abortion and restrained opponents from changing this situation. 
Unofficial Privilege: The Stipulations of the Religious Communities Act 
The legal boundaries of religious communities are ambiguously defined in Slovene 
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law. The Legal Status of Religious Communities Act,51 which was inherited from the 
Communist system, continues to regulate religious activity, even though it contains major 
flaws.52 The Act neither defines a "religious community" nor specifies the nature of the 
registration process for these communities. 53 As a result, the Office for Religious 
Communities,54 which carries out the registration process, is granted considerable 
discretionary powers when making decisions about applicants. Complaints about the 
Office have grown in recent years, particularly with regard to holdups in the registration 
process and inequitable treatment of relig ious communities. 55 This led the Human Rights 
Ombudsman to conclude that the Office is "not performing or performing badly certain 
tasks entrusted to it by law and by its founding acts."56 Following this conclusion, the 
Ombudsman recommended that the government force the Office to carry out its duties in a 
timely manner.57 Although the Office resumed registering religious communities after these 
51 Subsequently referred to as the Religious Communities Act. 
52 Crnic and Lesjak,352; Stunn, "Church and State in Slovenia," 333. 
53 Stunn, "Church and State in Slovenia," 337-339. 
54 This branch of the government is responsible for recording the presence and activities of 
religious communities in Slovenia. Republic of Slovenia, Public Relations and Media Office, " Religious 
Conununities in Slovenia," [online]; avai lable from http://www.uvi.si/eng/calendar/events/pope/ 
infonnationlreligious-conununities Internet: accessed 7 March 2005. 
55 Matjaz Hanzek, Human Rights Ombudsman, Republic of Slovenia "Constitutional R ights: 
Religious Conununities," Annual Report 2003 [online](Ljubljana: Office of the Human Rights 
Ombudsman, Republic of Slovenia, 22 March 2004), 19-20; available from http://www.varuh-
rs.si/fi lead min/user_ upload/pdf/lp/vcp _ lp _ 2003 _eng. pdf Internet: accessed 22 March 2006. 
56 Hanzek, Annual Report 2003, 20. 
57 Hanzek, Annual Report 2003, 20. 
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complaints, 58 it continued to favour certain religions over others in registration and funding 
decisions. 59 In addition, despite government intentions to replace the Act on Religious 
Communjties with a new, more comprehensive law since 1998/ 0 this event has not yet 
taken place.61 As long as the Religious Communities Act remains unreformed and the 
Office of Religious Commuruties retains such a high degree of discretion over the 
application of its authority, the Roman Catholic Church is endowed with an advantage over 
other religions. While other religions struggle with the Office's application of the outdated 
Act, the Church can rely on its traditional presence in Slovenia, substantial resources, and 
separate agreement with Church and state to cement its place in Slovene society and 
politics. 
Distinguishing the Church from Others: The Vatican Accord 
Until recently, Slovene law did not provide for specific relations between the 
Roman Catholic Church and the Slovene state; however, as early as 1992, the process of 
58 Hanzek, Annual Report 2003, 20. 
59 Matjaz Hanzek, Human Rights Ombudsman, Republic of Slovenia, "Selected Cases: 
Allocating State Support to Religious Conununities without Criteria," Annual Report 2004 [online] 
(Ljubljana: Office of the Human Rights Ombudsman, Republic of Slovenia, July 2005), 25-26; available 
from http://www.varuh-rs.si/fi leadmin/user _ upload/pdf/ lp/vcp _ lp _ 2004 _eng. pdf fnternet: accessed 2 1 
March 2006. 
60 Although two different versions of new re ligious legislation exist, the necessity of passing EU-
compliant legislation has put refonn of the Religious Communities Act on low on the Parliamentary 
agenda. Crnie and Lesjak, 353. 
61 Hanzek, Annual Report 2004, 25-26. 
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mapping out relations between the two began.62 A breakthrough occurred in 1999 when 
Church and state negotiated a tentative agreement. Once this was in place, the negotiation 
process proceeded up the Church 's hierarchy to the Holy See in 2001 , when the Vatican 
Accord came into being.63 Numerous concerns about this agreement delayed ratification 
until the Constitutional Court completed an evaluation of its consistency with Slovene law. 
Despite concerns that the agreement allowed the Church to step outside of the limits 
imposed by the Constitution, the Court concluded that "the Catholic Church can operate in 
line with canon law in areas such as public schools and marriage, as long as the operations 
are not in opposition to Slovenia' s law."64 Parliamentary approval of this Accord in early 
200465 appears to open up opportunities for the Church's pursuit of its moral agenda. The 
agreement accomplishes a number of essential tasks: 
defines the legal status of the two independent parties, commits them to follow 
certain procedures for resolving disputes, and guarantees the status of Catholic 
schools, charitable institutions, mass media, and pastoral presence as equal to other 
62 Relations between Church and state were fonnalized in the M ixed Committee, which consisted 
of representatives of the Church and the government, charged with the responsibility of fi nding 
resolutions to problems between the Church and state. Cmic and Lesjak, 362. 
63 
"Slovenia-Vatican: Vatican Agreement Finally Wrapped Up," Slovenia News 5 (3 February 
2004) [online]; available from http://slonews.sta.si/ indes.php?id= 1853&s=71 Internet: accessed 30 August 
2005; "Con titutional Watch: Slovenia," East European Constitutional Review II , no. 1-2 (2002) 
[online]; available from http://www.Iaw.nyu.edu/eecr/volll numl_2/constitutionwatch/slovenia Intemet: 
accessed 15 March 2006. 
64 
"Vatican Accord Constitutional," Slovenia News 43 (2 December 2003) [online]; available 
from http://slonews.sta.s i/ index.php?id= 16081s=63 Internet: accessed 30 August 2005. 
65 Despite opposition to the agreement, arising from possible Church encroachment on the public 
realm the agreement received a decisive 44 to 12 vote in the National Assembly. "Slovenia-Vatican: 
Vatican Agreement Fina lly Wrapped Up." 
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privately sponsored initiatives.66 
Furthermore, this Accord was signed with the Holy See rather than the Slovene component 
of the Church, forcing the state to deal with an institution that is simultaneously national, 
governed by Slovene law, and transnational, governed by Slovenia's pledge to adhere to 
international treaties above its own laws.67 Although the Constitutional Court has 
stipulated that the agreement must conform with Slovene law, the potential exists for 
relations between the Church and the state that supercede national law. 
The Vatican Accord places the Church into a new position in the Slovene legal 
context, such that its relations with the state have been formalized separately from other 
religious communities. This provides the Church with a number of opportunities for 
influence in Slovenia's future development, but the formality of this arrangement also 
constrains the Church in a number of ways. For instance, Slovenia's education system is 
decidedly secular in both its outlook and curriculum. The Education Act does not a llow 
rei igious education in public schools - only the teaching of a general, non-confessional 
religion course.68 At the same time, the establishment of private schools is permissible, but 
66 Cox, 125. 
67 Flere, "Slovenia: At a Distance from a Perfect Religious Market," 154. 
6H Republic of Slovenia, Public Relations and Media Office, "Religious Conm1Unities in Slovenia: 
The State and Religious Communities in the Republic of Slovenia," [online] ; avai lable from 
http://www.gov.si/uvs/ang/StateAndReligiousCommunities.htm Internet: accessed 7 March 2005; Sturn1, 
"Church and State in Slovenia," 341; Tatjana Rakar, "The Role of the Roman Catholic Church in the 
Service Provision of Education in Slovenia and Hungary," Social Compass 52, no. I (2005): 85, 91 . 
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only under strict conditions of state financing and oversight.69 In effect, the Church has 
been excluded from shaping public education by government strictures which are designed 
to be consistent with the secular character of the Slovene state.70 The Vatican agreement 
grants the Church special privileges in education through its acknowledgment of the 
Church's right to establish its own schools.71 Does this threaten the separation between 
private, Catholic schools and public, non-confessional schools? Not necessarily. As a 
registered religious community, the Church was able to operate its own private schools 
before the Vatican Accord was ever approved.72 The Accord fom1alizes this arrangement 
and guarantees that it can continue, but it does not extend the Church's rights into public 
education. The Church's greatest opening into education policy comes in the creation of a 
69 Financing is contingent upon the avai lability of private schools in the surrounding locality, as 
well as a number of other criteria. Also, the curriculum of the private school is subject to specific 
standards to ensure equivalence. Rakar , 85-86. 
70 According to Rakar, the state considers the Church 's private education facilit ies as 
complements to pub! ic schools, not replacements. Rakar, 91. 
71 The Church' s guarantees in education are laid out in the Constitutional Court' s recitation of 
Article I 0 of the agreement: " 'The Catholic Church shall have in confom1ity with the legislation of the 
Republic of Slovenia and in accordance with cannon Jaw the right to establish and administer schools of 
all kinds and levels, student donnitories and other educational and upbringing institutions. The State shall 
support the institutions determined in the previous article under the same conditions as it supports other 
private institutions of the same kind. The status of students and boarders of these institutions shall be 
equal to the status of boarders in public institutions."' Republic of Slovenia, Constitutional Court, "The 
Review of Article 10. 1 of the Agreement," Case Law Rm- 1102: Agreement between the Republic of 
Slovenia and the Holy See on Legal Issues ( 19 November 2003): B.-V., para. 46 [online]; avai lable from 
http://www.odlocitve.us-rs.si/usrs/us-odl.nsf/o/DOF5859E5E94B706C 1256FC400520 199 lntemet: 
accessed 22 March 2006. 
72 State law allows religious communities to establish partially state- funded, private schools. 
Republic of Slovenia, Public Relations and Media Office, " Religious Communities in Slovenia: The State 
and Religious Communi ties in the Republic of Slovenia" ; Rakar, 85-86. 
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process which deals with further issues between Church and state.73 This provides the 
Church with an opportunity to move beyond the confines prescribed by the Accord. Still, 
the language of the Accord and the Court's interpretation of its legality suggest that this 
opportunity has limits, specifically those in Constitution and law which specify that the 
state is separate from religion. Within this interpretation, the state can respect the Church's 
right to establish its own schools without changing legislation and allowing the Church into 
public education. The situation with the media is equally ambiguous for the Church 
because under Slovene law, all religious communities are granted publishing rights.74 With 
respect to the other matters in this agreement, the Accord represents a positive 
development in the Church's legal context because the Church can build on its guarantees 
in these areas to attain some influence. Most of all, the Accord introduces an element of 
certainty into Church-state relations which had not previously existed. Now that there is a 
fom1al framework for future relations, disputes between Church and state have the 
possibility of achieving a formal resolution. For the Church, this represents an opening 
because the Church can force the state through this dispute-resolution process over a 
specific issue. At the same time, the Church is held to specific mechanisms when its 
73 According to the Constitutional Court review of the agreement, clause 14 contains this 
guarantee: '"The Republic of Slovenia and the Holy See shall through diplomatic channels resolve 
potential disagreements which might occur in the interpretation or application of these Agreement 
provisions. The Republic of Slovenia and the Holy See shall further continue to discuss the open issues 
that are not part of this Agreement, in order to resolve such by agreement. "' Republic of Slovenia, 
Constitutional Court "The Review of Art. 14.2 of the Agreement," Case Law Rm- 1102: Agreement 
between the Republic of Slovenia and the Holy See on Legal Issues, B.-VI., para. 50. Need access info. 
74 Republic of Slovenia, Public Relations and Media Office, " Religious Communities in Slovenia: 
The State and Religious Communities in the Republic of Slovenia." 
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activities contravene Slovene policy or Jaw; tills acts as a constraint on the Church by 
forcing the Church to respond to state demands about Church behaviour. 
The ratification of the Vatican Accord, especially after a long period of contention 
about Church-state relations, indicates a wider change in the Church's context, directed 
toward regularizing relations with religious communities via legal agreements. This change 
was evident in the initial negotiations surrounding the Vatican Accord in 1999 and 
throughout the process leading up to its approval in 2004. It proceeded further with the 
negotiation of a similar agreement with the Evangelical Church in 2000.75 In the same 
year, both the Roman Catholic and Evangelical churches also procured guarantees of their 
presence in the Slovene Arrny.76 Even so, these churches did not maintain an exclusive 
status in this realm, as the Law on Defense was subsequently changed to create a multi-
religious chaplaincy to minister to soldiers.77 On the surface, the state's negotiation of a 
legal agreement with one other religion suggests that accommodation with religious 
organizations has become a dominant thread in government policy. An alternative 
interpretation, which takes into account the traditional status of the Catholic and 
Evangelical churches, shows that the priorities of this policy lie with specific religious 
75 Sturm, "Church and State in Slovenia," 35 1; Cmic and Lesjak, 363 ; Republic of Slovenia, 
"Religious Conununities in Slovenia, The State and Religious Communities in Slovenia." 
76 This was likely connected to Slovenia's efforts to conform with NATO policy and secure 
accession to the organization. Crnic and Lesjak, 363-364. 
77 The fa iths included in this Army chaplaincy are Catholic, Orthodox, Protestant, and Muslim. 
U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor, "Slovenia: Status of Religious 
Freedom," International Religious Freedom Report 2003 (online]; available from 
http ://www.state.gov/g/drl/ rls/ irf/2003/24433 .htm Internet: acces ed 21 March 2006. 
organizations over other organizations. In either context, the Church's opportunities to 
influence policy have increased over previous post-Communist times. 
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The opportunities provided by the legal context in Slovenia arise mainly from the 
realm of legislation and treaties, while the constraints arise from the Slovene Constitution. 
In effect, the Slovene Church lacked a solid base upon which to build future opportunities, 
and was thus more dependent on the whims of Parliamentary politics to provide openings 
in the political opportunity structure. As a result, the Church did not attain any special 
legal status that distinguished it from other religions until the negotiations of the Vatican 
Accord began; this agreement served as the signal of an opening and also created an 
opening for the Church. This pattern contrasts with the contributions of the legal context 
to the political opportunity structure of the Polish Church. The Polish Church's 
opportunities arose mainly from its special status in the Constitution and the consequent 
negotiation of a Concordat governing Church-state relations. For the Polish Church, legal 
regulations governing religious organizations have been irrelevant. Also, the Polish 
Church's legal context was open from the very early in the transition, even though neither 
the Constitution nor the Concordat were approved until 1997 and 1998, respectively, 
simply because of the expectation that the Church would require special relations with the 
state, over and above other religions. Therefore, based on these legal and constitutional 
measures and the relatively durable openings that they create, the Polish Church has 
generally faced and continues to face a positive political opportunity structure. In contrast, 
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the Slovene Church, granted few openings by its legal and constitutional arrangements with 
the state, has added few durable openings to its political opportunity structure. 
CHAPTER 10 
TRANSNATIONAL DIMENSIONS: JOINING THE WEST 
A multitude of factors that are external to the state shape the context of an 
individual state and thereby affect the state's specification of and capacity to achieve policy 
priorities. Throughout much of post-communist Europe, the reform of economic, social, 
and political structures was intended to bring these states closer to the prosperity enjoyed 
by western European states. Thus, even in states where political actors remained divided 
by their specific views on democratic reform, a state of general agreement existed about the 
"return to Europe"' This dynamic pushed both Poland and Slovenia to form a closer 
relationship to western Europe by seeking admission to major pan-European institutions. 
The process of each country's accession to and participation in the European Union (EU) 
is representative of the scope of this change, requiring a multitude of internal, state-level 
changes in order to successfully mesh with the larger structure of the EU. Thus, to a 
certain degree, membership in this larger international organization has bounded state 
policy within a realm of what is acceptable to the larger institution and its member states. 
Impetus to Join 
The Polish impetus to join western institutions has its foundations in Poland's 
identity as a nation of the western world, as opposed to the eastern world.2 Poles' image 
1 Millard, Elections, Parties. and Representation in Post-Communist Europe, 255. 
2 Piotr Mazurkiewicz, "Catholic Church in Poland in the Face of the Integration Process," in 
Church-State Relations in Central and Eastern Europe, ed. Irena Borowik (Krakow: NOMOS, 1999), 
236-237. 
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of their nation was defined by its power to separate them from their eastern neighbours, 
namely Russia, which was considered to be " barbarian, primitive, oppressive and evil."3 In 
contrast, Poland was defined by its place on the threshold of ' the good' - western 
civilization, the heart of Christianity and democracy.4 This construction of Polish identity 
persisted and was amplified by dissidents and the Church during the Communist era such 
that the Polish nation became synonymous with heroism and sacrifice, protecting its 
western brethren from the scourge of atheistic Communism. 5 Thus, once the Polish nation 
was freed from the Communist government, re-joining Europe (and rejecting Russia) 
became an immediate priority, evident in the declaration of the ' return to Europe.'6 
Consensus is rare in Polish politics; however, a relative consensus existed among society, 
major political parties, government, and the Church, about joining western Europe and the 
EU, even if some expressed reservations about the potential consequences of this move. 
Society's positive orientation toward the West and EU accession soured somewhat when 
the disparity between Poles' image of their nation as a defender of the West and western 
Europe's contrary image of Poland as a peripheral country became apparent,7 but most of 
3 Zdzislaw Mach, "Polish National Culture and its Shi fting Centres," Centre for European 
Studies: Online Academic Papers [online] (Krakow: Jagiellonian University, 2000), 3; avai lable from 
http ://www.ces.uj.edu.p l/mach/national.htm Internet: accessed I Febmary 2005. 
4 Mach, "Polish National Culture and its Shi ft ing Centres," 3. 
5 Mach, "Polish National Culture and its Shifting Centres," 6-7. 
6 Mach, "Polish ational Culture and its Shi fting Centres," 10; Mazurkiew icz, 236-237. 
7 Mach, "Polish Nationa l Culture and its Shi ft ing Centres," 11 - 12. 
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society appeared to hold onto the idea that joining the EU was essential for national 
prosperity.8 Also, most major political parties agreed on the necessity of joining the EU, 
with the exception of the Catholic LPR and the nationalist SO, who polarized the debate 
over the EU in the early part of this decade.9 Despite a short diversion to EU-opposition 
during the mid-1990s, the Church also officially supported the EU accession process for 
much of the post-communist period, 10 as well as during the EU accession referendum. 
Thus, for most of the post-communist period, the Polish national image and a national 
political consensus amongst almost all major political players supported the Euro-western 
accessiOn process. 
Like many other former Communist countries in Europe, including Poland, 
Slovenia also pursued integration with the West. For Slovenia, already geographically, 
economically, and culturally close to western Europe, further opening the country to 
western ideas and institutions merely continues the nation's natural and preestablished 
course. Over the course of Slovenia's affiliation with the Yugoslav state, Slovene national 
identity evolved to become centered around the idea that Slovenia is a western, central 
European nation, "grounded in traditions understood to be western, and not Balkan (or 
8 A majority of the population continued to support Poland 's accession to the EU. This evident 
in the results of the EU Accession referendum of 2003, reported by Jasiewicz, in which "yes" votes ranged 
from 63 to 85 percent in Poland ' s various regions. Krzysztof Jasiewicz, "Knocking on Europe's Door: 
Voting Behaviour in the EU Accession Referendum in Poland," Problems ojPost-Communism 51 , no. 5 
(2004): 37. 
9 Jasiewicz, "Knocking on Europe' Door: Voting Behaviour in the EU Acce sion Referendum 
in Poland," 34-35. 
10 Mazurkiewicz, 248-251. 
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even East European)."" Its submersion within the Yugoslav state was considered to be 
antithetical because of Slovenia's greater similarity to western Europe, as opposed to the 
Balkans. 12 In post-Communist Slovenia, "anything having to do with the Balkans, 
Yugoslavia, and Slavism is an impossibility," while the construction of greater ties with the 
rest of Europe is a main priority. 13 According to Tos, the similarity between Slovenes and 
western Europeans on various value measurements confirms that " Slovenes are 
Europeans."14 Thus, for many Slovenes, adopting western ideas and attaining membership 
in western institutions are additional steps in the realization of Slovenia 's essential position 
as a European nation. Thus, Slovenes share a common desire with Poles to be part of the 
West- to ' Return to Europe.' 
This social consensus has been accompanied by political consensus. Slovenia's 
main political parties shared a consensus around the desirability of joining Europe and its 
main institution, the EU15; left and center parties tended to base their approval on 
11 Patrick Hyder Patterson, "On the Edge of Reason: The Boundaries of Balkan ism in Slovenian, 
Austrian, and Italian Discourse," Slavic Review 62, no. l (2003): 11 0, 114. 
12 Lene Hansen, "Slovenian Identity: State-Building on the Balkan Border," Alternatives 21 
( 1996): 484. 
13 Hansen, 473, 485, 490. 
14 Republic of Slovenia, PubLic Relations and Media Office, :Niko Tos: Slovenes are Europeans," 
Slovenia News (30 November 2004) [online]; available from 
http://www.uvi .si/eng/slovenia/publications/slovenia-news/ 1460/ 1462/index .text.htrnl ; accessed I 0 
January 2006. 
15 The only opponent was the Slovene National Party, which failed to sign an all-party 
parliamentary agreement in 1997 stating consensus on the issue. Danica Fink-Hafner, "Slovenia," 
European Journal ojPolitical Research 43 (2004): 11 32. 
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Slovenia's European identity, while right parties tended to approve of the process as 
necessary to Slovenia's development, but also wanted to protect Slovenia's unique 
identity. 16 Nevertheless, concerns about the process of Europeanization do not detract 
from the consensus that joining European institutions was the "only viable option for the 
country."17 The dominant political party for most of the post-Communist period, notably 
the LDS, controlled the process and shaped political discussions about becoming part of 
Europe; this same party subscribed to Slovenia's European identity.18 The consensus has 
been so wide-ranging that it also includes the Church: Church officials, specifically on the 
Commission for Justice and Peace, openly stated that "a decision for EU and NATO 
membership was the only choice for Slovenia's future." 19 This is no surprise, given the 
international Church's favourable view ofEuropean integration. However, even as the 
Church shares the dominant positive view of European membership that exists in the 
Slovene polity, the forces which accompany this integration into the West have the 
potential to limit the sovereignty of the Slovene state and to alter the opportunities for the 
16 Z. Sabic and M. Brglez, "The National Identity of Post-Communist Small States in the Process 
of Accession to the European Union: The Case of Slovenia," Communist and Post-Communist Stu die 35 
(2002): 72-75. 
17 Harris, 198. 
18 The LOP in particular, Slovenia's leading party until the 2004 elections, placed its "trust in 
the democratic community of European nations, where national interests will be defended through 
dialogue rather than power." Sabic and Brglez, 73. 
19 
"Constitutional Watch -Slovenia," East European Constitutional Review II, no. 3 (2002) 
[online] ; available from http://www.law.nyu.edu/eecr/volll num3/constitutionwatch/slovenia.html 
Internet: accessed 15 March 2006. 
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Church to influence Slovenia's political development. 
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CHAPTER 11 
CONCLUSION 
The democratization of eastern Europe and the return of religious freedom in the 
early 1990s presented the Roman Catholic Church with an opportunity to assume a role in 
constructing the moral and political foundation of Catholic-dominated polities in post-
Communist Europe; however, the opportunities provided by the democratic polity proved 
to be much more complex than initial appearances suggested. 
This thesis sought to disentangle this complexity and determine the main factors 
influencing the opportunities that were available to the Church to imprint its moral agenda 
on two Roman Catholic-dominated countries, Poland and Slovenia, during their first fifteen 
years of post-communist democratic development. Using the concept of political 
opportunity structure, the Church's context was divided into several components: history 
and society, political parties, electoral politics, government dynamics, legal and 
constitutional features, and transnational influences. The use of this concept and the 
specific division of the components relied upon the assumption that although the Church' s 
religious functions make it somewhat unique among interest groups, the Church still 
operates much like many interest groups; that is, that the Church seeks to effect political 
change by engaging society, politicians, and the government. A variety of primary and 
secondary sources were used to delineate and compare the evolution of the political 
opportunity structure which the Church faced in each country, as well as to compare the 
effects of a political opportunity structure on the Church' s ability to realize its moral 
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agenda in each country. The results of this analysis were expected to support the idea that 
the Polish Church benefitted from a political opportunity structure that provided more 
opportunities and erected fewer obstacles to the realization of its agenda, as compared to 
the relatively weaker Slovene Church, which often faced a detrimental political opportunity 
structure that erected many obstacles and provided few opportunities for the Church's 
influence. 
Summary of the Analysis 
The importance of the Roman Catholic Church through much of Polish history, the 
nationalistic associations between Polish identity and Roman Catholicism, and the Church's 
significant role in politics during the communist period, all served to prime Polish society to 
receive and respond to the Church's appeals. In contrast, the Slovene Churcb started out 
in the democratic system in a weak position, lacking the strong nationalistic ties to Slovene 
culture and society, as weil as the esteem associated with communist-era political activity, 
that its Polish counterpart enjoyed in its relationship with Polish society. Also, Polish 
society retained a strong connection to Roman Catholicism and the institutional Church, 
despite a noticeable trend of increasingly individualized religion. At the same time, 
Slovenes possessed weaker ties to religion, Roman Catholicism, and the Roman Catholic 
Church. Consequently, although Polish society provided the Church with a relatively broad 
set of political openings that allowed for significant political activity, a skeptical, distanced 
Slovene society placed stringent limits on the Church, negatively affecting the Church's 
political opportunity structure. 
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The relative instability of Polish politics as compared to Slovene politics 
significantly altered the political opportunity structure in each country. First, the instability 
of Polish parties acted as both an advantage and a disadvantage for the Church, facilitating 
the image of the Church as a comparatively stable, reliable representative of the Poli h 
people but, simultaneously, limiting the effectiveness of potential political party allies and 
access to political openings created by affiliation with political parties. Conversely, the 
stability of the Slovene party scene provided little means to differentiate between political 
parties and the Church as representatives of Slovenes but, simultaneously expanded the 
number of stable, effective political party allies available to the Church. Thus, the Slovene 
Church was confined to working through political party allies to gain access to parliament, 
whereas the Polish Church, independently powerful as a representative and lacking stable 
party allies, could sometimes forgo the necessity of working through its party allies to gain 
access to government. Electoral contests in Poland often served to further fragment the 
Polish party system and produced divided legislatures with relatively unstable coalitions. 
This meant that the fortunes of the Church varied according to the shifts in power of their 
main allies and antagonists. Moreover, the rejuvenation of the former nomenklatura to 
form the most stable and effective party in the political arena for much of the post-
communist period, negatively affected the availability of political openings in both 
countries. The Polish Church, although sometimes limited by the instability of the Polish 
system, benefitted from its early gains and its continued presence as a pillar of Polish 
culture. In contrast, the Slovene Church, faced a party and electoral system, as well as a 
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government structure, that consolidated relatively quickly. Electoral and party politics 
were dominated by a stable core of parties. Although no single party garnered a majority 
of the votes, the Slovene system produced legislatures that were paradoxically stable, 
composed of coalitions that incorporated disparate partners. These elements of the 
democratic system, combined with the Church's relatively modest value to society, served 
to consistently limit the Slovene Church and provided few openings for political influence. 
The legal and constitutional structures which were erected by each state and the 
relative gains that the Church was able to achieve within these structures further highlights 
the disparity between the situations. In Slovenia, the Church's main opportunities arose 
mainly from the realm of legislation and treaties, while the constraints arose from the 
Slovene Constitution. In effect, the Slovene Church lacked a solid base upon which to 
build future opportunities, and was thus more dependent on the whims of Parliamentary 
politics to provide openings in the political opportunity structure. As a re ult, the Church 
did not attain any special legal status that distinguished it from other religions until the 
negotiations of the Vatican Accord began; this agreement served as the signal of an 
opening and also created an opening for the Church. This pattern contrasts with the 
contributions of the legal context to the political opportunity structure of the Polish 
Church. The Polish Church's opportunities arose mainly from its special status in the 
Constitution and the consequent negotiation of a Concordat governing Church-state 
relations. For the Polish Church, legal regulations governing religious organizations have 
been irrelevant. Also, the Polish Church's legal context was open from the very early in the 
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transition, even though neither the Constitution nor the Concordat was approved until 1997 
and 1998, respectively, simply because of the expectation that the Church would require 
special relations with the state, over and above other religions. Therefore, based on these 
legal and constitutional measures and the relatively durable openings that they create, the 
Polish Church bas generally faced a more open set of political opportunities. In contrast, 
the Slovene Church, granted few openings by its legal and constitutional arrangements with 
the state, added few durable openings to its political opportunity structure. 
Finally, as each country participated in the international community and pursued 
membership in international institutions, they reduced the number of openings available to 
the Church at that time and, potentially, in the future. In both countries, a pragmatic 
political consensus between most major political players placed Poland and Slovenia on the 
path to integration with western Europe. The Church, caught up in this current of change, 
became an active, public supporter of EU integration in Poland, but stayed largely on the 
sidelines in Slovenia. For the Polish Church, this pragmatic move seemed to result in a 
significant victory for its traditionalist views with the inclusion of a moral protection clause 
in Poland's treaty of accession with the EU. Conversely, the Slovene Church, a 
consistently marginal player in Slovene politics, maintained that position throughout much 
of the debate and accession process, regardless of its views on EU integration and gained 
little from the process. Although political openings in each country dictated a disparate 
level of participation for each Church in the integration process, EU membership carries 
similar implications for both Churches. By circumscribing member states to act within a 
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particular range of secularist values and norms, the EU could narrow political opportunities 
for each Church to imprint its traditionalist orientations on national policy. As society 
changes to accommodate the new values that permeate the European community, 
government decision-makers and society will have the option of incorporating secularist 
values into their own legislation over the traditionalist values of the Church. Because ofits 
relatively higher status in its national political and social realms, the Polish Church has a 
great deal to lose from such a trend and could find itself left with few openings into the 
political realm in the future. However, the pre-existing incorporation of ecular and liberal 
values in Slovenia, as well as the Slovene Church's relatively weaker position, means that 
very little will likely change for the Slovene Church; its opportunities will continue to be 
restricted. 
Conclusions and Implications 
This broad analysis of the Roman Catholic Church in the two homologous, yet 
different, contexts of Poland and Slovenia, utiliz ing the theoretical concept ofpolitical 
opportunity structure, led to a number of conclusions about the Church's development in 
these young democratic states. First, the role of political opportunity structure, and more 
broadly, context should not be underestimated in its influence on the options available to 
the Church in the circumstances particular to different times and places in each polity' s 
development. Also, historical and social factors played an important role in setting up the 
foundation of the political context, providing the Church with legitimacy and further 
openings during times of political change. Moreover, the Church's active participation in 
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claim-making activities and political agitation, both during the communist regime and the 
process of negotiation and change, made a substantial difference in making political 
opportunities available in the new regime. Finally, although this analysis chose to focus on 
context over leadership, the skill and insightfulness of leaders play an important role in 
recognizing and availing of political opportunities, as well as recognizing and overcoming 
obstacles. 
In each country, the Roman Catholic Church found that political activity was 
complicated by the emergence of a multipolar, democratic system in the place of a unipolar, 
communist state. The initial openings created by the changeover between communism and 
democracy represented the best opportunity for each Church to embed itself into the 
developing political system. Although this was the time of maximal openness in the 
political opportunity structure, the Church in each country faced remarkably contrasting 
opportunities to become an important political actor in the regime. The Polish Church, 
embedded in Polish life by its historical standing and religious role, was also an active 
participant in communist and transition-era politics. This meant that the Church had 
already laid the groundwork for a continuing political role in democratic politics. In 
contrast, the Slovene Church, burdened with an unfavourable history, diminished religious 
role, and insignificant political participation, did not possess the groundwork to assume a 
similar political role. Moreover, rapid coalescence among the major political players 
largely shut the Slovene Church out of politics. Consequently, the Polish Church enjoyed 
the greatest initial benefit from the maximal opportunity engendered in the transition period 
261 
and was able to secure a number of political gains, while the Slovene Church languished in 
relative obscurity. This divergence suggests that the upset created by political change is 
not sufficient to create the openings required for a dominant religious organization to 
assume a major role in subsequent political development. It appears that active political 
participation in the period leading up to the major systemic change, along with a solid 
standing with society and political leaders, was also required to create a favourable and 
open political opportunity structure for the Church. 
Once the structures of the democratic state were formed and the time of greatest 
openness had passed, the political opportunity structure varied within the limits 
circumscribed by the democratic system. The relatively volatile nature of Polish politics, 
combined with a religiously adherent, yet somewhat skeptical, society presented the Polish 
Church with a political opportunity structure that was often variable. However, except in a 
few specific instances, this variability generally favoured the Church and, as a result, it 
continued to enjoy a relatively open political structure and hence continued to build on 
earlier gains. The Slovene Church faced a remarkably different context than its Polish 
counterpart. The relatively stable political system and the openly skeptical Slovene society 
presented few openings to the Church to attain a significant influence in politics and, aside 
from a few state concessions in the early 2000s, the Church was shut out of politics. As 
both Poland and Slovenia increasingly integrate with transnational institutions such as the 
EU, the situation of each national Church appears destined to change. The influx of 
western and secular ideas represents a threat to the Church's religiously-based claims to an 
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important role in Polish social life and politics, compromising the favourable political 
opportunity structure that the Church became accustomed to for most of the last 15 years. 
Even though the Slovene Church ha much les to lose from this influx, as Slovene society 
is much more secular than Polish society, it faces further marginalization from the 
mainstream of social and political life in Slovenia and even fewer opportunities to gain 
political influence. 
The elements of context captured in the concept of political opportunity structure 
successfully explained the differential development of each Church's political power over 
the last 15 years of democratic politics in each of Poland and Slovenia, but that political 
opportunity structure does not repre ent all of the factors that are involved in making 
political claims. The factor of leadership was deliberately set aside in this analysis in 
favour of political context and political opportunity structure, departing from much of the 
existing literature, which predominantly focused on actors as progenitors of political 
change. However, this was not intended to imply that actors were not important in the 
proces of political mobilization, but that context was important in shaping the options that 
were available to leaders as they made strategic choices. Skillful and insightful leadership 
was vitally important to take advantage of available political opportunities, increase 
exi ting opportunities, and construct new opportunities. Additionally, political opportunity 
structure is tied to the concepts of repertoire and framing. These concepts emphasize the 
importance of leadership in creating and refining repertoires for activity, as well as framing 
important issues such that they will re onate with the intended audience. Thus, the 
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elucidation of the political opportunity structure does not define the entirety of the 
determining factors in the system, but it does define the limits within which actors in the 
political system must maneuver in order to pursue their political agenda. 
Directions for Further Study 
The adaptation of the concept of political opportunity structure to compare the 
contextual variables which affected the political roles of the Polish and Slovene Roman 
Catholic Church was a novel approach to the problem of explaining how the Church's 
influence evolved in these two post-communist countries. Since this approach provided a 
plausible explanation of how context has affected each Church, it merits further application 
to the study of the Roman Catholic Church and, perhaps, other religious organizations, in 
additional contexts that have undergone such profound political changes. In addition, other 
concepts, linked to political opportunity structure in the literature, could be used to define 
some of the other factors that affect an organization's ability to realize its political agenda. 
This includes, but is not limited to, an organization's ability to construct effective frames, 
utilize repertoires, and employ mobilizing structures that take advantage of openings or 
attempt to overcome obstacles in the political opportunity structure. The wide spectrum 
of possibilities for further application and elucidation of this approach promises to provide 
a wealth of new and unique perspectives on religious organizations as they interact with the 
political system of their nation. 
Becoming a Full Member 
Long before Poland attained membership in the EU in 2004, the state was required 
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to bring its economic and political system in Line with the conditions of candidacy and 
membership. Thu , long before Poland was even considered for membership in the 
institution, the EU was influencing the shape of political development in the country 
because the govemment directed its policies toward meeting the conditions of accession. 
These priorities consumed the process of national construction which was taking place, 
confining most of the political agenda in the country to the di cus ion of specific issues and 
goals. As political discussion became increasingly circumscribed to EU-acce sion issues, 
openings to pursue contrary views to these national priorities or to discuss different issues 
lessened, placing constraints on most political actors, including the Church, in the 
realization of their own policy goals. However, despite these constraints, numerous 
opening provided by other factors forming the political opportunity structure provided the 
Church with the chance to take part in and gain from the EU accession process. 
The generally pro-western attitude of politicians and society, the pace of the 
accession process, and the Church's cultivation of a westem European identity constrained 
the Church to follow a pro-EU policy; however, these factors also provided an opportunity 
for the Church to have a role in shaping Poland' s place in the EU. This opportunity 
stemmed from the government's need to shore up policy against nationalist challenger to 
EU accession, creating a significant opportunity for the Church to play a role in navigating 
Poland's course into the EU. At the same time, the Church expected Poland to act as an 
example to other EU members that would prove that Christian, pecifically Catholic, 
morality and values were compatible with democratic institutions. As a result of this 
265 
alliance, the Church became a prominent partner in the accession process, officially 
declaring its support for the process and its desire to overcome the obstacle of European 
secularism to bring Polish Christian values back to Europe. ' However, the Church's 
trepidations about the influence of European secular values on Poland temper this support 
with a "conditional" quality.2 During the course of the accession process, the Church 
participated in discussions surrounding the development of common values underpinning 
the EU,l as well as the general pro-EU campaign. The Church also encouraged Poles to 
vote in the accession referendum, held in 2003.4 The Church's greatest victory to date was 
the inclusion of a declaration in the Treaty of Accession that protects Poland's right to 
enact legislation on moral questions, specifically the "protection of human life."5 Thus, 
because Poland is one of the few states in Europe that places trict limits on the practice of 
'Marcin Mierzejewski, "Integration Approval," The Warsaw Voice [online] (2 December 200 I); 
available from http ://www.warsawvoice.pllarchiwum.phtml/1818/ Internet: accessed II March 2005. 
2 Mirella Eberts, "The Blessed Union? The Roman Catholic Church and Poland 's Accession to 
the EU," Red~fining Europe: Federalism & the Union of European Democracies [online], Fifth Scholarly 
Pane l: European Civil Society and Cooperation; Congress Held in Prague, Czech Republic 26-30 March 
2004 ;Available from http ://www.inter-disciplinary.net/AUD/s5.htm Internet: accessed 25 January 2005. 
3 Witold Zygulski, "Valuing Integration," The Warsaw Voice ( 19 May 2002) [online]; avai lable 
from http://www.warsawvoice.pllarchiwum.phtml/1987/ Internet: accessed II March 2005. 
4 Jasiewicz,37. 
5 The full text of this Declaration states that "[T]he Government of the Republic of Poland 
understands that nothing in the provis ions of the Treaty on the European Union, of the Treaties 
establishing the European Conununities and the provision of treaties amending or supplementing those 
treaties prevents the Polish State in regulating questions of moral significance, as well as those related to 
the protection of human li fe." Republic of lovenia, National Assembly, "EU Law- Ba ic Documents of 
Primary Legislation: The Treaty of Accession," Official Gazette RS-MP 3 (2004): 3003 [online] (L. 
Declaration of the Republic of Poland: Declaration 39); Available from http://www.uradni-
list.si/priloge/20040 I 1/EPenHkaz Internet: accessed 19 March 2006. 
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abortion,6 this article ensures that the state retains its sovereignty to legislate on abortion, 
helping to protect the Church-approved law from outside interference. Despite these 
openings and victories for the Church, the Church's association with such an overtly 
political issue may place a long-term burden on the Church if Poland's accession to the EU 
fails to produce the expected benefits for Poles. The Church's strong linkage to the EU 
accession process "means that the Church will be co-responsible for the social costs of 
integration."7 Thereby, the Church faces the risk of losing its considerable hold over 
society and political leaders, compromising its future opportunities and the generally 
favourable political opportunity structure that it has faced for much of the post-communist 
period. 
Like Poland, Slovenia was forced to compromise with the stringent membership 
criteria set by the larger structure of the EU; winning membership in the EU was not 
without cost, complication, or compromise. During Slovenia's accession to the EU the 
political priorities of government and the legislative process were similarly compromised. 
First, the passage ofEU-mandated legislation became a priority, perhaps at the expen e of 
democratic debate and other significant issues.8 Moreover, if the amendment of 
6 
"Constitutional Watch: Poland," East European Constitutional Review 1111 2, no. 4/ 1 
(2002/2003) [online] ; Available from http://www. law.nyu.edu/eecr/volll_ l2num4_ 1/ 
constitutionwatch/poland lntemet: accessed 15 March 2006. 
7 Janusz Mucha and Marek S. Szczepanski, " Polish Society in the Perspective of its Integration 
with the European Union," East European Quarterly 35, no. 4 (2002): 495-496. 
x The proces of passing legislation was often ha tened by limiting political debate about 
legislation. 
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Constitutional Article 68 is any indication, the process of qualifying for accession effected 
significant turns in government policy. The Constitutional restrictions on foreign 
ownership that were contained in Article 68 were inconsistent with EU rules and thus had 
to be amended in specific ways to reflect those rules. Since joining the EU was of major 
political importance, this article was hastily amended to comply with EU standards, even 
though other countries at a similar stage in the process were able to negotiate extended 
periods to phase-in the new regulations and despite concerns about how these changes 
would affect the development of Slovenia's economy.9 Not only has the EU imposed a 
large list of demands on this young democratic state, but also, surrounding states, intent on 
obtaining some concession from this aspiring member, have dangled membership approval 
over Slovenia, contingent upon certain bilateral agreements. Thus, pressure on the state 
has come at both the multilateral and bilaterallevels. 1° For instance, both Italy and Austria 
successfully used Slovenia's overarching goal of EU accession to settle their own issues 
with Slovenia, alternately blocking or stalling the accession process and making their 
approval for EU membership contingent on Slovenia' s settlement of bilateral issues.11 This 
9 This article in Slovenia' s 199 1 Constitution basically barred foreigners from owning land in 
Slovenia, except in specific cases. ina Bandelj , "Negotiating Global, Regional, and National Forces: 
Foreign rnvestment in Slovenia," East European Politics and Societies 18, no. 3 (2004): 464-469. 
10 Zlatko Sabic, "Slovenia and the European Union: A Different Kind of Two-Level Game," in 
Norms and Nannies: The Impact ofl nternationa/ Organizations on the Central and East European States , 
ed. Ronald H. Linden (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2002), 93 , 100. 
11 Sabic ' argument provides an extensive discussion of the ftaly and Austria ' s manipulation of 
the approval process to settle a variety of issues left over from previous eras, as far back as World War II. 
Sabic, "Slovenia and the European Union," I 04- 11 3. 
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amplified the effects of EU-dominance on the national agenda and forced the state to add 
more items to their Hst of policy priorities; essentially, the concerns of out ide interests 
altered Slovenia' domestic political agenda. This meant that opportunities to deal with 
issues unrelated to the EU accession became narrowed as a significant amount of time on 
the Parliamentary agenda concerned EU accession issues. For the Church, which sought 
remedies to several outstanding issues, this represented a constraint; the Church would 
have to wait until Slovenia was finished with meeting the conditions of acces ion to see any 
resolution in its relationship with the state. Also, the Slovene government never obtained 
any concessions in its treaty agreement with the EU that would allow it to maintain its 
legislative powers in areas ofpublic morality as had the Polish government. 12 This appears 
to further confine the Church to its marginal role in Slovene politics and reduces the 
Slovene government's ability to independently enact legislation that would be consistent 
with the Church's values about public morality. 
Both recent additions to the EU, Poland and Slovenia continue to face similar 
challenges. Attaining membership was only a small part of the membership process for 
Poland and Slovenia. Now that both countrie are members, their priorities will shift, but 
not away from the EU. Rather, politics will focus on successfully integrating with the EU 
and deriving benefits from membership in the organization. Also, their new roles as 
12 The main concessions in the EU treaty that the Slovene government obtained related to its 
power over the regional division of its territory and the protection of an indigcnou honey bee. Republic of 
Slovenia, National Assembly, " EU Law - Basic Documents of Primary Legislation: The Treaty of 
Accession." 
- --------~-~~~~~-
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members of the EU circumscribe the range of policies and activities that are available to 
these two states because they must now exist within the limits of norms and expectations of 
this political and economic union. This means that as a condition of membership, both 
Polish and Slovene laws should subscribe to both written and unwritten norms of the 
European community of which it is now a part. It follows that both the Polish and Slovene 
governments must consider both foreign and domestic policy carefully to comply with the 
norms of the EU. This further opens each country to the influence of the liberal values and 
norms which dominate much ofwestern Europe. This liberal influence, which runs 
contrary to the Church's traditionalist values, repre ents a significant threat to the Church 
in its crusade for political power. As each state is pulled further and further into the 
western European fold and the range of policy options is subscribed by western liberal 
values, can the Church wield political influence over major issues and morally guide their 
respective nations? In Slovenia, liberal values have been dominant for some time and the 
Church is both politically and culturally weak. Thus, the main threat to the Church is that it 
will have even fewer opportunities to regain some of the influence that it lost decades ago. 
However, as a dominant political power, the Polish Church has much more to lose. The 
increasing influence of liberal values on government policy threatens the Church's ability to 
impress Roman Catholic values on the Polish state, as well as its efforts to maintain Poland 
as a stronghold of traditional Roman Catholicism. Thus, it seems that the Church's choice 
to support EU integration in Poland, while providing temporary influence over government 
policy, could ultimately reduce the Church's opportunities for influence over the 
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development of the Polish state. 
Summary 
A pragmatic political consensus between most major political players placed both 
Poland and Slovenia on the path to integration with western Europe. The Church, caught 
up in this current of change, became an active, public supporter ofEU integration in 
Poland, but stayed largely on the sidelines in Slovenia. For the Polish Church, this 
pragmatic move seemed to result in a significant victory for its traditionalist views with the 
inclusion of a moral protection clause in Poland's treaty of accession with the EU. 
Conversely, the Slovene Church, a consistently marginal player in Slovene politics, 
maintained that position throughout much of the debate and accession process, regardless 
of its views on EU integration and gained little to nothing from the proces . The differing 
roles and results for each Church are another reflection of the disparate political 
opportunity structures that exist for the Church in each country; that is, it underscores the 
relatively prominent place of the Polish Church as opposed to the Slovene Church in their 
respective national political discourses. Although EU integration demonstrates this 
disparity, it has the potential to result in similar consequences for both Churches by 
circumscribing member states within a particular range of secularist values and norms, 
thereby narrowing political opportunities to imprint the Church's traditionalist orientations 
on national policy. Because of its relatively higher status in its national political and social 
realms, the Polish Church has a great deal to lose from the infiltration of secularism. Even 
with the moral protection clause, which gives the state the right to independently Legislate 
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about moral issue , the Church's traditionalist values are not protected. As society changes 
to accommodate the new values that permeate the European community, government 
decision-makers and society also have the option of incorporating those values into their 
own legislation over the traditionalist values of the Church. The pre-existing incorporation 
of secular and liberal values in Slovenia, as well as the Slovene Church's relatively weaker 
position, means that very little will likely change for the Slovene Church; its opportunities 
will continue to be restricted around pecific issues. 
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Table I 
Election Results to the Sejm of the Rep ubi ic of Poland on 27 October 1991 
Election Conun]ttees Resul ts 
in Po lish in English Percentage of Vote* Elected Deputies 
Unia Demokrayczna Democratic Union 12.3 62 
Sojusz Lewicy Democratic Left Alli ance 12 60 Demokratycznej (SLD) 
Wyborcza Akcja Katolicka Catholic Electoral Action 8.7 49 
Porozumienie Obywatelskie Center Alliance 8.7 44 Centrum 
Polskie Stronnictwo Ludowe Polish Peasant Party 8.7 48 
"Sojusz Programowy" 
Konfederacja Polski Confederati on Independent 7.5 46 
Niepodleglej Po land 
Kongres Liberalno- Liberal Democratic Congress 7.5 37 Demokratyczny 
Ruch Ludowy "Porozumienie 
Peasant Alliance 5.5 28 Ludowe" 
Niezalei:ny Samorzqdny 5.1 27 
Zwiqzek Zawodowy Solidarity 
"Solidam osc" 
Polska Partia Przyjaci61 Piwa Polish Beer-Lovers ' Party 3.3 16 
Chrzescijaitska Demokracja Christian Democracy 2.4 5 
Unia Polityki Realnej Real Politics Union 2.3 3 
Solidamosc Pracy Union of Labour 2. 1 4 
Stronnictwo Demokratyczne Democratic Party 1.4 I 
Mniejszosc Niemieska German Minority 1.2 7 
Partia Chrzescijar\skich Christian Democratic Party 1.1 4 Demokrat6w 
Partia "X" Party X 0.5 3 
Ruch Demokratyczno- 0.5 I 
Spoleczny 
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Election Committees Results 
Ludowe Porozumienie 0.4 I 
Wyborcze " Piast" 
Autonomia Sl<}ska Movement for Autonomy of 0.4 2 Silesia 
Krakowska Koalicja Krakow Coalition of 0.2 1 
Soliamosci z Prezydentem Solidarity and the President 
Zwi<}zek Podhalariski 0.2 1 
Polski Zwi<}zek Zachodni 0.2 4 
Wielkopolska Polsce 0.2 I 
Jednosc Ludowa (woj. 0.2 1 
bygoskie) 
Prawoslawni 0.1 I 
Solidarnosc "80" Solidarity "80" 0. 1 1 
Unia Wielkopolan Okrygu 0.1 I 
Leszczyr\.skiego 
Sojusz Kobiet Przeciwko 0 I 
Trudnosciom Zycia 
Total 460 
Source: Republic of Poland, Gl6wny UrZ<}d Statystyczny [Central Statistical Office]. "TA BL. 3( 103). 
Wyniki Wybor6w do Sejmu Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej Wedlug Komitet6w Wyborczych w Dniu 27 X 199 1 
R. ," in Rocznik Statystyczny 1993 [Statistical Yearbook 1993}, 66. Warsawa: Gl6wny Urz<}d 
Statystyczny, 1993. 
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Table 2 
Election Results to the Sejm of the Republic of Poland, 19 September 1993 
Election Committees Results 
in Polish in English Percentage of Vote* Elected 
Deputies 
Sojusz Leicy Demokratycznej Democratic Left Alliance 20.4 171 (SLD) 
Polskie Stronnictwo Ludowe Polish Peasant Party 15.4 132 (PSL) 
Unia Demokratyczna Democratic Union 10.6 74 
Unia Pracy Union of Labour 7.3 41 
Katolicki Komitet Wyborczy Catholic Election Committee 6.4 --
"Ojczyzna" "Homeland" 
Konfederacja Polski Confederation of Independent 5.8 22 
Niepodleglej Poland 
Bezpartyjny Blok Wspierania Non-Party Refonn Bloc 5.4 16 
Reform BBWR 
Niezalei:ny Samorz~dny 4.9 --
Zwi~zek Zawadowy Solidarity 
"SolidarnosC" 
Porozumienie Centrum Center Alliance 4.4 --
Kongres Liberalno- Liberal Democratic Congress 4 --Demokratyczny 
Unia Polityki Realnej Real Politics Union 3.2 --
Samoobrona-Leppera Self-Defense 2.8 --
Partia "X" Party X 2.7 --
Towarzystwa Spoleczno- 0.6 3 
Kulturalne Mniejszo · ci Gern1an Minority 
Niemiekiej 
Pozostale 6. 1 I 
Total 460 
Source: Republic of Poland, Gl6wny Urz~d Statystyczny [Central Statistical Office]. "TABL. 3( 11 2). 
Wyniki Wybor6w do Sejmu Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej Wedlug Komitet6w Wyborczych w Dniu 19 IX 1993 
R.," in Rocznik Statystyczny /994 [Statistical Yearbook 1994}, 77. War awa: Gl6wny Urz~d 
Statystyczny, 1994. 
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Table 3 
Election Results to the Sejm of the Republic of Poland, 2 1 September 1997 
Election Committees Results 
Percentage of Number of Elected 
in Polish in English Vote* Votes Deputies 
( 1000s) 
Akcja Wyborcza Solidarity Electoral 33.83 44274 201 
Solidamosc (A WS) Action 
Sojusz Leicy Democratic Left Alliance 27.13 35512 164 Demokratycznej (SLD) 
Unia Wolnosi (UW) Freedom Union 13.37 17495 60 
Polskie Stronnictwo Polish Peasant Party 7.31 9562 27 Ludowe (PSL) 
Ruch Odbudowy Polski Movement for the 5.56 727 1 6 Reconstruction ofPoland ROP (ROP) 
Unia Pracy Union of Labour 4.78 6206 --
Krajowa Partia Emeryt6w National Pensioners ' and 2. 18 2848 --Retired Persons ' Party -i Rencist6w (K.PEiR) K.PEiR 
Unia Przwicy Right Wing Union of the 2.03 2663 --
Rezeczpospo I i tej Republic of Po land 
Krajowe Porosumienie National Pensioners ' and 1.63 2 128 --
Emeryt6w i Rencist6w Retired Persons' Alliance 
Blok dia Polski Bloc for Poland 1.37 1784 --
Mnijszosc Nierruecka na Slijsk Opolski Gennan 0.39 510 2 
Slijsku Opolskim Minority 
Pozostale Other 0.49 629 --
Total 130882 460 
*Data not prov1ded by source; manual calculation reqwred from the number of votes cast for each 
committee divided by the total number of votes cast, multiplied by I 00. 
Source: Republic of Poland, Central Statistical Office. 'T ABL. 2(48). Results of the Election to the Sejm 
of the Republic of Poland on 2 1 IX 1997, by Election Committees," in Statistical Yearbook oft he Republic 
of Poland 1998, 38-39. Warsaw: Central Statistical Office, 1998. 
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Table 4 
Election Resul ts to the Sejm of the Republic of Poland on 23 September 200 I 
Election Comm.ittees Results 
in Polish in English Percentage of Vote Elected 
Deputies 
Sojusz Leicy Demokratycznej Democratic Left Alliance- 41.04 216 
(SLD)-Unia Pracy Labour Union 
Platfom1a Obywatelska Civic Platform 12.68 65 
Samboobrona Rzeczpospolitej Self-defense of the Republic of 10.2 53 
Polskiej Poland 
"Prawo i Sprawiedliwosc" "Law and Justice" 9.5 44 
Polsk.ie Stronnictwo Ludowe Polish Peasant Party 8.98 42 
Liga Polskich Rodzin League of Polish Families 7.87 38 
Akcja Wyborcza Solidamosc Solidarity E lection Action 5.6 --
Prawicy Right Wing 
Unia Wolnosci Freedom Union 3.1 --
"Mniejszosc Niemiecka" "Gem1an Minority" 0.36 2 
Pozostale Others 0.66 --
Total LOO 460 
Source: Republic of Poland, Central Statistical Office. "T ABL. 2(49). Results of the Eleciton to the Sejm 
of the Republic of Poland on 23 IX 2001, by Election Committees," in Statistical Yearbook of the Republic 
ofPoland 2004, 128- 129. Warsaw: Central Statistical Office, 2004. 
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Table 5 
Election Results to the Sejm of the Republic of Poland, 25 September 2005 
Election Committees Results 
in Polish in English Percentage of Vote* Elected 
Deputies 
Prawai Sprawiedlwosc (PiS) Law and Justice 26.99 155 
Platforma Obywatelska (PO) Civic Platfonn 24. 14 133 
Samoobrona Rzeczpospolitej Self-Defense of the Republic 11.4 1 56 
Polskiej (SO) of Poland 
Sojusz Leicy Demokratycznej Democratic Left Alliance 11.31 55 (SLD) 
Liga Polskich Rodzin (LPR) League of Polish Families 7.97 34 
Polskie Stronnictwo Ludowe Polish Peasant Party 6.96 25 (PSL) 
Socialdemokracja Polskiej Social Democracy of Poland 3.89 0 (SDPL) 
Partia Demokratycznaj- Democratic Party 2.45 0 demkraci.pl 
"Mnijszosci iemieckiej Gennan Minority 0.05 2 Sla~ka" 
Total 460 
Source: Panstowa Komisija Wyborcza. Wybmy do Sejmu Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej Zarz<tdzone na Dzien: 
Wyniki Wybor6w 25 Wrzesnia 2005 [Elections to the Sejm of the Republic of Poland: Election Results 25 
September 2005} [online]. Warsawa: Rezeczypospolitej Polskiej , 2005. Available from 
http://www.wybory2005 .pkw.gov.pi/SJM/PLIWYN/Miindex.htm Internet: accessed 29 September 2005. 
Note: Although a greater number of electoral committees took part in the electoral contest, this table has 
been limited to display only the top 8 parties, by popular vote, as well as all those who attained seats in the 
Sejm. 
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Table 6 
Election Results to the Senate of the Republic of Poland on 25 September 2005 
Election Committees 
in Polish in English Elected Deputies 
Prawai Sprawiedlwosc (PiS) Law and Justice 49 
Platfonna Obywatelska (PO) Civic Platfonn 34 
Liga Polskich Rodzin (LPR) League of Polish Families 7 
Samoobrona Rzeczpospolitej Polskiej Self-Defense of the Republic of Poland 3 (SO) 
Polskie Stronnictwa Ludowego (PSL) Polish Peasant Party 2 
Nowy Senat 2005 I 
Kazimeiera Juliana Kutza I 
Wyborc6w prof. Mariana Milka I 
Wyborc6w Macieja Ptazyskiego I 
Wyborc6w Bogdana Borusewicza I 
Total 100 
Source: Panstowa Komisija Wyborcza. Wybory do Senatu Rzeczypospolilej Polskiej Zarzt~dzone na Dzieil: 
Wyniki Wybor6w 25 Wruisnia 2005 [Elections to the Senate of the Republic ofPoland: Election Results 25 
September 2005] [online]. Warsawa: Rezeczypospolitej Polskiej , 2005. Available from 
http://www.wybory2005 .pkw.gov.pl/SJM/PL/WYN!Miindex.htrn Internet: accessed 29 September 2005. 
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Table I 
National Assembly of the Republic of Slovenia, 1992 Election Results 
List of Candidates Results 
in Slovenian in English Percentage ofVote Elected Deputies 
Liberalno-demokratska Liberal Democratic Party 23.5 22 
stranka (LOS) 
Slovenski krscanski Slovenian Christian 14.5 15 
demokrati (SKD) Democrats 
Zdruzena lista (ZLSD) The United List 13.6 14 
Slovenska nacionalna Slovenian National Party 10 12 
stranka (SNS) 
Slovenska ljudska Slovenian People's Party 8.7 10 
stranka(SLS) 
Demokratska Democratic Party 5 6 
stranka(DEMOKRA TJ) 
Zeleni S lovenije The Green Party 3.7 5 
(ZELENJ) 
Socialdemokratska Social Democratic Party 3.3 4 
stranka Sloveij e(SDSS) of Slovenia 
Jtalijanska narodna Italian national 
-
I 
skupnost community 
representative* 
Madzarksa narodna Hungarian national 
-
I 
skupnost community 
representative* 
Total --- 90 
*These seats are he ld fo r each nationality and elected by maJonty vote. 
Source: Republic of Slovenia, Statistical Office of the Republic of Slovenia "5.2 National Assembly of the 
Republic of Slovenia, 1992 elections," Statistical Yearbook 2004 [online]. Available from 
http://www.stat.si/ letopis/2004/05 _04/05-02-04. htm?j ezik=en Internet: accessed 18 August 2005. 
295 
Table 2 
National Assembly of the Republic of Slovenia, 1996 Election Results 
List of Candidates Results 
in Slovenian in English Percentage of Vote Elected Deputies 
Liberalna demokratska Liberal Democrats of 27.01 25 
Slovenije (LDS) Slovenia 
Slovenska ljudska stranka Slovenian People's Party 19.38 19 
(SLS) 
Socialdemokratska Social Democratic Party 16.13 16 
stranka Slovenije (SDS) of Slovenia 
Slovenski krscanski Slovenian Christian 9.62 10 
demokrati (SKD) Democrats 
Zdruzena lista socialnih The United List of Social 9.03 9 
demokratov (ZLSD) Democrats 
Demokraticna stranka Democratic Party of 4.32 5 
upokojencev SlovenUe Retired Persons of 
(DeSUS) Slovenja 
Slovenska nacionalna Slovenian National Party 3.22 4 
stranka (SNS) 
ltalijanska narodna Italian national 
-
I 
skupnost community 
representative* 
Madzarksa narodna Hungarian national 
-
I 
skupnost community 
representative* 
Total --- 90 
*These seats are reserved for each nationality and elected by majority vote. 
Source: Republic of Slovenia, Statistical Office of the Republic of Slovenia, "5.3 National Assembly of the 
Republic of Slovenia, 1996 elections," Statistical Yearbook 2004 [online]. Available from 
http://www.stat.si/letopis/2004/05 _04/05-03-04.htm?jezik=en Internet: accessed 18 August 2005. 
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Table 3 
National Assembly of the Republic of Slovenia, 2000 Election Results 
List of Candidates Results 
in English in Slovenian Percentage of Vote Elected Deputies 
Liberalna demokratska Liberal Democrats of 36.2 1 34 
Slovenije (LDS) Slovenia 
Socialdemokratska Social Democratic Party 15.8 14 
stranka Slovenije (SDS) of Slovenia 
Zdmzena lista socialnih The United List of Social 12.07 ll 
demokratov (ZLSD) Democrats 
SLS + SKD Slovenska Slovenian People's Party 9.53 9 
ljudska stranka 
(SLS+SKD) 
ova Slovenija - New Slovenia- Christian 8.77 8 
krscanska lj udska stranka People's Party 
(NSi) 
Demokraticna stranka Democratic Party of 5.16 4 
upokojencev Slovenije Retired Persons of 
(DeS US) Slovenia 
Slovenska nacionalna Slovenian National Party 4.38 4 
stranka (SNS) 
Stranka mladih Slovenije Party of Young People of 4 .33 4 
(SMS) Slovenia 
Italijanska narodna Italian national 
-
I 
skupnost community 
representative* 
Madzarksa narodna Hungarian national 
-
I 
skupnost community 
representative* 
Total --- 90 
*These seats are reserved for each nattonahty and elected by maJonty vote. 
Source: Republic of Slovenia, Statistical Office of the Republic of Slovenia "5.4 National Assembly of the 
Republic of Slovenia, 1996 elections," Statistical Yearbook 2004 (online]. Available from 
http://www.stat.si/letopis/2004/05 _04/05-04-04.htm?jezik=en Internet: accessed 18 August 2005. 
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Table 4 
National Assembly of the Republic of Slovenia, 2004 Election Results 
List of Candidates Results 
in Slovenian in English Percentage of Vote Elected Deputies 
Slovenska demokratska Slovenian Democratic 29.08 29 
stranka (SDS) Party 
Liberalna demokracija Liberal Democracy of 22.08 23 
Slovenije (LOS) Slovenia 
Zdruzena lista socialnih The United List of Social 10.17 10 
demokratov (ZLSD) Democrats 
Nova Slovenija - New Slovenia- Christian 9.09 9 
Krscanska ljudska People's Party 
tranka (NSi) 
Slovenska ljudska stranka Slovenian People's Party 6.82 7 
(SLS) 
Slovenska nacionalna Slovenian National Party 6.27 6 
stranka (SNS) 
Demokraticna stranka Democratic Party of 4.04 4 
upokojencev Slovenije Retired Persons of 
(DeS US) Slovenia 
rtalijanska narodna Italian national I 
-
skupnost community 
representative* 
Madzarksa narodna Hungarian national 
-
I 
skupnost community 
representative* 
Total --- 90 
*These seats are reserved for each nationality and elected by majority vote. 
Source: Republic of Slovenia, Statistical Office of the Republic of S lovenia "5.5 National As embly of the 
Republic of Slovenia, 1996 elections," Statistical Yearbook 2004 [online]. Available from 
http://www.stat.si/letopis/2004/05 _04/05-05-04.htm?jezik=en Internet: accessed I 8 August 2005. 




